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
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
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1948



**Christian Paths to
Self-Acceptance**





Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance

ROBERT H. BONTHIUS

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TO MY FATHER

*Whose love and trust have been
my constant encouragement*

Preface

ADVANCES IN SCIENCE OFFER RELIGION the alternatives of resistance or assimilation. Religion may oppose new knowledge, a procedure which since Galileo has usually impaired its own effective witness, or it may try to profit by it, in which case its concepts may be enriched and its techniques improved. Today dynamic medical psychology, that is, the Freudian school and other schools of psychotherapy which have arisen in the process of modifying and developing Freudian theory and practice, is presenting these alternatives to religion. Religion is reacting both ways. Some fear that modern psychotherapy menaces religious work, even threatens to take it over. Others feel that psychology provides illumination which religion can well use to make its own distinctive message more relevant and redemptive than ever before.

This study assumes the second attitude. Its aims is to re-examine Christian ideas of self-acceptance, ideas of the way man should look at himself, of the way he should accept himself, of the manner in which he should treat himself, in the light of modern psychotherapy's discoveries about self-acceptance. While the term self-acceptance is taken from the vocabulary of psychology and is not commonly used in religious circles, religion—Christianity at least—may rightly be said to be concerned with it always. For the various distinctive expressions of Christianity seek to teach man about himself as well as about God. Ideally they inform man about his nature and his place in the universe, they enlighten him about his duties and his destiny, they inspire him with ideals for living. In such ways they teach and encourage self-acceptance of one type and another.

It is just at this point (among others) that dynamic medical psychology has significant contributions to make to religion. In-

tensive work with maladjusted individuals has revealed the destructive (from the standpoint of mental health) effects of certain attitudes toward the self and the constructive results of other self-estimates. What is more, we know now that healthy self-acceptance is a *sine qua non* of spiritual well-being. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the appraisals which make up the individual's attitude toward himself influence his appraisals of others, so that in a very real sense he can love others only as he loves himself. Such striking certainties indicate the fateful significance of religion's work: evidently the various Christian ideas of self-acceptance may work great good or tremendous harm upon the individuals and the societies in which they operate. Christian leaders ought to know more about all this in order to insure the benign effect of their gospel upon man.

Moreover, we can no longer assume that religion's effect upon man is uniformly good. As a matter of psychotherapeutic record—case histories included in this study will testify—certain expressions of Christianity have actually complicated self-acceptance to the point of frustration. It would seem that those who are interested in or responsible for religion have virtually a moral obligation to re-examine their teachings and practices in the light of the new knowledge to see whether they are contributing to the maladjustment of personality or to its security and growth.

Again, the fact that many sick souls in our generation are seeking out psychiatrists rather than priests for spiritual aid suggests the wisdom of religious self-criticism. In any foreseeable future there is plenty of room for religious counselling. Christianity's representatives may regain their respected places in the eyes of the spiritually needy, but this possibility is unlikely unless they assimilate some of the healing knowledge unearthed by their secular brethren.

From a psychotherapeutic point of view it is possible to distinguish three great historical pathways to self-acceptance within Christianity. Each stresses different values and has distinctive strengths and weaknesses from the standpoint of mental health. Viewed from this perspective and with special regard for healthy

self-acceptance, these three Christian ideas may be described as the rejectionist, the forensic, and the meliorist. They are presented in this order; in each chapter the theological doctrines which inspire the particular concept of self-acceptance are presented along with the actual steps toward fuller self-acceptance which each advocates and provides for. The fourth chapter presents a psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance with seven case histories from dynamic psychology of typical relevance for Christian views of self-acceptance. In this light the Christian pathways are reconsidered, and the common elements of the three pathways are appraised.

I hope that these chapters will convey my conviction that through the centuries Christianity in its varied expressions has helped man to find self-acceptance of high and healthy types. Indeed, recognizing this, the concluding chapter points to particular strengths of each pathway and to strengths common to all. On the assumption, however, that religion as well as science has much to learn, certain weaknesses and dangers of each path and of all three are indicated. Throughout the study it is my endeavor to deal in the most constructive way possible with Christianity, and to relate dynamic medical psychology to it in ways which can enrich its views and benefit its approaches to man.

This study was inspired by many teachers as well as by experiences in private life and public ministry. I am inexpressibly grateful to Professor Horace L. Friess of Columbia University. His stimulating ideas and penetrating criticisms helped at every stage of the work. I wish to thank Professors John C. Bennett and David L. Roberts of Union Theological Seminary for their valuable suggestions. Dr. Sandor Rado, clinical professor of psychiatry at Columbia University, provided indispensable technical advice with regard to psychotherapy. The Religion and Health Seminar discussions of Columbia University also provided profitable material for this study. Finally I want to acknowledge the assistance of my wife in preparing the manuscript and encouraging the writer.

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R.H.B.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Rejectionist Pathway to Self-Acceptance

WE FIND IN JOHN CALVIN a man of remarkable productivity and admirable dedication. It is obvious that he found something from which he derived the self-acceptance evidenced in his impassioned life and work. What this something was he described in religious terms. He called it God. And the way by which he found Him illustrates one of the classic pathways to self-acceptance espoused by Christianity, nowhere more clearly explained than in the writings of the Geneva reformer himself. Calvin found this particular path outlined for him in the Scriptures. It is epitomized in Paul's adjuration to the Romans: "Present your bodies [as] a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God." ¹ This means, wrote Calvin, that

we are not our own; therefore neither our reason nor our will should predominate in our deliberations and actions. We are not our own; therefore let us not propose it as our end, to seek what may be expedient for us according to the flesh. *We are not our own; therefore let us, as far as possible, forget ourselves and all things that are ours.* On the contrary, we are God's; to him, therefore, let us live and die. . . . We are God's; toward him therefore, as our only legitimate end, let every part of our lives be directed. . . . Let this, then, be the first step, to depart from ourselves, that we may apply all the vigour of our faculties to the service of the Lord.²

This is the rejectionist pathway: the service of God in which the self is renounced. In the Latin, *rejicio* means (narrowly) to cast behind or to throw back, as one throws a cloak back on the shoulders in order to leave the hands free. So the self is to be put out of the way in the interest of doing the divine will in every area of life. "To deny

yourself and discard all selfish considerations, and to devote your whole attention to the pursuit of those things which the Lord requires of you,"³—this, declared Calvin, with Christians of many lands and eras, is "the first entrance into life."⁴

For the most part this precept of self-rejection issues from the spiritual experiences and the theology of twice-born men, to use William James's descriptive term. Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Fox, and Bunyan—all more or less fully represent renunciation and despair of self and the whole natural human organism. They place their hope solely in the transforming work of the Divine Spirit.

It was at the time of the Reformation that rejectionism came to full flower. The Reformers censured the Roman Catholic Church because they believed it frustrated man's possibilities for salvation by not depending sufficiently on God. They charged the Church of Rome with focusing on man—man's history and his traditions, man's intelligence and his natural powers, man's good will and his capacity for grace. Their own disposition was to depend wholly upon God. They placed no hope in anything human. Even in their most famous doctrine, justification by faith, they stressed nothing so much as the idea that it is God who accomplishes this justification.⁵ We have in the Reformation and especially in Calvinism what Professor N. P. Williams has described as "a colossal recrudescence of the rigidly 'twice-born' anthropology [and soteriology], combined with a remorseless accentuation of all its sternest lineaments."⁶ This Reformed Protestantism contains the fullness of the view we have called rejectionism.

All through the history of Protestantism in America one finds prominent advocacy of Christian self-rejection. The puritans are sterling examples of it. Self-rejection and God-centeredness were central for them. And certainly their influence in this respect has been pervasive in our religious life up to and including the present era. Not only have the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists and others whose theological background is Calvinistic proclaimed rejectionism; Methodist and Baptist groups, despite their Arminian heritage, have led American Protestantism in perhaps less thoroughgoing but more emotional paths of renunciation and surrender.

Holiness groups, too, and Fundamentalists of many types advocate rejectionism of sorts, stressing ecstatic self-emptying and sudden supernatural transformation. In America these all are representatives of the way to self-acceptance here to be presented. Their common conviction is that human well-being lies in utter dependence upon the Living God and upon the casting off of self-consideration.

Before presenting the theological doctrines which inspire this view, we must mention the means by which it has been propagated through the centuries. For the most part, of course, this has been the task of preachers and teachers connected with the churches. It is a matter of principle with these advocates that little is made of ecclesiastical rites. Their spiritual forefathers warred against the Mass, penance, the cultus of the saints, pilgrimages, monasticism, and other external works and forms. The visible church is still important, but subjectively rather than objectively. The church is the church as men gather to hear the word of God "purely preached" and receive the two sacraments (Baptism and the Lord's Supper) administered in the Biblical way. Preaching and Holy Communion are the most important corporate channels of divine salvation for rejectionists, especially since the Reformation. Important also is individual pursuance of the way. Great emphasis is placed upon personal prayer and Bible study in catechetical classes, for example, and in the family circle. Robert Burns draws the picture of this individualized form of Protestant procedure in his homely poem, "The Cotter's Saturday Night."

The Bible is the very basis of this point of view—the Bible as interpreted by the particular church, it must be admitted. The Holy Scriptures play a more central role here than in either of the other Christian pathways we shall present. When the individual guides himself by the Bible and is illuminated inwardly by the Spirit of God he has the rule of faith and life. What more is needed? This is the lustrous light upon the rejectionist path which leads to the highest—reconciliation with God—and, as a consequence, self-acceptance.

THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REJECTION

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD

Central among the beliefs which lead to the advocacy of self-rejection is the concept of the transcendent majesty and power of God. We may well cite Isaiah's vision of the Lord, "sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up," and the prophet's resultant cry of despair, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips." ⁷

- The viewpoint we are considering is grounded in the Biblical conception of God as the Eternal Judge and Lawgiver, the Inscrutable Ruler of the universe. To be sure, there is even in Calvin, who made the most extreme emphasis on God's sovereignty, the sense of God's loving-kindness and tender mercy. It is all a matter of emphasis, and in Christian rejectionism the emphasis falls upon sovereignty, the transcendence, even the mystery of God, *Deus absconditus*.⁸

One of the most significant features of this theology from the standpoint of self-acceptance is its frank embracing of the irrational and contradictory elements which characterize human existence. While confident that God is the Sovereign Lord of creation, those who hold this view feel that man cannot come to a satisfactory understanding of creation by any stretch of his reason or his imagination. God, the Ground of all Being, remains unknown. He can only be trusted. Like Calvin of the sixteenth century, Karl Barth in this century has stressed God's transcendent greatness. Consider the following passage as typical:

God is ever transcendent to man, new, remote, foreign, surpassing, never in man's sphere, never man's possession; whoso says God, says miracle. Indeed God stands as Either-Or before man's soul; over against God there is therefore an electing or rejecting, an affirming or negating, a waking or a sleeping, understanding or misunderstanding of man. [Nevertheless] *so far as it comes on the human side to an affirming and understanding of God, so far as the psychological process receives the direction of God, determination by God, which accepts the form of faith, there appears the impossible, miracle, paradox.*⁹

The spirit here represented is evidently not afraid of perplexities, unanswerable questions, or logical impossibilities. Its faith rests in the Determining Sovereign who now as justice, now as mercy, now as wrath, and now as love works out His own inscrutable design. "When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so," declared Calvin, "the answer must be, Because he would." Nothing higher than the will of God can ever be found.¹⁰ For this form of faith life's most damning paradoxes are not insuperable. As Frederick W. Faber put it in a hymn:

*Ill that he blesses is our good,
And unblest good is ill,
And all is right that seems most wrong,
If it be His sweet will.*¹¹

Significant also for self-acceptance is the religious and moral judgment of man involved. The Calvinist idea of God, in so many ways similar to the Hebrew conception of Yahweh, knows Him to be Will. His will, of course, is a loving one; it is *agape*. But here is the rigor of this view—His will for man is *agape* also. "Thou [O Man!] shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." And, "Thou [O Man!] shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."¹² This is the divine imperative everywhere the same and equally binding. "What is demanded," interprets Reinhold Niebuhr, another brilliant exemplar of this view, "is an action in which regard for the self is completely eliminated."¹³ Historically such an interpretation of the divine will often has led to welcome martyrdom, but the modern conception does not lead to such a drastic conclusion.¹⁴ God does not require man to throw himself away, declares the well-known Swiss theologian, Emil Brunner. God simply asks man to regard himself as an instrumentality of the Divine Spirit, something which is possible only through constant surrender of the total personality to Him.¹⁵

The religious and moral judgment in this view arises out of the fact that it sees no man living unto God in the way described. On the contrary, it sees man seeking to establish his own security by his own means rather than centering in and trusting the

Sovereign God. However, this does not, cannot, qualify man's sacred obligation; the lines of religious and moral requirement are held taut. No man, natural or regenerate, is excused. In the words of Brunner:

Every human "I," is in the last resort a being who seeks himself. This self-seeking may be refined, but is indissolubly bound up with our present existence. In this sense the harsh saying of Grisebach, "The Self is the Evil," is absolutely true. Our life—even though we may be very "socially-minded" and friendly towards other people—ultimately circles round ourselves as the central point. We only absorb our neighbor as it were into our circle, but no effort avails to enable us to break through this charmed circle of self-interest. *To all of us, without exception, the command to "love one's neighbor as oneself" becomes a sentence of condemnation.*¹⁶

And yet, despite the awful persistence of the moral contradiction between what man is and what he ought to be, there is a way out which Almighty God himself has provided. On man's part it calls for sublime self-rejection:

- In the life of faith the sacrifice of Christ becomes the Divine Command to deny ourselves. . . . In the language of ethics, to be "in Christ" means the death of the selfish Ego; it means the willed, deliberate mortification of that will whose poison penetrates the whole of our nature—in defiance of our natural self-will; thus *it means an attack "upon oneself," upon the natural self-will in the form of spiritual self-regard, upon the desire to live for self, upon the spiritual tendency to live independently of others, humbly submitting oneself to the claims of others, of the "Thou," becoming "one who serveth."*¹⁷

The ideal for this life is not ascetic in the classical sense of striving for holiness and flight from the world—for that is a kind of self-regard, too, in the eyes of the rejectionist. True renunciation is neither concerned for its own fulfillment nor interested in flight; it is life lived here and now for others; it is pure *agape*, not *eros* in any form however sublimated.¹⁸ This is God's divine imperative. Since even the man of faith never lives up to it, we are led to

see the significance of another tenet of this view: namely, the utter sinfulness of man.

THE SINFULNESS OF MAN

Professor Ernest S. Bates has observed that "the higher the idea of God, the greater the enormity of sin, until if God is regarded as infinite, sin also acquires an infinite character."¹⁹ Exponents of the view we are considering have carried both terms of this relationship to their extremes. As Jonathan Edwards wrote: "God is a being infinitely lovely, because he hath infinite excellency and beauty. . . . His authority over us is infinite; and the ground of his right to our obedience is infinitely strong. . . . So that sin against God, being a violation of infinite obligations, must be a crime infinitely heinous and so deserving of infinite punishment."²⁰ Reformed Protestantism sees sin as a rebellion against God so ✓
inexcusable in its inception and so awful in its results that it is to be reckoned in terms of utmost seriousness.

Indeed, we find that this view does not define sin ultimately in moral terms but in religious ones; the tendency in some cases is to go so far as to convict man not of particular breaches against the life of the human or the divine community, but of being human and not divine.²¹ In any case, the "nicely calculated less and more" of social morality loses most of its significance in the face of the disrupting egocentricity inherent in everything human.

Because the original Reformation and the subsequent Protestant scholastic doctrines of man's depravity are distorted by literalism, we will turn to those in our day who have revived Reformation thought, the so-called neo-orthodox theologians, for explanation of this profound view of sin and its importance for true self-acceptance. It is important to bear in mind, however, that man's sinfulness is still conceived of and preached about in the undialectical forms of the past. Especially is this characteristic of flourishing sectarian bodies here in America—groups which are able to number their adherents in tens of thousands.²²

It is Sören Kierkegaard of Denmark who has provided the key to modern reinterpretation of this austere doctrine of sin with his

analysis of the relation of sin to anxiety. "Dread or anxiety," he explained, "is the psychological condition which precedes sin, comes as near as possible to it, and is as provocative as possible of dread, but without explaining sin, which breaks forth first in the qualitative leap."²³ Kierkegaard saw this "sickness unto death" as an inherent factor in human existence, and he taught that a "synthesis" was needed, by which he meant a vital relationship of man with God by which man may resolve his inner conflicts and live at peace with himself.²⁴

Influenced by these thoughts of Kierkegaard, Reinhold Niebuhr has developed the thesis that man is a creature of two dimensions: "He stands at the juncture of nature and spirit."²⁵ As finite, man is a part of nature, subject to its laws and its vicissitudes; but as self-conscious, man transcends himself, being capable of viewing himself as object, and thus is a creature of spirit. As part of nature he is determined; as spirit he is above nature and free. It is natural to man, therefore, to be in tension between the two; that tension is his anxiety, which is not sin but tempts to sin.²⁶

The temptation to sin, and with it the possibility of inner conflict, arises precisely out of this paradoxical situation: freedom and finitude. In the face of this anxiety and insecurity man inevitably, but not of necessity, sins; that is, he seeks to transmute his finiteness into infinity, his weakness into strength, his dependence into independence."²⁷ We are reminded here of Karl Barth's striking sentence: "All man's will to live is from top to bottom, even if other elements seem also to play their part, an effort of some sort to magnify, to elevate, to extend our self, our little Ego."²⁸ To be sure, there is always the ideal possibility that faith in God may purge anxiety of this tendency toward sinful (and futile) self-assertion. This ideal possibility is symbolized in the life and person of Jesus Christ. Historically, however, man has never taken this path; he has never manifested such perfect trust in the divine security. Instead, he tries characteristically to overcome his limitations and to establish premature securities *for and by himself*.

It should be noted that this doctrine of sin contends that man's corruption is infinitely serious and statistically inevitable because

of the very nature of human existence: yet, all this to the contrary notwithstanding, it holds that sin is not necessary, man is responsible for his egocentricity. Calvin presents this paradox with unusual clarity:

We say, therefore, that man is corrupted by a natural depravity, but which did not originate from nature. We deny that it proceeded from nature, to signify that it is rather an adventitious quality or accident, than a substantial property originally innate. Yet we call it natural, that no one may suppose it to be contracted by every individual from corrupt habit, whereas it prevails over all by hereditary right.²⁹

As Kierkegaard put it, sin "comes neither as a necessity nor by chance."³⁰ The rejectionist account of sin endeavors to join paradoxical ideas: the inevitability of human egocentricity (sinfulness) and man's immeasurable responsibility for it. Proponents of the view freely admit its irrationality but not its irrelevance. As a matter of experience, writes Niebuhr, the ultimate paradox to which this doctrine of original sin points cannot be escaped; namely, "that the final exercise of freedom in the transcendent human spirit is its recognition of the false use of that freedom in action. *Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free.*"³¹

The symptoms of man's sinfulness appear in many different aspects of his temporal life: struggle for power, prestige, and dominance; misuse of rational capacities; hypocrisy and self-righteousness—these forms of unreasonable self-assertion root back, so it is contended, to one basic sin. That sin is trust in self, as contrasted with trust in God. This is pride, and the very practical result of it is the disruption of man's inner and outer life. For man can never persuade himself that he is his own adequate security, even while he tries to be.³² Nor can he ever find full satisfaction in regarding himself as the center of meaning and existence. The only sure and ultimate result of egocentricity is despair, "sickness unto death." Thus, paradoxical as the view may seem, it is contended that when man fails to follow the path of self-rejection he actually fails to derive self-acceptance; and, on the other hand, so

far as he follows the rejectionist road he will find self-acceptance—just how will be shown presently.

Before turning to the third characteristic doctrine of this Christian view, we should mention one more implication of this idea of human sinfulness that has played as conspicuous a role as pride, historically. We refer to the connection of sin and sexuality. Calvin's blunt dogma: "Man is of himself nothing else but concupiscence," describes the inordinate self-love of the total personality.³³ However, for many reasons special attention has been attached to the most vibrant symptom of that concupiscence: inordinate sexuality. Indeed, in Calvinist circles, condemnation sometimes falls upon sexuality *per se* in the name of Christianity.³⁴ Perhaps the "sinfulness" of the very representatives of self-rejection is nowhere better illustrated than in their historic tendency to struggle against fleshly inordinacy at the cost of succumbing (unconsciously) to "spiritual" inordinacy and self-righteousness. Consider, for example, the puritanical offer of marriage which Whitfield made to his sweetheart. Thinking—it must be—to impress her, he wrote: "I bless God, if I know anything of my own heart, I am free from that foolish passion which the world calls love. . . . I trust I love you only for God, and desire to be joined to you only by His commands and for His sake."³⁵ Professor R. B. Perry opines that the marriage ethics of American puritanism were so debased by a similarly unnatural view of marriage that they constitute Calvinism's most notorious failure.³⁶ A viewpoint which teaches or even implies that physical passion is better repressed has grave bearing on self-acceptance, and this must be discussed subsequently. Attention can now be directed to the doctrine popularly known as justification by faith.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH

Most important for the understanding of the Christian rejectionist pathway is its conviction of man's inability to achieve fulfillment. In the last analysis Reformation thought does not look for completion of life in history even with the aid of divine grace;

salvation lies in hope. "Reconciliation is not yet deliverance," as Barth explains, "but the act of God's mercy this side of the boundaries eschatological, between the Fall and redemption."³⁷ The great Luther set forth this doctrine with such clarity and conviction in his commentary on Galatians that we quote it fully:

God is the God of the humble, the miserable, the oppressed, and the desperate, and of those that are brought even to nothing; and his nature is to give sight to the blind, to comfort the broken-hearted, to justify sinners, to save the very desperate and damned. Now that pernicious and pestilent opinion of man's own righteousness, which will not be a sinner, unclean, miserable, and damnable, but righteous and holy, suffereth not God to come to his own natural and proper work. Therefore God must take this maul in hand (the law I mean) to beat in pieces and bring to nothing this beast with her vain confidence, that she may so learn at length by her own misery that she is utterly forlorn and damned. But here lieth the difficulty, that when a man is terrified and cast down, he is so little able to raise himself up again and say, "Now I am bruised and afflicted enough; now is the time of grace; now is the time to hear Christ." The foolishness of man's heart is so great that then he rather seeketh to himself more laws to satisfy his conscience. "If I live," saith he, "I will amend my life: I will do this, I will do that." But here, except thou do the quite contrary, except thou send Moses away with his law, and in these terrors and this anguish lay hold upon Christ who died for thy sins, look for no salvation. Thy cowl, thy shaven crown, thy chastity, thy obedience, thy poverty, thy works, thy merits? what shall all these do? what shall the law of Moses avail? if I, wretched and damnable sinner, through works or merits could have loved the Son of God, and so come to him, what needed he to deliver himself for me? If I, being a wretch and a damned sinner, could be redeemed by any other price, what needed the Son of God to be given? But because there was no other price, therefore he delivered neither sheep, ox, gold, nor silver, but even God Himself, entirely and wholly "for me," even "for me," I say, a miserable, wretched sinner. Now, therefore, I take comfort and apply this to myself. And this manner

of applying is the very true force and power of faith. For he died not to justify the righteous, but the *un-righteous*, and to make *them* the children of God.³⁸

The components of the classic justification by faith idea are all contained in this revelation of Luther's personal experience: (1) conviction of the futility inherent in self-centered forms of fulfillment, accompanied by (2) intention to serve God only; (3) awareness of continued incompleteness and persistent egocentricity, together with (4) implicit trust in God's forgiving love, and hope of transhistorical fulfillment.

The psychological explanation given for the inherent futility of self-centered forms of fulfillment is that man transcends himself indeterminately with the result that only God can be the satisfying center and end of his being.³⁹ According to this doctrine, man must finally despair of his efforts to find security in temporal things, such as wealth or power, or in interpersonal relationships, such as romance. He must discover that he is a helpless but responsible victim of his own egocentricity. "This is harder than all penances, prayers, and the good works of the pious heathen," declares Brunner. "For there is nothing in all the world so humiliating as no longer to trust in one's self."⁴⁰

This conviction of one's vain self-love contains within itself the possibility of a reorientation of life about the only true center and end: namely, God. As Niebuhr puts the case for serving God only: "Human personality is so constructed that it must be possessed if it is to escape the prison of self-possession. The infinite regression of its self-transcendence represent possibilities of freedom which are never actualized in self-possession; for self-possession means self-centredness. The self must be possessed from beyond itself."⁴¹

The great need of man, then, is radical revolution, real repentance, true conversion. What is involved is nothing less than full admission that seeking one's own is contrary to the will of the Sovereign God and recognition that doom accompanies all such attempts. At the same time what is involved is the attitude of complete dependence, "counting on the reality of God," in the words of Barth. In short, revolution, repentance, conversion mean reali-

zation that God alone can and does achieve man's integration, True rejectionism is marked by the intention to serve God only, forgetting oneself. Brunner represents this spirit in the following epitome: "By faith alone then, means not I, but God alone creates my redemption, my salvation, the saving and redeeming of the world; He alone is good, He alone brings to the desired goal—'with might of ours can naught be done;'—that means to rely on God alone, to make God our whole defense."⁴² And, again, "For faith is simply belonging wholly and completely to God."⁴³

While the doctrine of justification does not deny that there may be ecstatic moments when the conflict between self-love and the love of God are transcended, it is acutely aware of continued incompleteness and persistent egocentricity in the life of the most devout believer. This is illuminated by the reminder that as long as man remains in time he remains also in the anxious state of finitude and freedom, which tempts him to persist in sinful, self-centered strategies. Calvin was evidently conscious of this. The saints, he declared, "are still so afflicted with the disease of concupiscence, that they cannot prevent their being frequently stimulated and incited either to lust, or to avarice, or to ambition, or to other vices."⁴⁴ Despite the conviction that, to the end of their lives, believers are saved by grace, not works, "lest any man should boast,"⁴⁵ Calvin himself developed a high doctrine of sanctification under the impetus of his desire to serve God alone.⁴⁶ In this Reformed Protestants in general have followed him, while the neo-orthodox thinkers of today have not.⁴⁷ Barth has expressed the complexity of perfection and sin in this incisive sentence: "Our real life in God consists in nothing else than our admitting to ourselves: we do not live in God, but far from God."⁴⁸

Thus, according to this view, the Christian finally proceeds in the liberating awareness of divine forgiveness despite continued sinfulness, and in the joyous hope of transmundane fulfillment.

Here is the wonderful power of Christian faith, and the wonderful mainstay of our Christian life—the word of the eternal mercy that follows us: that while we decrease, by the mercy of God our inward man increases. . . . Let us first of all stick to

this: here is a hand. God's grace really avails. *Forgiveness avails, lays hold of me just as I am.* I am claimed by God, accepted by God. He does not regard me as too unimportant to use again to-day as he used me yesterday. *He seems to find something in me that I myself cannot find.* It is His goodness. *I shall now keep firm hold of that: for the next task, the next conflict, the next complication. God's grace avails. I have this pledge. And with it I shall now live.*⁴⁹

INTRAMUNDANE ASCETICISM

The sovereignty of God, the sinfulness of man, and justification by faith—do not these doctrines lead to passivity and idleness? For some, perhaps; but for many before and after Calvin who shared his experience and his doctrines, no. One of the most energetic Scotch Calvinists of the nineteenth century, William Cunningham, expressed the significance which the Reformed symbols held for him in this way: they convey "the ineradicable sense which every converted man has, that if God has not chosen him, he never would have chosen God, and that if God, by His Spirit, had not exerted a decisive and determining influence in the matter, he never would have been turned from darkness to light, and been led to embrace Christ as his Saviour. This is really the sum and substance of Calvinism."⁵⁰

Among other things it is an "ineradicable sense" of owing one's very life to the holy and redeeming God that motivates men like Cunningham to such active service of their fellowmen. It is quite understandable that when man conscientiously believes that all of life's blessings come directly from the hand of God he is overwhelmingly conscious of his responsibility to honor the Saviour's name. With this in mind Calvin's exhortation takes on added meaning: "Let this, then, be the first step, to depart from ourselves, that we may apply all the vigour of our faculties to the service of the Lord."⁵¹

Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch have called this pursuit of God's will on earth "intramundane asceticism." Ascetic Protestantism is distinguished from Catholic asceticism by its systematic

utilization of secular means and its communal end, and from Lutheran Protestantism by its concern for the transformation of society.⁵² Neither Catholicism nor Lutheranism has expressed the world-changing activism of Calvinism in any comparable way, especially as seen in the Reformed faith's English and American expressions of the three past centuries.⁵³

Unquestionably there are many motives involved in the various historical types of intramundane asceticism. We have already noted one: profound gratitude. Before characterizing this basic concept of the theological orientation from which self-rejection springs, we may note at least two more. The assurance of salvation in the after-life is a second motive. We must remember that the early moderns still lived in the shadows of deep medieval dread; hell and its flames were commonly regarded as indubitable realities. Calvinism assured the elect that they would know of their election by their continual ability to accomplish good works. While good works remained useless as means of attaining salvation—for man is a sinner as long as he lives—they afforded a most significant means of exorcising fears of damnation.⁵⁴ Puritanism, particularly, abounds with examples of a third motive that is often lost from sight; namely, the real joy which can be found in preoccupation with the glory of God. Consider the testimony of Jonathan Edwards, for whom the majestic sovereignty of God was, as he put it, “not only a conviction, but a *delightful* conviction.” “Absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God,” he wrote. “This I know not how to express otherwise, than by a calm, sweet abstraction from all the concerns of this world; and sometimes a kind of vision, or fixed ideas and imaginations of being alone in the mountains, or some solitary wilderness far from all mankind sweetly conversing with Christ, and rapt and swallowed up in God.”⁵⁵ Evidently obedience is not always blind and oppressive, certainly not for Edwards; it may be intelligent and glad alignment with Him who is supremely attractive, gracious, and inherently worthy of service.

In defining intramundane asceticism Troeltsch offers this statement:

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Calvinism, therefore, creates an intramundane asceticism which logically and comprehensively recognizes all secular means, but which reduces them to means only, without any value in themselves, in order that by the use of all the means available the Holy Community may be created. The method by which all that is secular is reduced to the level of a mere means is a rigorous discipline of the instinctive life, a destruction of all merely instinctive feeling, and the limitation of the sense-life to that which is necessary and useful, the practice of self-discipline and self-control in order to lead a holy life in obedience to the Law of God.⁵⁶

It is apparent that some forms of thought and practice, especially among modern Calvinists, do not agree completely with Troeltsch's analysis. Present day Fundamentalism makes far less demand upon the individual than typical Calvinism does; the ever-recurring tendency today in the well-established Reformed churches is to exalt symbols rather than press for moral commitment; neo-orthodoxy has a thoroughly ethical emphasis but rejects the derogatory estimate of art, pleasure, and marriage which characterizes the Calvinism Troeltsch describes.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that there are elements of the typical intramundane asceticism in all these modern viewpoints; and, what is more important, the type which Weber and Troeltsch describe has been most pervasive in English and American culture for several centuries past. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the established middle-class virtues of our society were promulgated largely through Calvinistic groups. The psychological case histories, which appear in Chapter Four of this study, indicate the great extent to which the moral values germane to the theology which inspires self-rejection are still today the values of bourgeois America.

Common to all viewpoints influenced by Calvinism old and new is the moral rigor, the activism concerned about the realization of the divine community, and the purposeful self-control. Characteristic most particularly of the English and American puritanism, which has permeated our culture so thoroughly, are the following: the derogation of sensuous experience, the idea of work for work's

sake and as a discipline, the unfailing relation of industry to an otherworldly aim, the depreciation of earthly possessions, the willing use of profit for the religious community and for public welfare.⁵⁷ These components of the Christian rejectionist pathway to self-acceptance will be treated with the attention they deserve in the second half of this chapter. To this we turn now in order to survey the actual steps on the road to self-acceptance.

STEPS ON THE REJECTIONIST PATHWAY

REJECTION OF ALL SELF-CENTEREDNESS

Nothing is more important to the proponents of the rejectionist pathway than that man become acutely aware of his need for God. On its negative side this issues in prophetic opposition to all forms of egocentricity. It is said that the sermons of the seventeenth century puritan divines were spiritual charts intended to guide the individual soul out of its hardness and indifference into the consciousness of its lost condition, and then out of this despair through faith in God.⁵⁸ The homiletic approach may vary from age to age and from church to church but the emphasis upon the need for self-despair is constant. Typical of this view is the statement of Kierkegaard: "Despair . . . is a great piece of good fortune and a gift from God to have had it, even though it is the most dangerous illness."⁵⁹

The first step on the rejectionist path is the personal realization that the very something which is necessary to integrate life is not within one's own power to provide, and that continued effort to complete life by and for oneself can only compound inner conflict. Because rejectionists believe that man does not generally see this—indeed, that he often tries not to see it—they take pains to emphasize it. "Individuals must be taught the self-defeating character of every form of egocentricity," so a modern exponent underlines the idea.⁶⁰

We may now ask, what constitutes despair and rejection of self-centeredness? What are the forms of self-centeredness against which the rejectionists inveigh? First of all, they regard the corrupt-

ness and the inadequacy of reason. Man is warned against trusting his reason because, it is held, life can be rightly understood and lived only by faith in divine revelation. In the second place, religious and moral self-sufficiency is attacked. One of the gravest dangers to the human soul is seen in the absolutizing of any finite spiritual form or practice. Again, worldly achievements are regarded with great suspicion, especially by the Calvinistic sectarian groups, because of their tendency to wean the believer away from complete dependence upon God and full devotion to His will. Finally, sensuality is considered to be a most tempting form of egocentricity. Man is exhorted to forsake all fleshly indulgence for the good of his spirit. This view is expressed with greatest rigor by puritanism of the last three centuries and by present day Protestant Fundamentalism.

Rejection of reason.—Christian rejectionism believes that no man can arrive at a true knowledge of himself “without having first contemplated the divine character.” Only in this way can he properly understand himself.⁶¹ This means, in other words, that really to know his nature and what is good for it man must begin not by the exercise of rational objectivity but by personal subjection to God. “To understand himself truly means to begin with a faith that he is understood from beyond himself, that he is known and loved of God and must find himself in terms of obedience to the divine will.”⁶²

The rejectionist contention is not that human reason is incapable of discovering salutary and even inspiring realities and values in the natural world. Art, science, and statecraft testify to the capability of man’s mind. The contention is rather that the ultimate meaning of life is undiscoverable by reason apart from revelation because reason itself is always in search of this meaning. “Human reason is itself involved in the enigma which it tries to comprehend.”⁶³ Moreover, man’s reason is contingent and limited in other ways. He can see and understand only from his particular perspective, from his station, from his point in history, and within his cultural framework. Nor is this all, for it is emphasized that the human understanding is in part dictated by private interest; in-

deed, by self-centeredness. For instance, man uses his reason to accomplish evil as well as good. In face of all this, "the very reason, which modern culture has regarded as God, as the principle of universality and as the guarantor of goodness, is really man's problem and not his answer to the problem." ⁶⁴ The only solution, it is held, is the renunciation of reason and the acceptance of the God "who is not the construct of human reason but the presupposition of all thought and life, in short, the creator of the world and its judge." ⁶⁵

Psychologically, the rejection of reason means rather different things to those who propose it. For what might be called Scholastic Protestantism past and present the rejection of reason means unquestioning acceptance of the Bible as interpreted by the particular church to which the believer belongs and unhesitating endorsement of the church's symbolical books. A familiar example of this point of view in our day is the typical Protestant Fundamentalist group which identifies revelation with the very words of the Bible and contrasts it with reason, derogating the latter in the process.

However, there is a different psychological import in the great confessions of the Reformation. It is the one which the neo-orthodox teachers of our time have recovered. This view staunchly opposes the irrational rationalism of Scholastic Protestantism, as well as other forms of rationalism, on the ground that transformation of life necessitates abandonment of objective relationships with Reality and willing assumption of an intimately personal relationship with it, that is, with the Sovereign God. The revelation which changes man's life is not anything "intellectual," neither truth nor doctrine, but experience in which the whole man—thinking, willing, and feeling—is involved. Man is asked to relinquish the situation in which he stands apart as a speculator in favor of the one in which he bows in loving submission—renouncing egocentric reasoning. Brunner describes this type of revelation in the following terms:

The self-disclosure of the gracious Lord to the self is one aspect, the obedient, trustful surrender of the previously independent and anxious self is the other aspect, of the same process. All

acts of objective, positive knowledge are therefore merely a preparation for this, and take a secondary position; they are not the perception of faith [i.e., revelation] itself. The latter is *sui generis*; it is not fulfilled in the "I-It" dimension, in the realm of abstract truth, but rather in the "I-Thou" dimension, as a perception of the way in which love is recognized in love, and not in any other way.⁶⁶

In this view reason remains important for the working out of theoretical and practical implications of revelation, as well as for dealing with the realities and values of the natural order. "God's Word, received in faith, does not eliminate the *humanum*," Brunner assures us, "but it purifies it from all that is inhuman, which comes from the illusion of reason and from sinful desire."⁶⁷

Rejection of finite spiritual forms and practices.—The mistrust of finite spiritual forms and practices in the religious and moral life of man is typical of Protestantism in general, but particularly in that part of it which is Reformed in principle. The technical difference between the Catholic and the Protestant roads to redemption is symbolized in the fact that the Catholics have seven sacraments while the Protestants have only two, and that, in practice, even these two ceremonies are overshadowed by the stress on preaching. Ideally, at least, Protestantism sees the peril of human self-confidence in religious forms and moral practices. It does not believe in saints. It cannot concede that the visible church is ever to be identified with the Kingdom of God. It does not endorse the idea of priestly mediation between God and man. And it is firmly fixed against the supposition that pious and moral acts can resolve man's basic "dis-relationship," to use Kierkegaard's apt term. Obviously, neither Lutheran nor Reformed Christianity has consistently abided by these strictures. Hence, the recurring rise of reforming sects within Protestantism. But it is significant that reformers do arise periodically to remind these churches of their idolatry, and that the symbolical books of these churches condemn "magical-materialistic conceptions" of salvation.⁶⁸

A striking example of this aspect of rejectionist counsel in our time may be found in the work of Karl Barth. The opening chapter

of his first work in English translation carries these provocative paragraphs on the vanity of modern man's attempted resolutions of his spiritual predicament:

Religious righteousness! There seem to be no surer means of rescuing us . . . than religion and Christianity. Religion gives us the chance . . . to celebrate solemn hours of devotion—to take flight to Christianity as to an eternally green island in the gray sea of everyday. There comes over us a wonderful sense of safety and security from the unrighteousness whose might we everywhere feel. . . . *A wonderful illusion, but an illusion, a self-deception!* . . . What is the use of all the preaching, baptizing, confirming, bell-ringing, and organ-playing, of all the religious moods and modes, the counsels of “applied religion” . . . and whatever else may belong to the equipment of modern ecclesiasticism? . . . *We are fixed firmly, very firmly, in human righteousness. . . . Our deepest longing is unstilled.*⁶⁹

[Morality.] I think . . . of the good will which we all, I trust, develop and exemplify in certain excellent principles and virtues. . . . *Steadily or intermittently we apply ourselves to our morality—to our thrift, let us say, to thought for our family, to efficiency in our vocation, to our patriotism—and through it we lift ourselves above our own real level and that of our fellow men. . . . Is it not our very morality which prevents our discerning that at a hundred other points we are the more firmly fettered to that will?* Does it[morality] not make us blind and impenitent toward the deep real needs of existence? Is it not remarkable that the greatest atrocities of life—I think of the capitalistic order and of the war—can justify themselves on purely moral principles. *The devil may also make use of morality.*⁷⁰

According to such a view man's true redemption begins when he is willing to admit what his conscience, however dull or foolish it may be, tells him; namely, that he is not righteous but sinful, not altruistic but egocentric. To stifle this conscience is to avoid the pathway to fulfillment for conscience is the “place” in the human mind where man recalls the fact that he must submit to a power higher than himself. Calvinism is pre-eminently the religion of the uneasy conscience. Its leaders find in fierce inner

conflict the hope of that radical despair which leads to humble dependence upon God alone. Let conscience speak to the end then, admonishes Barth. "It tells us not only that there is something else, a righteousness above unrighteousness, but also—and more important—that this something else for which we long and which we need is God. He is right and not we!"⁷¹ When morality and culture and religion are rejected as final securities, ultimate disillusionment is avoided because man's trust is in the holy and forgiving God, not in himself. This may seem childlike and inadequate, suggests Barth. It may even seem to be squaring the circle. Nevertheless, there is no other way.⁷²

As we have said, Barth is but a modern preacher of rejectionism at this point. The reformers and the puritans consistently called their disciples away from reliance upon form and ceremony. Their positive principle is stated over and over again: salvation is by faith, not works, "lest any man should boast." Still, this did not lead men into moral passivity. In fact, through the centuries Calvinism has exhibited an unmatched moral zeal; its religious perspective has not destroyed ethical discrimination. It is even claimed that so far as the principle has been followed it has made devotion to duty possible without fanaticism, and prevented righteousness from degenerating into self-righteousness. What it can mean to the modern age is well stated here:

To understand that the Christ in us is not a possession but a hope, that perfection is not a reality but an intention; that such peace as we know in this life is never purely the peace of achievement but the serenity of being "completely known and all forgiven"; all this does not destroy moral ardour or responsibility. On the contrary it is the only way of preventing premature completions of life, or arresting the new and more terrible pride which may find its roots in the soil of humility and of saving the Christian life from the intolerable pretension of saints who have forgotten that they are sinners.⁷³

Rejection of reliance upon worldly achievement.—Weber is substantially correct in declaring that Calvin's idea of living in this world solely to the glory of God guided Reformed Protestant-

ism into an activism that resulted, strangely enough, in the pre-occupation of the religious man with material goods and temporal achievements. Perhaps, writes Weber, the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the saint "like a light cloak which can be thrown aside at any moment," as Richard Baxter advised, but fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.⁷⁴ It may have been the success and prosperity achieved by worldly asceticism which prompted this emphasis in Christian rejectionism; however, it is characteristic of all prophetic religion. At any rate, the pathway to self-acceptance which we are discussing regards all worldly achievement with suspicion because success has the tendency to wean the believer away from complete dependence upon God, full devotion to His will, and therefore from his own true fulfillment. John Wesley exemplifies the concern with which Christian rejectionism views worldly achievement. He felt this as an acute problem, and he wrote:

I fear wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things, for any revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these can not but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches. . . . Is there no way to prevent this—this continual decay of pure religion? ⁷⁵

Wesley eventually found the practical solution of his problem where most later Christian churches found it. People, he said, should gain all they can, but they should also give all they can. The greater the wealth the greater the opportunity to exercise the virtue of charity. Thus a constant emphasis is made upon the stewardship of possessions. A famous piece by the English preacher Thomas Taylor entitled, *The Pilgrim's Profession*, extols this over-all view of life. Taking his cue from the Old Testament, this Calvinist writer bids each believer remember that, after all: "I am a stranger with thee, and a sojourner, as all my Fathers were."⁷⁶ Therefore, one should conduct himself as a traveler going home ✓ through a strange country. He should enjoy the world only as a

passer-by, having other and better business of his own elsewhere: "hee useth other mens goods for a night, but hee setteth not his heart on them . . . because hee knoweth hee must leave them next morning, and may take none with him."⁷⁷ Nonetheless the pilgrim uses nothing lightly. He knows that he is "countable" and will have to square his accounts with his Maker in the end. Throughout life he carries a threefold weight of sin, worldly care, and fear of death. Happily he travels on, delighting in the blessed hope of arriving one day at his estate and his patrimony. Taylor's work is a quaint expression of the religious perspective within which the puritans conducted their earthly life. It is a plea for the renunciation of worldly ends, which it regards not only as injurious to true religion but as self-destructive.

This puritan perspective on worldly achievement is representative of the rejectionist point of view in every age. So is Kierkegaard's view which stresses the importance of freeing oneself from reliance upon worldly activity and concern. Of worldly man he wrote:

In spite of the fact that a man is in despair he can perfectly well live on in the temporal, in fact all the better for it; he may be praised by men, be honored and esteemed, and pursue all the aims of temporal life. What is called worldliness is made up of just such men, who (if one may use the expression) pawn themselves to the world. They use their talents, accumulate money, carry on worldly affairs, calculate shrewdly, etc., etc., are perhaps mentioned in history, but themselves they are not; spiritually understood, they have no self, for whose sake they could venture everything, no self before God—however *selfish* they may be for all that.⁷⁸

Seeing the peril in reliance upon worldly achievement for the fulfillment of life, rejectionism bids its disciples to discount public recognition, temporal achievement, and material security—all these things pass away; they are false gods, in whose worship man destroys himself. In turning to God man may find himself by losing himself. Herein lies the wisdom of the rejectionist pathway; it is claimed that "we can participate in the fulfillment . . . only if we do not seek too proudly to appropriate the meaning as our

secure possession or to effect the fulfillment by our own power.”⁷⁹

*Rejection of Sensuality and Sexuality.**—“Sensuality is never the mere expression of natural impulse in man,” declares Niebuhr. “It always betrays some aspect of his abortive effort to solve the problem of finiteness and freedom.”⁸⁰ This peculiar sensitivity to the possibility of existence of evil in sensuous experience is characteristic of the Christian view we are discussing. As the harmony of the self may be destroyed by other forms of egocentricity (reason, finite spiritual forms and practices, and worldly achievements) so, it is pointed out, sensuality may destroy self-harmony by the self’s undue identification with and devotion to particular impulses and desires within itself.⁸¹ Traditionally Reformed Protestantism has fought fleshly inordinacy. The Calvinist, as Troeltsch observed, has always known that “he must go to work thoughtfully, systematically, and progressively to overcome the tendency to deify the creature, and all the sin which clings to the senses and to self-love.”⁸² The sins of sensuality, sexual license, gluttony, extravagance, drunkenness, idleness, and carefree enjoyment, have always been subject to sharp disapproval among Christians, but particularly among those who see these things, on the one hand, as symptoms of self-love, and, on the other hand, as failures to serve the Sovereign God actively. Calvinism’s whole spirit “displays an untiring activity, a boundlessness of grasp, quite contrary to the natural impulse of enjoyment and ease, and contentment with the mere necessities of existence.”⁸³

Turning to sexuality, the most vital form of sensuality, the view under discussion sees similar perils for man.

The sexual, as every other physical, impulse in man is subject to and compounded with the freedom of man’s spirit. It is not something which man could conceivably leave imbedded in some natural harmony of animal impulses. Its force reaches up into the highest pinnacles of human spirituality; and the insecurity of man in the heights of his freedom reaches down to

* “Sensuality” is used here in its primary neutral sense: gratification of the senses, or indulgence of the appetites. “Sexuality” is used in the same neutral sense: exercise of the sexual functions or appetite.

the sex impulse as an instrument of compensation and as an avenue of escape.⁸⁴

Niebuhr sets forth three ways in which the various forms of sensuality, particularly sexuality, are likely to seduce man. In the first place, they gratify hungers and thus serve self-love. In the second place, they facilitate escape from an uneasy sense of guilt and they compensate for feelings of inadequacy. This is accomplished through identification with a process or another person, such as the beloved one. Finally, sensuality provides man with an escape from the responsibilities of freedom by entrance into subconscious or unconscious forms of existence.⁸⁵

For the most part Christian rejectionism does not regard sense and sex as *per se* sinful. Only when misused does the sensual merit condemnation. It is because sensual inordinacies are expressions of life not centered in God that they are so serious. Brunner is most insistent upon this point in his notable exposition of Christian ethics *The Divine Imperative*. He declares that *it is not the sex element itself which is evil or impure. "The evil in the life of sex is the isolated function, which manifests its hostility to the Divine order by reducing the awful process of procreation and sexual union to a mere trifle, and by refusing to accept responsibility for 'the other two.'"*⁸⁶

Sexuality, then, must be rejected as an end in itself, as mere physical indulgence, as mere passion without fidelity. Divine will is understood to demand that natural love be expressed within the framework of responsible relationships. "So long as love does not become fidelity, sex union simply means . . . that the one 'makes use' of the other."⁸⁷ This means, for adults, that sexuality is to be subsumed in the monogamous marriage bond, and within this bond sex may be used both as an expression of love and for the sake of begetting children. To be sure, the idea that sex can be the vehicle of virtuous love is not characteristic of all present day rejectionists, but it is gaining prevalence. Contemporary Fundamentalist groups would not agree with Brunner when he declares: "Sexual intercourse is intended by the Creator not only as a means of procreation but also as a means of expressing the love of married

people for one another.”⁸⁸ In the main, however, all forms of Protestant Christianity would endorse Brunner’s definition of marriage. He writes:

It is life in community of two persons of different sexes, a community which is complete, based upon the natural foundation of sex love, but only fulfilled in the recognition of the fact that by divine appointment they belong to each other; through whose created distinctiveness the Creator maintains the human race, and through which the sex nature of man, which is disposed for community, can and should realize its personal character.⁸⁹

It is very important to note also that birth control is provisionally approved by an increasing number within the Protestant churches. Here again, to be sure, there are impressive numbers who would condemn it for reasons very similar to those which the Roman Catholic Church advances. Recurring to Brunner’s work again, he endorses birth control as an important step toward responsible parenthood, and as a salutary means of enabling the mother to have a child “when she is ready both inwardly and outwardly, instead of whenever the sex impulse of the husband demands.”⁹⁰

For the most part, we have presented the views of contemporary thinkers who stand in the Calvinist tradition but who do not regard sense and sex as *per se* sinful. Nor do they call for the rejection of physical desires except in so far as they are made ends in themselves. Yet, for three centuries past, large sections of Protestantism have hushed, avoided, and, in many cases, condemned sensuality and sexuality as such. In Fundamentalist Protestant circles known to the writer this attitude still prevails.

The source of sense and sex derogation is probably Patristic Catholicism. During that era the prevailing attitude of the Western Church was one of extreme asceticism. The senses were often thought to be evil and the suppression of sexual impulses was looked upon as good in itself. Professor Williams has shown that Augustine approved and elaborated this view of sensuality and sexuality, especially by his tendency to identify concupiscence with the reproductive instinct. Williams points out that in Augustine’s

thought concupiscence tends to be used in its most restricted sense with the result that original sin, considered as *vitium*, equals concupiscence which in turn equals sexual passion—an equation which explains for Augustine the mode of sin's transmission, and which marks sexuality as intrinsically bad.⁹¹

Since the puritans accepted Calvin's declaration that marriage was ordained by God for the propagation of the race, marriage could be viewed as a part of the divine plan. But, at the same time, for them, as for the early Christian fathers, it evidenced a shameful passion—concupiscence, the material mark of original sin. Professor Perry, who is sympathetic to puritanism in general, points out that, partly as a result of this attitude, puritanism was a "cult of denial and concealment," so far as sense and sex were concerned.⁹² Even in puritan ethical theory sex has been so completely ignored that theologians have written at length about marriage without ever feeling the need to mention its sexual side, points out another Protestant writer on the subject.⁹³ This represents a thorough rejectionism, and, under the name of Calvin, it has pervaded the whole of Western culture and exercises great influence even today, as the case histories in Chapter Four clearly show. It is not true to Calvin himself however, as Professor Piper points out, even though he was not fully emancipated from this conception of the inherent sinfulness of sensuality.⁹⁴ Against this attitude, whether held by Roman Catholics or Protestants, Brunner declares, "If we are ever to master the rebellious uprising of all those natural instincts which have so long been repressed, we must resist this dangerous perversion of the truth with all our might." The Christian ethic, he says, must stand for "the independent meaning of the erotic and sex element within marriage" as an expression of love and not merely as a means of procreation.⁹⁵ Of course, this must be done in line with the Christian rejectionist pathway—self-rejection and God-centeredness, which in this life implies living for the community, and, especially, living in loving fidelity with the mate in marriage.

CENTERING IN GOD ALONE

So far we have seen that the Christian rejectionist pathway to self-acceptance is characterized by opposition to all forms of self-centeredness. The exponents of this view continually emphasize that God alone is the true center of man's life. They try to make man vividly aware of the self-destructive perils which inhere in following his own rational, "religious," "moral," worldly, or sensuous strategies of fulfillment. In other words their teaching is that man can realize himself in so far as he is no longer concerned with realizing himself but is preoccupied with the will of God alone. As Niebuhr has summed the view: "The perfect harmony of the soul with itself is thus a derivative of its perfect communion with, and love of, God." ⁹⁶ The first steps on this pathway involve rejection of all self-centeredness; the next steps are directed toward God-centeredness.* Let us now see what centering solely in God consists of.

Acknowledgment of God as Sovereign Lord.—A clear description of what is meant by the acknowledgment of God as Sovereign Lord is given by Emil Brunner in his popularized presentation of Christianity, *Our Faith*. Brunner describes the ego as sitting like a "king enthroned," and demanding that "the world serve it." ⁹⁷ In subtle or obvious ways, each human life seeks to glorify itself saying, "I am the Lord my God." However, since God did not make men for this, self-centeredness is self-destructive. Jesus Christ makes this clear in history. Christ in his life and in his death challenges man, calls him to account, presses him to make a decision—will he renounce himself as the center of life and allow God to become the Center? When man answers, Yes,—and this must be a daily Yes—God truly becomes king. "He ascends the throne previously occupied by the pretender king, Ego, a truly violent revolution." ⁹⁸ In doing this man finds his divinely appointed position; in acknowl-

* The idea of "steps" is used figuratively, and it does not refer to a time sequence. In this case, for example, self-rejection and God-centeredness are spiritual correlatives, necessary in every moment of life if true self-acceptance is to come about, so its exponents contend.

edging, "Thou art the Lord my God," man really begins to live. As Brunner puts it in another book, indicating especially the important place which reason has in bringing about this reorientation:

In its own name the reason still says: My autonomy is an illusion; what henceforth is expressed positively the new King alone can say who in His mercy installs the previous rebellious usurper, now becomes obedient, as His servant. What the self henceforth expresses as a believer takes place simply in the repetition of that which his Lord says to him. In this subordination, however, all the powers of the rational self alone come to their full development. As master it had to play a part for which it was not suited; as a subordinate, it can do all that God has given it to do in His purpose in the Creation.⁹⁹

Characteristic of the view presented here is the stress that is laid upon the individuality of the divine-human relationship. God is believed to regard each particular individual in a peculiar way. Again we may cite a sentence of Brunner's so typical of Christian rejectionism's conviction:

I am a self, I, as this particular person, cannot be exchanged for any other, simply and solely because God, the Self-personal, knows me, this person as this person, because He "called me by my name," when He created me, because He loves me . . . from all eternity, and destines *me* . . . for an eternal goal, namely, for a personal end, for communion with Himself, the Creator, because He values me unconditionally and will never exchange me for any other, because He never confuses me with any other, nor depreciates me at the cost of someone else, because He gives me this supremely personal life in His supremely personal Word of election.¹⁰⁰

Obviously this puts the responsibility of acknowledging God squarely up to the individual. In other words, no other human being or collective body can resolve his ultimate problem or decide his final destiny or claim his primary loyalty. Brunner writes:

As I myself must believe, must decide, as I myself must hear the electing Word, the Call of God—and *no church, no priest,*

*no Pope, and indeed no word of the Bible can take from me my responsibility for listening to this call—so I myself must stand before the Judge; and no other can take my place—none save Himself, the merciful God, who Himself provides the “Advocate.” So solitary, so absolutely independent does the Christian faith make us.*¹⁰¹

Awareness of one’s continued sinfulness.—The acknowledgment of God as Sovereign Lord does not issue in perfect love to Him and to fellowmen as He commands. This is simply a matter of history; it is plain to Reformationists that egocentricity persists in the lives of the saints. Indeed, we have seen that this is one of the basic conceptions of the view under discussion. Yet, this very recognition is regarded as another aspect of centering in God. Luther first made this idea great:

You ask, how shall we begin to be godly and what shall we do that God may begin his work in us? Answer: Do you not understand, it is not for you to work or to begin to be godly, as little as it is to further and complete it. Everything that you begin is in and remains sin, though it shines ever so brightly; you cannot do any thing but sin, do what you will.

Learn then . . . what takes place when God begins to make us godly, and what the first step is in becoming godly. *There is no other beginning than that your king comes to you and begins to work in you.* . . . For the preachers come from him, not from you; their sermons come from him, not from you; *your faith comes from him, not from you; everything that faith works in you comes from him, not from you; and where he does not come, you remain outside; and where there is no Gospel there is no God, but only sin and damnation, free will may do, suffer, work, and live as it may and can. Therefore you should not ask, where to begin to be godly; there is no beginning, except where the king enters and is proclaimed.*¹⁰²

Karl Barth has emphasized the same idea by declaring that the Christian life is *not doing something or being different*. Quite the contrary, the Christian life is the *knowledge* that one is regarded and acknowledged by God,” infinitely far as one actually is from God.¹⁰³

Psychologically this means that temporal life may be expected to involve the man of faith in tensions and temptations, discouragements and despair. The Reformed tradition is always very definite about this as against all mystical points of view. Brunner's word on this matter is typical. The distinctive thing about faith, he writes, is its objectivity of direction toward God: this is peace. A man's heart remains an agitated thing, "there does not cease to it the ebb and flow of feeling, the waxing and waning of power, vivid tension and relaxation, fearing and hoping, the change from joy and being depressed."¹⁰⁴ But, Christian life is one of *comforted* despair, as Luther first suggested. What it means, according to Brunner's own testimony, is this: "I belong to Christ in spite of all: in spite of myself, my feelings and happenings, in spite of all experiences of my own powerlessness even in faith. I belong to Christ not through my faith, but through Christ's speech through God's Word, to me in Him, the Mediator."¹⁰⁵

Another implication of special significance for self-acceptance is the denial that centering in God is principally an environmental or cultural matter. Rather, it is clearly an inner, spiritual affair. No station in life is free from the limits and the corruptions of human life. Calvin clearly enunciated this conception when he declared that every man has a *vocatio*, by which he meant a calling to live a godly life. Provided we follow our vocation, he said, "there will be no employment so mean and sordid as not to appear truly respectable, and be deemed highly important in the sight of God."¹⁰⁶ In practice the Protestant theory of vocation quickly assumed a double reference: it included both earthly life as such and one's particular employment. Thus the Christian life becomes "quite profanely and trivially, that life which each has to live in his station. One does not need to undertake this and that in order to live the Christian life. We live it in the place in which we find ourselves, in our situation."¹⁰⁷ And again Barth in summation: "There is no situation and no place in our life where comfort fails, but also none where the thought of God does not mean the profoundest disturbance, none where we get peace. *Our life as it is, is placed in God's light by Christ and His Spirit.*"¹⁰⁸

Trust in God for forgiveness and transmundane fulfillment.— This is a third aspect of centering in God. Not only *it* acknowledgement of his sovereignty, and awareness of one's own self-centeredness, but it is reliance upon his continued forgiveness and the transmundane fulfillment of personal life. Luther may be cited once more, this time in a characteristic exhortation to his congregation in which he urged just such faith in the divine mercy. Using the figure of a wagon Luther declared:

For I am a sinner; yet I am drawn in His righteousness, which is given me. I am unclean; but His holiness is my sanctification, in which I pleasurably ride. I am an ignorant fool; but His wisdom carries me forward. I have deserved condemnation; but I am set free by His redemption, a wagon in which I sit secure. So that a Christian, if he but believe it, may boast of the merits of Christ and all His blessings, even as if he had won them all himself. . . . And now it is well with us.¹⁰⁹

Not only is conviction of God's free and full forgiveness a part of the meaning of centering in God alone but the conviction that God will finally raise up the individual beyond the grave. From the human standpoint death is the end, it is man's ultimate frustration. Death threatens man with an even greater despair when viewed in the light of the conviction that man's sinfulness will prevent fulfillment in every coming age of history. The Christian rejectionist answer to this deepened frustration is faith, faith that God will complete what man cannot. "We believe," confesses Niebuhr, "that only a power greater than our own can complete our incomplete life, and only a divine mercy can heal us of our evil."¹¹⁰

Our situation is that, by reason of the freedom of our spirit, we have purposes and ends beyond the limits of the finiteness of our physical existence. Faith may discern the certainty of a final completion of life beyond our power, and a final purging of the evil which we introduce into life by our false efforts to complete it in our own strength. . . . The important issue is whether we will be tempted by the incompleteness and frustration of life to despair; or whether we can, by faith, lay hold on the divine

power and wisdom which completes what remains otherwise incomplete.¹¹¹

Guidance from the Bible.—We pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that the Bible plays a more central role for the Christian rejectionist pathway than for the other two. We must now describe that role. It is succinctly stated in the Westminster Confession of Faith, which is typical of the Reformation's credal confessions in saying:

The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men. *Nevertheless, we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word.*¹¹²

Here, centering in God is attached to centering in the Bible. Multitudes of past and present exponents of rejectionism have caused the Bible to become an inerrant law book. They have centered on the written word itself rather than on the spirit of the Book. To be sure, they have often been forced into this position or felt themselves forced into it because of the need to stress the importance which they attach to the Bible for all who would center in God. Generally speaking, Calvinists have staunchly opposed both mystic and churchly pathways to God. For them the divine-human encounter takes place *via* the Bible. However, those who would seem to be truer to the Reformed symbolical books declare that the Bible itself is not the revelation but the record of the revelation. The importance of the Bible, they contend, lies in the fact that it is the peculiar means by which God speaks to men.¹¹³ It is the Bible and nothing else which tells the truth about God and his will, and man cannot know this truth apart from his own personal surrender to the God of this same Book. This means that even the Bible is, in the last analysis, only a means, a guide, not an end, never an arbitrary authority. God alone, by "the inward illumination of the Spirit," makes himself known to man by faith.

SERVING GOD IN THE TEMPORAL SPHERE

The remaining steps on the Christian rejectionist pathway to self-acceptance may easily be inferred. We need only to outline them, since they are clearly implied in the basic concepts already described in the first main section of this chapter. God is conceived to be the Sovereign Will whose commandment to man is love (*agape*) of neighbor here and now. Man is regarded as fundamentally incapable of such love, but he finds continued forgiveness and strength in the love (*agape*) of God for him. This profound sense of gratitude is, as we have noted, one of the main motivational forces in the intramundane asceticism characteristic of this view: it is a moral rigor which seeks to order all of life in the service of the (impossible but always relevant) law of God.

Before noting two final steps on the rejectionist pathway one characteristic of the whole view should be underlined. This is the stalwart individualism of it all. In the first steps on the path the intimately personal note already sounds as we learn what Christian self-rejection means. The next steps show the personalistic character of rejectionism even more markedly as emphasis is placed upon individual acknowledgment of God, awareness of personal forgiveness by God, and guidance by God's Word. Here, in the further steps on the rejectionist pathway, the "I-Thou" relationship remains primary. Because of their bearing on self-acceptance we must note two further steps to be taken in the self-rejecting service of God.

✓ *Living for the community.*—"The structure of man . . . is such that he cannot complete himself within himself," notes Niebuhr. "Love and brotherhood are the law of his existence."¹¹⁴ There are no discernible limits to brotherhood or to the possibilities for the development of the Holy Community. And at every stage of life, the law of love proves irrevocable. The fact that man does not live by it does not abrogate it. This is the rationale which undergirds the high moral idea, *agape*, of Christian rejectionism.

Moreover, for this viewpoint real conversion implies a life dedicated to the community. "Self-denial is the ethical aspect of re-

pentance.”¹¹⁵ “Evil is lack of fellowship, the desire to live for and in oneself; therefore the new Good means life-in-fellowship, life lived for other people, love.”¹¹⁶ In this view natural law and divine law are one in demanding of man his conscious commitment to God and fellowmen for the sake of the Holy Community, the Kingdom of God, which becomes an all-encompassing end. The ideal is uttered in a simple way—perhaps too simple—in a little poem discovered on the back of a church bulletin:

OTHERS

*Lord, help me to live from day to day
In such a self-forgetful way
That even when I kneel to pray,
My prayer shall be for OTHERS.*

*Help me in all the work I do
To ever be sincere and true,
And to know that all I'd do for You,
Unless to live for OTHERS.*

*Let "self" be crucified and slain,
And buried deep; and all in vain
May efforts be to rise again
Unless to live for OTHERS.*

*And when my work on earth is done,
And my work in heav'n's begun,
May I forget the crown I've won,
While thinking still of OTHERS.*

*OTHERS, Lord, yes, OTHERS,
And none of self for me,
Help me to live for OTHERS
That I may live like Thee.*

—C. D. Meigs

Responsibility for the family.—In the presentation of the Christian rejectionist attitude toward sensuality and sexuality we noted that there are markedly different points of view within the tradition. From its inception the puritan attitude dominated Western cul-

ture. Puritanism also perpetuated patriarchalism in the family, almost completely subordinating the wife and children to the husband, derogating sexuality *per se*, and connecting procreation with the perpetuation of original sin. What is more, marriage itself was regarded in part as a phophylactic against lust.¹¹⁷

Coupled with this view, however, is a different emphasis, something new in history—a divinely ordained purposefulness for marriage, which is the begetting and the bringing up of children. The family becomes a chief place for the younger generation to learn the Word of God. This idea has played a great pedagogical part in Protestant family life. For example, in New England puritanism parents were continually reminded by their pastors of their baptismal vow to bring the child up “in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.”

The view of the family as divinely ordained—even before the Fall, be it noted—contains the possibility of an elevated view of the marriage relationship and the responsibilities and privileges it entails, as Brunner and others have shown. The theological basis for this idea is the Reformation doctrine of marriage as an “order of creation.” Far from being an unnatural, arbitrary, and restrictive thing, monogamous marriage is the most natural and liberating relationship in God’s creation, according to this implication of Calvin’s own idea. As Brunner puts it: (1) there is an irrevocable relationship between father, mother, and child that is not first of all biological but rather intimately subjective and personal; moreover, (2) while polygamous instincts exist, there is, quite apart from ethical obligations, a certain indivisibility about love when it is strong and genuine; “Genuine love . . . always feels: ‘It is with this particular person that I wish to live alone and for always.’”¹¹⁸ These “monistic facts” find their place in the Reformed Protestant’s rationale of marriage, although they have not been stressed until the modern period by Calvinists. Weber is authority for the statement that, despite puritanical austerity, Calvinism has exhibited “a certain refinement and spiritual and ethical penetration of marital relationships,” and in its movements there has blossomed “matrimonial chivalry” not characteristic of other major forms of Christianity.¹¹⁹ What is clear about the view we are discussing is the

seriousness with which the bringing up of children and the conduct of family relationships is taken.

Having considered one of the main expressions of Christianity in its bearing upon self-acceptance we come to the end of this chapter. Now we have before us what, for lack of a better term, we have called the Christian rejectionist pathway to self-acceptance. We started out with a quotation from John Calvin in which he exhorts Christians to depart from themselves in order to apply all their vigor to the service of the Lord. If we should now ask, what kind of self-acceptance does this Christian self-rejection envisage?—we may find answer in one of Calvin's most ardent present-day exponents, Emil Brunner. These words of his upon the topic, "Self-Affirmation and Self-Denial," promise much to those who take the Christian rejectionist path:

This kind of self-affirmation, which is the same as self-denial, is not only permitted, it is commanded. *The "putting on of the new man," this true "revolution of the disposition," means acceptance of myself because God through His forgiveness has already accepted me.* This dignity is just as unassailable as it is incomparable. It is the dignity of those who belong to the "household of God," it is the joy of the restoration of the divine image which proceeds from God Himself. In truth, self-hood, the dignity of the individual, has not here been submerged in some collective unity—neither in the Idea, nor in culture, nor in the race, nor in the All; for the member of the community, in this sense of the word, is the same as the utterly solitary individual who has heard and answered God's call, he is the true "individual." Indeed, the Church, the *ecclesia*, means the sum-total of all those who have been called out by Christ, of the "elect." The new regard for personality is based upon this fact: that man, as an individual, knows that God is continually regarding him with favour; he knows for a certainty, in the deep and secret places of the soul, where he is alone with God, that God regards him thus. The Christian is commanded to "boast" of this new standing of his, and with this in his heart he can defy the contempt of the whole world. This "God-dependence" constitutes his true "self-dependence."¹²⁰

CHAPTER TWO

The Forensic Pathway to Self-Acceptance

NOW WE TURN INTO A SECOND WAY that leads to self-acceptance. For reasons to be mentioned it may properly be called the forensic pathway. In every century of the Christian era it has had able and devout proponents. Indeed, multitudes have followed it and found fullness of life which they could only call divine—fullness issuing in inner peace that the world can neither give nor take away.

Professor A. C. McGiffert points out that two views of Christianity are already apparent in the late first and early second centuries of the Church: the one, predominantly mystical, is the Christianity of Paul, John, Ignatius, and the Christian Gnostics; the other, legal in stress and more widespread, finds expression in the lives and works of the writers of Luke-Acts, the Pastoral Epistles, the Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude, the Apocalypse of John, as well as the so-called apostolic fathers and the apologists, such as Justin Martyr.¹ For this latter company Christianity is “a divine law by keeping which a man may win eternal reward and escape eternal punishment.”² It involves faith, repentance, baptism, followed by the main thing, a life of obedience to the will of God, which means a life of faithful Christian discipleship.³ It is the Christian law which makes possible salvation. As the second century Shepherd of Hermas put it, the commandments are “beautiful and powerful and gladsome and glorious and able to save a man’s soul.”⁴ It is precisely because the law is held to be the indispensable and sufficient condition of salvation that man is exhorted to such serious self-regulation. The modern Jesuit father, Joseph Rickaby, has summarized the forensic rule of life in these words:

Since perfect happiness is not to be had in this mortal life, and is to be had hereafter; since moreover man has free will and the control of his own acts; *it is evidently most important for man in this life so to control and rule himself here as to dispose himself for happiness there.*⁵

Consider how similar in spirit is the ancient Shepherd's precept to this modern rule of Rickaby's:

"You know that you who are the servants of God dwell in a strange land; for your city is far away from this one." . . . Have a care, then, ye who serve the Lord, and have Him in your heart, that ye work the works of God, remembering His commandments and promises which He promised, and believe that He will bring them to pass if his commandments be observed.⁶

- We term this the forensic pathway first of all because, as will be seen, it tends to conceive of the temporal life in terms of religious and moral regulation, with emphasis upon self-regulation. It regards man's hopes for ultimate happiness as contingent upon his active fulfillment of God's requirements here; "he is in duty bound to regulate his conduct so as to be enabled to reach his divinely appointed end (*bonum*)," as another contemporary Catholic theologian puts it.⁷ Moreover, the term *forensic* seems to describe aptly the chief means by which man is helped to regulate himself aright;
- namely, the church. The churches which espouse the pathway we
- are considering here employ legalistic methods of guidance. That is, they require personal observance of religious rites and moral acts, and they adjudicate individual violations of these requirements in the interest of facilitating better relationships with God, who makes full salvation possible. In the third place, the theological doctrines held by the advocates of this path have a noticeably forensic character. God is conceived of rather juridically as the Supreme Lawgiver. Sin is thought of in terms of disobedience and broken law. Salvation tends to be regarded as a pardoning and a rewarding. The theological ideas from which the idea of self-regulation springs will be outlined in the first part of this chapter. It should be emphasized at the outset that the forensic view certainly contains non-forensic

elements—the whole idea of the contemplation of God, the *sum-mum bonum* to be attained only in the after-life, indicates this fact. We call the second Christian pathway forensic because we are thinking of its bearing upon the idea of self-acceptance in the temporal life of man.⁸

It is in the developing line of Catholic Christianity, particularly in its medieval and modern Roman forms, that we find the idea of self-regulation systematically propagated. In the last three hundred years it would seem that Roman Catholicism's forensic character has become particularly marked, for many reasons which we cannot stay to list. It must suffice to point out that many Anglicans, for example, regard post-Reformation Roman Catholicism as fatally legalistic, attributing this development first to the work of the Jesuit casuists, second to that most influential of modern moralists, Alfonso Liguori (1696–1787).⁹ At least this opposition indicates that the forensic pathway is enunciated today with as much if not more vigor than at any period in its history, and that self-regulation is advocated as widely as ever, particularly within the fold of the Roman Catholic Church. Upon authorities within this church we shall depend most heavily for the explication of the doctrines which inspire the Christian forensic pathway to self-acceptance, and for understanding of the steps which are involved.

In passing to the principal beliefs of forensic Christianity we need only refer to the means by which the whole view is propagated; they will be much in evidence in the balance of this chapter. First of all, great importance is attached to the services of the church, and by the church is meant sacraments, the priesthood, and sanctuaries, through all of which it is understood that God is eternally at work for the purpose of effectively redeeming those within. The observance of certain kinds of moral acts and attitudes, also, are recommended by the church in its preaching, teaching, and penitential practices. Again, stress is laid upon private acts of self-regulation such as fasting, prayers, and other performances sometimes connected with the church, such as veneration of the saints, attendance upon special services, and so on. For those who are called, the monastic life is offered as the superior pathway to fulfillment.

Thus, in a multiplicity of ways, the proponents of the forensic pathway seek to help their believers along the way. Always the historical, hierarchical institution is central. "By the institution of Christ, no one can be saved unless he is a member of that concrete, visible society which is the Catholic Church," declares Mr. John G. Brunini in his recent exposition of Catholicism for laymen. "This means actual, visible communion with her whenever this is possible."¹⁰ It is within the body of believers that the individual is urged, yes required, to journey. The church points the path leading to beatitude, and within the church the individual receives all things necessary for this life and the next if he himself remains faithful and obedient—herein true self-acceptance first becomes a possibility and, increasingly, a reality.

THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REGULATION

✓ GOD AS THE SUPREME LAWGIVER

There are two aspects of God upon which Catholic thought has traditionally laid emphasis: the one is philosophical, the other is religio-moral. Both concepts are relevant in considering man's relationship to God, to others, and to himself. On the philosophical side God is conceived of as the "first cause, himself uncaused," who as such is existent only in act: his essence is *actus purus et perfectus*.¹¹ In God, therefore, there is perfect knowledge of the good and absolute will to realize the good. In Aristotelian fashion, this Catholic theology relates all temporal means and ends, in a great teleological system of hierarchies. All motions are finally realized in terms and by the power of God; for God governs the moving world as the "universal first cause," says Thomas in concluding the first part of the *Summa*. From this point of view the entire universe, including the free activity of man, is predestinated by the the First Cause of all; philosophically considered, Catholic theology is deterministic.¹² Religiously conceived, this determinism is very significant for the Catholics also. Consider the teaching of Thomas which stems from it:

When things are ordained for a particular end all of them are subject to the government of him to whom the end principally pertains, as appears in an army. For all the parts of an army and their works are ordained for a final end, namely, *the good of the commander which is victory*. And therefore it belongs to him to govern the whole army.¹³

This thought from Thomas portrays the religio-moral aspect of God, as well as the philosophical view of him. He is the creator of rational beings (as of everything else), who are endowed with powers of apprehending their true good and who have capacities to regulate their lives in accordance with these apprehensions—this Creator is God the Philosophical First and Final Cause. And God remains at all times personally concerned in the realization of his ends—this Sovereign God is the one to whom man owes religious worship and moral obedience. Professor Francis J. Connell of the Catholic University of America brings both of these aspects of God together, as Catholics customarily do, in a total view of God that places practical emphasis upon him as the Supreme Lawgiver: "We must all keep before our mind the fundamental principles of human life—that our intellect must accept God as the First Truth, that our will in its quest for happiness must seek God, the Final Goal, that our actions must conform to the commandments of God, the Supreme Lawgiver."¹⁴

The Supreme Lawgiver of Christian forensicism is a definite contrast to the *Deus absconditus* of Christian rejectionism. For one thing, the will of the latter can only be known in a personal divine-human encounter—and then His will is only known very imperfectly; while the commandments of the former are well-known to an extent by everyone through reason, and may be known with clarity and conviction through the Church. For the Christian outlook we are now discussing man's duties are certain; in principle they can all be known. As the influential contemporary Jesuit theologian, Henry Davis, declares:

There is a body of law, Divine, Natural, Ecclesiastical, and Civil, which has to be explained. The quarrel with a juristic system should logically be a quarrel with the Ten Commandments; in-

deed, it should be a quarrel with human nature itself, for nature forbids certain human acts, because human reason reveals to man a Lawgiver Who has imposed laws on human beings, and reason imposes on man certain obligations as from a Supreme Lawgiver . . . *A sane legalism, as a sane casuistry, will determine the reasonable and necessary implications of all law . . . In this way man can know the way of salvation, which will be attained by the observance of the Commandments of God and of the Church.*¹⁵

This certainty that through natural reason and positive divine revelation "man has his requirements," the issue being simply "whether he acts up to them or against them,"¹⁶ is obviously significant for the idea of self-acceptance.

Another significant implication of this theology is the nature of the religious and moral obligations it places upon man. Here again there is a marked difference between the rigor of the Christian rejectionist view, in which God is believed to demand complete selflessness, and the mollifying flexibility of the view under discussion. To be sure, "*God wills to bind His creatures to certain lines of action, not arbitrary lines . . . but the natural lines of each creature's own being.*"¹⁷ The inescapable result is that when man thinks or acts in any way that is unnatural or irrational he sins philosophically, that is, against reason, and religio-morally, against the Living Reason. "The Archetype is outraged by the violation of the type," to quote Rickaby.¹⁸ In other words, man is under a two-fold sanction at all times: the sanction of nature, which involves self-destruction and failure to attain perfection and happiness, and the sanction of God, who righteously exacts satisfaction for every violation.

The one Eternal Law embraces all the laws of creation. It has a physical and a moral side. On the former it *effects*, on the latter it *obliges*, but on both sides it is imperative; and though in moral matters it be temporarily defeated by sin, still the moral behest must in the end be fulfilled as surely as the physical behest. The defeat of the law must be made good, the sin must be punished.¹⁹

However, all this is greatly mitigated by several considerations. One is that there are many attitudes and acts which are indifferent so far as the natural and the revealed moral laws are concerned, according to Catholicism; these, a man may participate in or not as he wills. Moreover, while the natural physical law is immutable and therefore man inevitably separates himself from his true nature when he transgresses any part of it, there are many mutable factors when it comes to man's moral obligations. For example, his responsibility in any particular matter of natural or revealed morality is partly determined by the amount of his knowledge; in Catholic thought "no sin is culpable that is not *formal*," that is, consciously known to be sin.²⁰ Moreover, the Supreme Lawgiver while never bound to forgive man his trespasses is willing to do so upon receiving satisfaction from man. "He never can receive due satisfaction from man for the contempt that a deliberate, grave, and flagrant violation of the moral law puts upon the Infinite Majesty of the Lawgiver," but He reveals through the church the conditions by which such a sinner may receive pardon.²¹ In the last analysis man's eternal happiness depends upon faithful fulfillment only of the "substance," not the entirety or anything like the entirety, of God's commands. Rickaby explains the Roman Catholic interpretation of the expectations which the Supreme Lawgiver has for his subjects in this way:

The balance between deeds good and evil is not struck merely at the instant of death. It is being struck continually; and man's final destiny turns on how that balance stands at the close of his time of probation. *So long as he keeps the substance of the moral law, the balance is in his favour.* But one downright wilful and grievous transgression outweighs with God all his former good deeds. It is a defiance of the Deity, a greater insult than all his previous life was a service and homage. It is as though a loyal regiment had mutinied, or a hitherto decent and orderly citizen were taken red-handed in murder. *If however God deigns to draw the offender to repentance, and to pardon him, the balance is restored. Thus everything finally depends on man being free from guilt of grievous transgression at the instant of death, or at*

*the end of his period of probation, whenever that end may come.*²²

THE FREE WILL OF MAN

Despite the presupposition that God is the prime cause of all motion without exception and therefore of the motions of the human soul, Catholicism believes that psychological freedom remains to man. Thomas declares: "As it behoves divine Providence to preserve, not to pervert, the natures of things, God will move everything according to the requirements of its nature . . . So God moves the human will in such a manner that its motion remains contingent and not necessary."²³ In this view human free will and metaphysical necessity subsist side by side. However adequate or inadequate the Thomistic reconciliation of necessity and freedom may be philosophically, it has found official approval in the Roman Catholic Church by the decrees of the Council of Trent (1545-1563) which declared, on the one hand: "If any one man shall say, that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God worketh the works that are evil as well as those that are good, . . . let him be anathema"; and on the other hand: "If any one shall say, that . . . the free will of man is lost and extinguished; or, that it is a thing with a name only, yea, a title without a reality, . . . let him be anathema."²⁴

What this freedom means to a modern Catholic thinker is suggested by Jacques Maritain, the able French philosopher, who writes:

If the creature has indeed the first initiative in the line of evil, it thereby—negatively—intervenes in the very moulding of the designs of providence. . . . God, if one may say so, . . . waits on each one of us, on our refusal or acceptance of the gifts that sovereign power from which all being and all action derive—all things, save the nothing we may bring.²⁵

- It is Catholic conviction that man's willing response to God
- makes possible a "new man," not new in principle only but new
- in fact. According to some, Reinhold Niebuhr for instance, this is the basic cleavage between the Reformed faith and the Catholic.²⁶

The former view sees man as an anxious creature who always and inevitably seeks his own best welfare in inordinately egocentric ways rather than trusting God to bring his good about; the latter believes that it is always possible for man to relinquish his egocentricity with God's help and live a life which conforms essentially with the will and power which governs all things. Catholic thought is sure, in the words of Augustine, "that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him for such a force of will as suffices to make us act by willing. It is certain that it is we who *will* when we will, but it is He who makes us will what is good, . . . it is He who makes us act, by supplying efficacious powers to our will."²⁷ To be sure, there is the deep recognition here of the indispensable need for divine grace every step of the way through life; but, God's grace presupposed—and it can be presupposed through faithful use of the church's sacraments—progressive overcoming of destructive self-love is an earthly possibility. This does not mean that Catholicism believes Christians can be sinless. Thomas says that in the redeemed state "man can abstain from all mortal sin, whose source is in the reason, . . . but man cannot abstain from all venial sin because of the corruption of his *lower appetite of sensuality*," which can never be satisfactorily repressed by reason.²⁸ Thus we may say only that Catholicism believes in the possibility of a high degree of self-harmonization in this life by means of the discipline of reason and the faithful use of the means of grace.

What are the elements in human life which prevent the Beatific Vision with its consequent full self-acceptance? Part of the answer is, the continued activity of the "lower appetite of sensuality." According to Thomas and the Tridentine Fathers concupiscence remains always in man not as *per se* sinful but as the *fomes peccati*, the tinder of sin.²⁹ For the most part the Catholic Church, following Augustine, tends to identify concupiscence with sensuality and sexuality. Since man cannot entirely rid himself of concupiscence in this life he fails to find full reconciliation with God. The most that he can do is to mortify concupiscent tendencies by strict regulation according to the principles laid down by the church.

From Paul himself the motto is taken: "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences." ³⁰

— Ignorance is another element which prevents life's fuller realization. Catholic thought places great stress on this. Every man is believed to need education in faith and morals just as he needs education in health or mathematics. As Rickaby expresses the idea: "There is no authentic copy of the moral law, printed, framed, and hung up by the hand of Nature, in the inner sanctuary of every human heart. *Man has to learn his duties.*" ³¹ This means that man's conscience at any particular stage of life may direct him erroneously, dictate wrong principles, or fail to speak as it should. The individual conscience has value only in so far as it perceives and understands the natural and revealed moral laws of the universe correctly. "*The voice of conscience*, whatever feeling it may stir *must be an intellectual utterance*, and, to be worth anything in a case of difficulty, a *reasoned conclusion*, based on observation of facts, and application of principles, and consultation with moral theologians and casuists." ³² Herein lies one of the great functions of the church body: the education of the individual conscience so that ignorance, and concupiscence, may be progressively overcome.

- A third major obstacle to the temporal realization of beatitude
- is fear or anxiety, which often gives rise to irrational movements in
- the soul and sometimes issues in actual disobedience. Concupiscence, ignorance, and fear are all mitigating factors in Catholic penitential practice. Their presence in any particular attitude or act is held to diminish the objective sinfulness of it. In agreement with Protestant Christianity, Catholicism regards anxiety as an inevitable factor in human existence, but it does not attach responsibility to the attitudes and acts which issue from this anxiety as Protestantism does. As has been mentioned, in so far as fear enters disruptively into human thought and conduct it is regarded as at worst venial rather than mortal. What is more, Catholics understand that faithful participation in the church involves the reception of that transforming grace which reduces basic anxiety in significant though indeterminate degree. For these reasons fear is not considered to be a wholly insurmountable obstacle in this

life, and yet it is recognized as an intrinsic human factor which must be dealt with over and over again in mortal life.

THE CHURCH AS THE MEDIATOR OF SALVATION

It will be quite apparent from what has been presented that the church plays a central part in the minds of the exponents of the Christian forensic pathway. This is explicit in Roman Catholicism where it is claimed that the church is the only mediator of salvation between man and God. The Church of Rome declares that it holds the "keys of the kingdom" committed by Christ to Peter, and that these keys have remained ever since in the possession of the Catholic Church. The Vatican Council of 1870 completed the formal claim of this Church to spiritual authority over all mankind by adopting the dogma of papal infallibility. This dogma teaches that when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, in his office as spiritual head of the Church with the intent to define a doctrine of faith or morals and to bind all Christians to it, his word is divinely guaranteed against all error and is final.³³ This claim symbolizes the conviction that the church alone knows what is good for man, and that man can discover that good only in so far as he surrenders to the church. There are at least four important ways in which the Catholic Church functions as the mediator of salvation. Each may be considered briefly.

The chief function of the church is that of complete provision for the mediation of divine grace to man through the sacraments. In the sacraments, when rightly administered and faithfully received, divine grace lays hold on man and transforms him from a child of natural disharmony into a being truly and supernaturally reconciled with God. By far the most important of the sacraments is the Mass. In fact all the other sacraments are to be understood either as preparations for it or as means of carrying forward the divine work which it has begun. In the Mass the transcendent miracle of transubstantiation takes place, as Catholics believe—a miracle through which the believer is enabled to feed upon the very Body and Blood of his Saviour; and what is more moving still, the divine sacrifice on Calvary is represented in bloodless form

so that new merit is created which becomes available for the needs of new generations of sinners on earth and in purgatory. Nothing is more important for the Catholic than faithful participation in this reconciling rite of his religion—it is the chief means of divine forgiveness and the earnest of eternal reconciliation with God.

2 A second indispensable role of the church in the forensic view is that of education. In principle, the Roman Catholic Church, for example, regards itself as the *ecclesia docens* and claims all education for its field. It is no exaggeration to say, with William Adams Brown, that the Roman Church “makes itself responsible for what its members think all along the line. . . . Every phase of contemporary activity, whether it be economic, political, or social, falls within the purview of the church.”³⁴ Within the past fifty years, for example, the Vatican has issued encyclicals on such important and diverse subjects as labor, youth education, marriage, social reconstruction, and communism. To be sure, encyclicals are instructions, not dogmatical definitions or decrees. However, in this way as in many others the Roman Church educates its clergy and its laity to certain points of view toward the various aspects and relationships of worldly life and thought. It is immediately apparent that this function of the forensic institution is of great importance for the idea of self-acceptance.

3 Even more significant is the place which the forensic view gives to the church in the direction of faith and morals. “The authority which the Catholic sees in the Church is *not limited anywhere* in the field of faith and morals,” declares Brunini. “He does not appeal beyond her to the Bible, for to do so would be to assert that a part is greater than the whole.”³⁵

4 The Catholic Church directs the consciences of the faithful by means of preaching, teaching, and most of all through the penitential system, most completely worked out in the Roman communion. Through the practice of confession “the church attempts to reach each individual, . . . keep in touch, not only with his acts, but with his thoughts and desires, and prescribe what it wishes him to do under conditions which give the best promise of success.”³⁶ There are two major functions of the confessional; the

dominant one is that of absolution, the other is that of counsel. Through the first, the individual receives remission of part or all of the temporal punishment of his sins by accepting a less disagreeable equivalent after appropriate confession and repentance and, hence, reconciliation with God. Through the latter, the individual receives advice calculated to enable him to walk more righteously in the sight of God hereafter. Counsel is based upon the moral theology of the church, and may be given to the penitent in the forms of correction, precept, or information.³⁷

There is yet another way in which the church acts as the mediator of salvation to man in Christian forensicism: through its "fraternity of service," to use Dr. Brown's phrase. The Church of Rome, for instance, requires participation in certain of the sacraments and asks its members to assume certain other responsibilities for Mother Church. Sacramental requirements center in the observance of Masses as well as various acts of devotion which may have no immediate connection with the stated rites of the church. The moral responsibilities of Catholic laymen have traditionally consisted of special acts of kindness and good will, particularly almsgiving, the winning of converts, and the raising of their children as Catholics.

In all these ways the churches which are Catholic in outlook make vital connection with the visible institution central for personal salvation. Sacraments, pronouncements upon manifold aspects of human activity and thought, direction of the individual's intellectual and moral life, and religio-moral activities—all are conceived to be very important in facilitating man's spiritual development, and all are conducted by the church.

TRANSMUNDANE ORIENTATION

Concern for the transmundane order of existence is characteristic of all Christianity but in special measure of its Catholic forms. Here the reality of the supernatural world is constantly brought to the attention of the believer in teaching and practice. Moreover the importance of earthly preparation for entry into Life beyond this life is emphasized, particularly in the Roman Church, to a

degree not found in Protestant circles, with the possible exception, that is, of the Fundamentalist groups, whose emphasis is largely negative.³⁸

The reality of the heavenly world is brought home to Catholic believers in many practical ways for which Protestantism has no parallels. Catholic Christianity places great stress upon full symbolical representation in its sanctuaries, its liturgies, and its priesthood. There are, for example, many physical objects in a Catholic church: statues and pictures of the saints, the Virgin Mary, and the Christ-child, altars, crucifixes, candles, and a host of lesser objects, such as the alms-box. There are symbolic acts, such as the elevation of the host and the sign of the cross. The church building itself is a great symbol regarded much more sacredly in and of itself than is usually true of Protestant churches. By far the most significant symbols, of course, are those connected with the sacraments, notably the "host," received in the Mass as the climax of the sacramental act. All of these religious symbols serve to remind the worshiper that he is a part of another order of things, and to enable him to grow in grace through the right use of these gracious media. For, to the Catholic, Christian symbols are not merely signs of realities not present to sense, realities that must be grasped by the imagination or the reason. They are things in which the reality signified *is truly present*; in them nature and supernature are understood to meet so that by means of them the earthbound creature is gradually fitted to live as an infinite and perfected being in a heavenly and deathless order.

The Catholic lives at the same time in two worlds: this familiar world of space and time, of persons and things, in which all of us exist, but at the same time in another world, no less real, no less accessible, no less substantial, to which the sacraments of religion introduce him. It is the heavenly world in which God has his home, and the angels, and the saints. And this world, unseen though it be, is everywhere present.³⁹

✓ Whereas Protestantism utilizes the sacraments chiefly to strengthen man for the living of his earthly life, Catholicism lays

✓ a great deal of stress upon their importance for the transmundane

life, not ignoring the present, to be sure, as the sacraments of confirmation, orders, and marriage most clearly indicate. The other Catholic sacraments have a marked transmundane orientation. Baptism, for example, is necessary for eternal life. Indeed it is believed that "the soul cannot enter into supernatural life unless this sacrament is received—whether actually or in desire."⁴⁰ Likewise the Mass is urged upon the believer not only because it strengthens him as a Christian here but because it is the principal preparation for the life beyond. The Catholic Church teaches that "whoever receives this sacrament signifies by his action that he is united to Christ and is one with the members of Christ."⁴¹ Thus the individual Catholic is introduced into that transmundane society of souls which includes the suffering in purgatory and the saints in heaven. The sacrament of penance also forcibly reminds the believer of another world. Since it is taught that "one downright wilful and grievous transgression outweighs with God" all a man's former good deeds, this sacrament offers the means of rendering one's debt to God.⁴² In this way penance continually reminds man that he stands before the Supreme Lawgiver, in whose sight he must one day be finally judged and rewarded or punished, as the case may be. Still another sacrament, extreme unction, specifically directs attention to the next world. In Brunini's words, it is the sacrament which equips man for the "supernatural life through eternity."⁴³ True, the total sacramental system of Catholic Christianity has definite effects relative to this life, but there is in it the marked transmundanity which we have just outlined.

The practice of venerating the Virgin Mary, the saints, and angels, in Catholicism also makes for an other-worldly consciousness. Mary and the saints furnish the Catholic believer with examples of true religion, and they incarnate the virtues of the Christian life to which the Christian is counseled to aspire. This is true in a unique way of Mary, the paragon of virtue and holiness, to whom all honor is given by Catholics. Actually all those in the "church triumphant" are regarded by Catholicism as helpers of the living. One of the marks of the true saint, so far at least as the Church of Rome is concerned, is that it can be proved that after

death he or she has performed at least three miracles. To the greater saints, and to Mary most of all, the working of miracles is frequently attributed.⁴⁴ Before God the saints serve as intercessors for those on earth and those in purgatory.⁴⁵ Through the attention which is directed to these heavenly beings the Catholic Church further fosters a vivid sense of continuity with the supernatural world.

The thought of purgatory also plays a part in Roman Catholicism as a transmundane element. The teaching is that while those who depart from this life may be fundamentally approved by the Supreme Lawgiver for entrance into heaven they themselves may not be ready for it. Such souls must be cleansed of their remaining sins or endure temporal punishment for their forgiven sins if this debt is not yet paid; all this takes place in purgatory. The Tridentine Council declared "that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained are relieved by the suffrages of the faithful, but chiefly the acceptable sacrifice of the altar."⁴⁶ Thus it is taught that the living in the "church militant" are both able and obligated to pray and offer works of atonement for those in the "church suffering." The outcome of this belief is the continued concern of Catholics for those who have passed on and particularly for their own relatives whose purgatorial torments they must strive to alleviate as long as, according to the church, these souls remain "between heaven and hell." The idea of purgatory provides what is possibly the most intimate connection between the mundane and the transmundane sphere of life. As one American Catholic puts it: "It keeps us in touch with our relatives and friends who have gone before us. It assures us that we can reach eternity and help them by our prayers."⁴⁷

✓ Traditionally the Catholic Church has made a negative other-worldly emphasis, also, which, we have noted, is made by Protestant Fundamentalism today—viz., the preaching of hell-fire and damnation. It is official Roman teaching that hell is a reality, that it is everlasting, and that the punishment therein is according to the individual's deserts. Brunini declares that the Church neither approves nor disapproves the vivid and imaginative descriptions of

sufferings to be found in Dante's *Inferno*.⁴⁸ In any case majority opinion favors a literal interpretation of hell, that is, real fire producing pain eternally.⁴⁹ The practical application of this doctrine is manifest in the threat of damnation that hangs over man outside the visible church. "Life after death will be spent either in heaven or hell," it is pointed out. Therefore, man "must win or lose salvation within the earthly days allotted to him—once and for all eternity."⁵⁰ The only surety is the church.

STEPS ON THE FORENSIC PATHWAY

CONVICTION THAT GOD IS MAN'S HAPPINESS

In the light of the four dominant doctrines which inspire the advocates of the forensic pathway we can now consider the actual steps which they recommend. The first step on the path is, in the words of the great Bernard of Clairvaux, to realize that one "cannot exist by and through himself," and thus to begin "to seek and love God as indispensable to . . . [one's] own existence."⁵¹ It is not of particular importance that the individual despair deeply of himself and of his earthly securities as Christian rejectionism counsels. It matters only that he come in one way or another to the simple realization that he is made in a certain way for the purpose of progressing toward a certain end, and that it is only in conformity to this end that he can find real and lasting happiness.⁵²

The expression of this realization is faith. "Faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and the root of all justification," declared the Tridentine Council. Without faith "*it is impossible to please God*, and to come unto the fellowship of His sons."⁵³ For the exponents of this view, faith is a very concrete thing: it is trust in the church which, as Troeltsch puts it, has been endowed as an institution with "the objective treasures of grace and of redemption."⁵⁴ More especially, faith is belief in the teachings of the church, it is, as Koch explains,⁵⁵ that "by which a man firmly believes whatever God has revealed and the Church proposes on His authority." Of course, the *telos* or goal of true happiness is the contemplation of God, but this is not regarded as

an earthly possibility for any human creature. "Like the resurrection of the body, and much more even than that, the Beatific Vision must be relegated to the realm of the Supernatural," Rickaby reminds us.⁵⁶ But in the confidence that man may experience a degree of beatitude during his earthly life, and full beatitude in the life to come, the first step to be taken is the realization that God is, in Bernard's words, "indispensable to . . . one's own existence."

Characteristic of this viewpoint is the frank and open eudaemonism with which man is bidden to consider his nature and his destiny. In the last analysis, Catholic theologians note, all human ends are reducible to one: the search for happiness.⁵⁷ To be sure, the view we studied in the first chapter comes to a similar conclusion. But Catholic Christianity does not face this psychological fact with the kind of guilt feeling which characterizes the other view. Indeed, it does not hesitate to justify self-love and appeal to it. Consider, as a point of view, the declaration of the well-known Dominican moralist, Antony Koch:

Whilst we do not deny that Catholic moral teaching, like every other rational system of ethics, contains a eudaemonistic element, nay even a strain of "egoism," we must insist that this admixture is justifiable and supplies a most effective antidote against precisely that false egotism which our enemies charge against us, inasmuch as it emphasizes true charity (love of God and neighbor). We claim that the moral teaching of Christ effectively reconciles and combines altruism with egoism.⁵⁸

- From this standpoint man's confidence in reason or in finite spiritual forms and practices, his concern for worldly achievement or his interest in sensual forms of security are not regarded as forms of self-centeredness in contradistinction to God-centeredness but simply as lower forms of self-centeredness. It is quite justifiable, as a matter of fact it is unavoidable, that man seeks God himself for selfish reasons. Even the Bible takes this into account: "Sacred Scripture again and again exhorts men to strive for eternal happiness and promises the joys of Heaven as a reward for obeying the law of God," declares Koch.⁵⁹ Catholic theology makes its basic

appeal to man on the ground that "only the possession of God can make man perfectly happy." ⁶⁰

Rational contemplation of God.—In beginning to seek God it is most important to exercise the intellect. The advocates of the view we are considering constantly urge this upon their followers, even more so, of course, upon the "religious" than upon the laity. Even if the highest play of reason, which would be the life of unalloyed contemplation, cannot be experienced in this world, every man should cultivate rationality. The counsel of the Christian forensic view is: subject "appetite to reason by temperance, and the will to reason by justice, and reason herself by a 'reasonable service' to God." ⁶¹

Lest this rational cultivation of God be thought of as a cold, abstracting activity it should be noted that this is far from the actual case. In Catholic piety, contemplation involves the instincts and the emotions as well as the rational consciousness. We have mentioned some elements of the full symbolical representation connected with the sanctuary, the liturgy, and the priesthood of Catholicism, all of which provide for the orientation of the believer to God and the supernatural order. Specifically, we may mention here the stations of the cross, which help to recall to memory the stages of Christ's passion from the judgment hall of Pilate to Calvary and the cross; the rosary, which is designed to help recall the church's teaching about prayer and to provide the individual with helps for its practice; and the missal, which contains all that is said and sung at Mass for each and every day of the year. The most important of contemplative exercises is prayer itself. "And by prayer the Catholic means not petition simply, but adoration. To be pious in the Catholic sense one must fix one's attention upon God and hold it there." ⁶² Indeed, as Baron von Hugel declared, "Religion is adoration." After all, reiterates Rickaby, happiness rests upon contemplation and contemplation is a matter of habit which must be formed by frequent acts. "It is, then, important for man in this life so to act as to acquire a habit of lifting his mind to God." ⁶³

Apart from the exercise of the mind in pious contemplation,

there is a strong appeal in Catholicism for man to use his intellect for the sake of buttressing his religious beliefs and for strengthening his conviction that God is his true end and complete happiness. Professor Connell illustrates this when he writes in a popular pamphlet that it is not as important for a Catholic to feel that God exists as it is for him to know it, that is to have reasons for believing it.⁶⁴ The forensic writers, whether addressing scholars or the populace at large, seldom fail to base their positions upon careful logic. Fundamental in their theology is this principle, elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, that the natural and the supernatural are complementary, not contradictory, as in the view of Barth, for instance. This implies first of all that the human mind is naturally capable of reaching and understanding objective reality, if rightly led.⁶⁵ On this conviction Catholics advance their entire system of natural theology. It is held that sense-knowledge can lead to knowledge even of those things which are beyond sense, as Thomas declared, following Aristotle.⁶⁶ Notably it asks man to pursue the implications of his law-abiding universe by a *posteriori* reasoning from motion to a Prime Mover, from efficient or secondary causes to a First Cause, from contingent existence to a necessary Being.⁶⁷ Catholicism today, as in the time of Thomas, places a definite measure of confidence in the power of truth to impress the *species intelligibiles*. So Connell can confidently invite all his readers to "study the question of God's existence from the standpoint of pure reason," confident that the church's arguments for Him are "sufficiently clear and simple to be understood by the least educated, yet sufficiently convincing to win the assent of the most brilliant genius."⁶⁸ So also Catholicism places stress upon the indoctrination of the young. "To be education in the proper sense, the training of the young must include the understanding of the solid, logical argument for the existence of an intelligent, personal Creator."⁶⁹

Volitional cultivation of God.—It has been explained that freedom of the will is a dominant doctrine of the Christian forensic exponents. To will to find one's happiness in God is fully as important if not more so than to know intellectually that God is man's true end. Of course the two factors are inseparable in actual

temporal life, the contemplation of God which accompanies participation in the Mass or the saying of the rosary, for instance, clearly involves rational and volitional elements. The achievement of regeneration, of greater harmony and fullness in life, is neither compulsory nor a magical process, as Koch has pointed out, but one which takes place in a manner corresponding to human nature, that is, "by the free co-operation of the will with grace."⁷⁰ It remains to be asked just what kind of psychological freedom this implies, and how man is advised to use it to advance his beatitude.

Professor John A. O'Brien of Notre Dame University has recently summarized this Catholic view for laymen. He explains that free will does not imply "causeless" or "motiveless" volition at all.⁷¹ Neither does free will mean that all of a person's acts are free. Some human acts are automatic, such as breathing and winking. Other acts are compulsive or pathological, such as pyromania or some kinds of stealing. What free will means is capacity to choose between alternative motivations as they present themselves. It is the power to do an act or to refrain from doing it. Every man is so constituted, according to Catholic teaching. "The individual is not compelled by external circumstances or by the internal forces of heredity to make all his choices and issue all his volitions."⁷² To be sure, these may profoundly influence him, tipping the scales in one direction or the other, but it really remains for the self, the ego, to choose between alternatives, to do or not to do, and to approve or not to approve acts once done. O'Brien epitomizes the Catholic concept of free will neatly and conclusively when he writes:

Man is driven by his very nature to seek happiness. *Thus we are not free to will happiness or not to will it.* It is a necessary volition.

The means of achieving happiness, however, are by no means perfectly clear. *A great variety of means looms up before the imagination.* These the intellect can explore, and scrutinize the closeness of their relationship with the end sought. *Among these various means the will can freely choose.* Freedom manifests itself not in choosing to be happy, but in choosing the *means*

that make one happy. This does not reduce freedom to a mere question of intellectual discernment. *For the search for happiness involves the inhibition of desires and the restraint of impulses driving to contrary ends.*⁷³

Of course, without the intellectual capacity to conceive ends and the relations of means to ends there would be no possibility of making choices. Thus Catholic thought comes back to the inseparableness of intellect and volition in man. What the will is drawn to depends upon what possible goods the intellect can conceive. In other words the degree of beatitude possessed by an individual at any particular stage of life depends partly upon the degree to which he is cognizant of unlimited and unalloyed good, which to the Catholic means God. And also, the degree of beatitude depends partly upon the degree to which he directs attention to "God-ward" motives, motives leading to the contemplation of God. In all matters, religious, moral, and non-moral, Catholicism counsels rational and volitional activity.

The first step on the forensic pathway to self-acceptance—which in all forms of Christianity is really the derivative of acceptance by God, as became evident in the first chapter—is rational and volitional concern for God, man's true happiness. It should be noted that there is considerable optimism about man's destiny, among the exponents of this path, optimism even as to what can happen to man in the temporal sphere, if he co-operates. Professor A. E. Taylor of Edinburgh, in one of *The Anglo-Catholic Congress Books*, voices this when he writes:

In the natural order of things, it may be that an effort of attention is just the one strictly original contribution human personality can make to the control of the course of events. If it is really in our own power to make such an effort, then our habits are not simply predestined for us by our inheritance of temperament, nor our characters fixed beyond recall by the habits we have acquired. Our ordinary conviction that we can resist the formation of evil habits, or conquer them, if we will make the effort, will be just the truth. And if Christianity is right in holding that we are not left to shape our characters by our own unaided efforts,

but may obtain the help of God's grace by honestly asking for it, clearly we have in prayer to God, and again in the sacraments, a most potent source of augmented freedom.⁷⁴

This statement points to the importance of participation in the visible church, which is the next step on the Christian forensic pathway.⁷⁵

PARTICIPATION IN THE VISIBLE CHURCH

We have noted a number of times in this chapter the central place which is given to the historical, ecclesiastical institution by advocates of the Christian forensic view. "*Salus extra ecclesiam non est*," as the ancient Cyprian first put it. It has been shown that the church provides a number of things for the individual without which there is no ordinary hope of salvation, among them, rules of faith and morals, guiding pronouncements, and the sacraments, all of utmost importance for self-acceptance. The components of genuine participation in the visible church are two: confidence in the church's authority, and acceptance of the church's sacraments—these are indispensable requirements for all who want to make progress toward beatitude along the forensic path.

Confidence in the church's authority.—It is necessary to accept the church as God's own sure and certain revelation of the pathway to Life. Within the Catholic Church the one sin for which there is no forgiveness is unbelief, and unbelief means unwillingness to accept at its full value and in the sense that the church intends whatever its authorized representatives may teach.⁷⁶ Consider Cardinal Newman's revelation of his own confidence in the authority of the church. It exemplifies the confidence which proponents of the pathway under consideration urge upon all their disciples: "People say that the doctrine of transubstantiation is difficult to believe; I did not believe the doctrine till I was a Catholic. I had no difficulty in believing it, as soon as I believed that the Catholic Roman Church was the oracle of God, and that she had declared this doctrine to be part of the original revelation." ⁷⁷ To be sure, the believer is counseled to try to gain as complete an understanding of the church's authority and of its doctrines as possible. This is

always possible to some extent for the rational being. However, since the most brilliant intellect is necessarily limited, and, what is more, since there are some truths so sublime they could never be known except man were told about them; therefore, in the last analysis, confidence in the church's authority is necessary. The Roman Church declares that man is under "grave obligation to know [at least] the contents of the Apostles' Creed, the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, and all that is required for the worthy reception of the Sacraments and for proper participation in public worship."⁷⁸ In principle participation in the visible church means acknowledgment from the start that the church is unquestionably right and is to be followed in all matters of religious belief and moral conduct on which it has chosen to declare itself. Brunini, a faithful Catholic layman, puts it bluntly: "*He who is at the door of Catholicism must believe, at least by general intention, whatever the Church proposes as a truth revealed by God.*"⁷⁹

Acceptance of the church's sacraments.—The other component of membership in the church is partaking of the sacraments. Confidence in the church is expressed by acceptance of her rites. If man would find reconciliation with God along the forensic pathway he must at least receive baptism and also penance if he commits mortal sin after baptism. Confirmation and extreme unction are enjoined, and may not be disregarded. The Eucharist must be received as a matter of divine precept: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you."⁸⁰ The sacraments offer to the faithful and contrite heart remission of sins, opportunity to make restoration, fellowship with a vast and loving company of the seen and the unseen, and assurance of transmundane fulfillment. Penance and the Mass, the two sacraments which are repeatable, naturally play the largest part in man's earthly travel along the forensic path.

The sacrament of penance provides the principal illustration of reconciliation with God through remission of sins. Upon entering the confessional the penitent is expected to give brief, specific, and truthful account of at least his grievous sins since his baptism or his last confession. If the priest is dissatisfied with the confession,

deeming it too general or incomplete or in other ways unsatisfactory, his duty is to instruct the penitent accordingly. For example, Davis notes that some who come to confession are excessively worried about their sins and recur to those they have confessed before. "The wise confessor will put the matter right once and for all, and will forbid the penitent to go back on the subject in future confessions."⁸¹ In Roman Catholic practice when the confession is completed satisfactorily—and usually it takes only a few minutes—prayers are said and the priest grants absolution, "*Ego te absolvo ab omnibus censuris et peccatis, in nomine Patris et Spiritus Sancti. Amen.*" Confession, explains a popular pamphlet on the subject, "is God's own sweet method of reconciliation with His wayward children. It's the most blessed assurance of peace and freedom from guilt that could come to the human heart."⁸²

Opportunity to make restoration to God for one's confessed transgressions is also offered through the sacrament of penance. "The confessor is in duty bound to impose upon every penitent a sacramental penance," which must be suitable to the case.⁸³ The reasoning behind this requirement is that there are consequences of sin that cannot be got rid of by repentance. Even the Divine Forgiveness confers no exemption from the temporal penalties which attach to violations of the moral law. Through "works of piety," such as prayers or hearing masses, through "works of mortification," such as fasting, and through "medicinal penances," which might be any worthy act performed for the purpose of overcoming a bad habit, the individual is given new opportunity to do God's will.⁸⁴ The confessor should try not to allow any penitent to despair of ever obtaining a complete victory, writes the Anglican priest, Francis Belton, "he should try to inflame his heart with the thought of Divine love, and encourage him to greater effort."⁸⁵

By participation in the sacraments of the church man is offered the fellowship of those on earth, those suffering, and those in glory. No one has expressed the sense of membership in the Communion of Saints more acceptably than the Roman Catholic priest, Frederick W. Faber, whose hymn "Faith of Our Fathers" (1849) is sung the world around by Protestants as well as by Catholics. The

inspiration and the challenge of those who have gone on to their reward as well as the feeling of present communion with them can be felt in these lines:

*Faith of our fathers, living still
In spite of dungeon, fire and sword,
O how our hearts beat high with joy
Whene'er we hear that glorious word!
Faith of our fathers, holy faith,
We will be true to thee till death.*

*Faith of our fathers, we will strive
To win all nations unto thee;
And through the truth that comes from God
Mankind shall then indeed be free:
Faith of our fathers, holy faith,
We will be true to thee till death.*

Finally, the acceptance of the church's sacraments enjoined upon the individual by advocates of the forensic pathway enables him to journey in the confidence of a transmundane fulfillment. Here we may refer to the rule of Rickaby cited at the beginning of this chapter. Now, it may be seen not only as a precept but as a promise. Self-regulation here, which involves rational and volitional focus upon God and participation in his church, assures full happiness beyond the grave. Within the church man need have no fear of eternal punishment or of death itself. Through participation in the visible church man faces life beyond the grave with the confidence that the church which was given control over the kingdom of earth has control of the kingdom of heaven, also.⁸⁶

SELF-REGULATION OF PRIVATE LIFE

- He who has come into conviction that God is his happiness and
- enters into the church in order to partake of this beatitude must
- go farther. He must strive earnestly to regulate his private life in
- conformity with the will of God made known in the church, no
- matter what the cost. Clearly this is implied in all that has been

presented, but several aspects of this self-regulation are so important for self-acceptance that they must be considered in greater detail. Specifically, man is asked to regulate his sensuality and sexuality, his family life, his beliefs, and his moral ideals. That this may not give man complete happiness in this life is freely granted. "The Christianity of the New Testament is appallingly uncompromising on the point," Professor Taylor reminds us. "It demands in the plainest language that its followers shall sacrifice very real earthly good."⁸⁷ On the Christian forensic pathway man must be prepared to "put out the right eye," or "cut off the right hand" if need be.⁸⁸

*Regulation of sensuality and sexuality.**—One of the most important steps for man is the regulation of his native hungers. Gratification of the senses, or exercise of what Davis calls the "animal appetencies," is not considered evil *per se* by Catholic thinkers any more than it is by Protestant ones. The official position of the Roman Catholic Church is reflected in these words from Davis:

Now God has endowed man with these appetites, which run through the whole gamut of his sensitive life. They are instruments of self-preservation. A man without them from his birth . . . would be like an inert, immovable, and homogeneous mass of jelly, with no capacity for change, growth, evolution or improvement. Indeed, God has most wisely, we may be sure, added to our natural activities a sense of pleasure, as He has given to our intellects an innate desire for truth, and to our will an innate striving after the good, so that we may truly live and exercise all our faculties with pleasure, but according to right reason, which should dominate every activity, an orderly and harmonious microcosm. *Concupiscence in this sense, as is evident, it in itself neither good nor bad; it is simply natural tendency.*⁸⁹

This is nothing more than an amplification of Thomas Aquinas' own view. In reference to the basic hungers, food and sex, Thomas said:

* Again, in this chapter, "sensuality" and "sexuality" are used in their primary, neutral sense.

Now as the use of food is directed to the preservation of the life of one man, so is the use of sexual intercourse directed to the preservation of the whole race of mankind. *And therefore as the use of food can be without sin, when it is done in due mode and order as is proper for the welfare of the body, so the use of sexual intercourse can be without sin, done in due mode and order as is proper to the end of human generation.*⁹⁰

The stress here is placed upon the ordered expression of sensuality. This is particularly important and has austere implications when it comes to sexuality, as will be pointed out.

For Catholics the danger is that sensuality will exceed reasonable bounds thus distracting man from his true end. Catholicism is even more sensitive to the perils which inhere in sensuality than is the Protestantism of the type described in the first chapter—and that type of Christianity sees a number of perils. Concupiscence is practically identified with bodily appetites; concupiscence is not sin but it is an “incentive to sin.”⁹¹ “It is left for us to strive against,” as the Council of Trent puts it; it is something to “resist manfully by the grace of Jesus Christ.”⁹² The seriousness with which the Roman Catholic Church undertakes to school the faithful in self-regulation of the body is unparalleled in Christianity. Davis himself goes so far as to say that “the *whole process* of moral education, both of the young and of persons in maturer years, is a process of gaining command by repeated acts over all the movements of the sensitive appetite.”⁹³

Undoubtedly Catholic rigorism in this regard stems from the patristic period of the Christian Church when sensuality and sexuality were commonly regarded as intrinsically evil. Particularly was this true in the West. Tertullian (born c. 160. A. D.) and still more Jerome (347–420) and Augustine looked upon the suppression of sexual impulses as good in itself. It is true that Augustine did not regard conjugal intercourse as sin, if its purpose was the generation of children. However, it is also true that he failed to distinguish between concupiscence and sin, practically identified concupiscence with sexuality, and further advanced the idea that sex is the instrument by which original sin is transmitted.⁹⁴ All this

had its effect. "In the Catholic Church suppression of sex life was regarded as a meritorious act, by means of which every believer could gain a special divine reward, and, in certain circumstances, had a definite claim to such reward."⁹⁵ Marriage, also, was fully justified only by the intention to bear children. And apparently in the patristic and medieval periods of the Roman Church it was not usually held that even marriage could legitimately be regarded as *remedium concupiscentiae*, although this is generally accepted today by the Catholic Church as a "secondary" aim of marriage.⁹⁶

As has been mentioned, the Catholic Church today does not hold that the appetites are evil *per se*. However, the idea that complete denial is the best way has not been abandoned, as is evidenced by "Evangelical Counsels": poverty, chastity, and obedience, the rule of all the religious orders. In Catholicism virginity remains the higher, nobler state and is "absolutely more pleasing to God."⁹⁷ But marriage is simply a practical necessity for some men and women: "It is better to marry than to be burnt," as the Douay Bible significantly translates Paul's admonition.⁹⁸ What is asked by this Church in the realm of sensuality is conscious self-regulation which borders on deliberate mortification. As Davis warns, concupiscent desires, while natural, "will be the occasion of sin if they are accepted consciously and deliberately."⁹⁹

On the adult level, the Roman Church is most explicit in its demand for self-regulation at the point of sexuality. This is exemplified in its determined opposition to birth control. Birth control is described in Pius XI's monumental encyclical, *Casti Connubii* (1930), as a "shameful and intrinsically vicious" thing, a "grave sin." Quoting Augustine, the Pope declared, "Intercourse even with one's legitimate wife is unlawful and wicked where the conception of the offspring is prevented. Onan, the son of Juda, did this and the Lord killed him for it."¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, those who tread the Roman Catholic pathway must allow themselves to engage in the marital act only when they are willing to take responsibility for the consequences, although "it is permissible to limit sexual intercourse to the period during which conception does not ordinarily take place."¹⁰¹ It is not untrue to say that the

Roman Church stresses relative sexual abstinence for all as a fundamental virtue. It is a solemn obligation in marriage that Catholics abstain from non-conjugal intercourse, and from conjugal intercourse which is only for the sake of pleasure.¹⁰²

With equal vigor this church urges the regulation of sensuality and sexuality upon its children and youth. For example, Davis admonishes parochial school leaders and Catholic parents to do the following things, among others, in order to train children and youth aright: moderate strictly all gratification of the sensitive appetites; help youth to practice positive mortification, such as going without trivial necessities or pleasant unnecessaries; urge children to expel immediately all impure phantasies; teach them to avoid "soft and sentimental friendships with those of the opposite sex at a comparatively early age, since such friendships induce precocious sexuality"; disapprove of mixed dances between small boys and girls; prevent coeducation up to the age of puberty, if not earlier; prevent mixed games and camps especially after the age of puberty; discourage promiscuous and general friendships between the sexes.¹⁰³

The positive ideal of the Roman Church for its disciples young and old is very definite and far more detailed than in that of any other Christian church. It is expressed in these words:

Religious education consists [among other things] in the appreciation of the virtue of chastity, the abhorrence of impurity as sinful, . . . the cultivation of modesty in all places and at all times, . . . prompt resistance to temptations against chastity, however vehement they may be, sorrow for sins even of frailty, gratitude for victory over temptation, horror of the lax standard of worldly persons who proclaim that chastity is impossible.¹⁰⁴

Regulation of family life.—Dr. Anthony Ostheimer, in his Thomistic study of the family, finds that the doctors of his church have approved marriage almost solely on the grounds of procreation and the education of children until very recent times. That marriage might rightly be (even) *sedatio concupiscentiae* or (still less likely) *mutuum adiutorium* finds little approval in patristic and medieval Catholicism, he says.¹⁰⁵ Today, however, there seem to be some who place emphasis on "real conjugal love, and the development

of human personality, as well as the good of offspring.”¹⁰⁶ Of course, the idea of marriage as the remedy for passion is widely accepted now. Still, the forensic view places even graver responsibility upon those who enter marriage than the rejectionist view. The responsibility varies, in part, according to the sex and the status (whether parent or child) of the individual. We can mention only the regulations which have special bearing upon self-acceptance.

Most important is the maintenance of marriage for length of days. Marriage is “a perpetual and indissoluble bond which cannot therefore be dissolved by any civil law,” *Casti Connubii* reiterates.¹⁰⁷ The words of Jerome to the effect that second marriages for any reason whatsoever are adulterous relationships are still quoted with approval—so indissoluble is marriage held to be.¹⁰⁸ With certain exceptions, therefore, the forensic disciple is required to maintain his or her first marriage for life, unless papal dispensation for annulment is obtained. To be sure, separation is always a possibility; divorce, hardly ever.¹⁰⁹

Of special significance for feminine self-acceptance is the Catholic principle of subordination. The “order of love,” as it is termed, “includes both the primacy of the husband with regard to the wife and children, the ready subjection of the wife and her willing obedience.”¹¹⁰ Subordination differs from both degradation and exploitation, Ostheimer points out: “Legitimate subordination permits the retaining of all that is one’s own, as a person, while common effort is made to attain to other goods for all.”¹¹¹ While the unique place and function of woman is emphasized, Catholic teachers unfailingly inculcate the principle of female subordination. Paul’s dictum is definitive here: “Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord, because the husband is head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church.”¹¹²

The child is of great concern to Catholicism, as he is to all forms of Christianity. However, more provision is made for his “correct” upbringing in the church and in the family by Roman Catholicism than by other churches. Fundamental to this training is what might be called will-education. From the beginning the priest and the parents are expected to teach the little child how to be “good,”

assuming, with allowances for age, sex, and so forth, that the child can be good if he wills. The forensic pathway imposes two types of self-regulation upon the child: immediate obedience to his superiors, and control of himself at all times in accordance with their precepts. "The duty of filial *obedience* . . . is co-extensive with parental authority, and hence comprises whatever is subject to that authority, *i.e.*, all matters of education and domestic government," explains Koch.¹¹³ This is simple Scriptural teaching. It follows from the Fourth Commandment: "Honor thy father and thy mother."¹¹⁴ While parents are strongly adjured not to misuse their authority over their children, the weight of responsibility falls upon the child. Moreover, under penalty of grave sin, Catholic children are bound to regulate themselves everywhere in accordance with what they have been taught. "Children owe reverence to their parents as long as they live, nay, beyond the grave." Such reverence is even held to forbid criticism of parental views or conduct. Koch can say, "Reverence forbids us to reveal the faults of our parents."¹¹⁵

Regulation of beliefs.—It has already been pointed out that the forensic view asks the confidence of its disciples in "whatever God has revealed and the Church proposes on His authority." It has also been shown that Catholicism is characteristically rational in its approach to man and encourages him to understand its beliefs. However, the final authority upon which man must depend, if he would find beatitude, is objective authority. Only where the church has not spoken man is free to believe as he chooses. In partial justification of this attitude Rickaby asserts that the masses of men are not philosophers. "They have neither the time, nor intelligence, nor love of hard thinking sufficient to arrive at the final and adequate *why* and *wherefore*."¹¹⁶ Thus it is argued, they are led willy-nilly by custom and authority. For this reason authoritarianism is necessary as well as good for man. At best his private judgment is not as reliable as the church's certainties. More than this, much liberty of opinion is actually "mere wild humour and headstrong self-will."¹¹⁷ The church knows this, argue the exponents of this posi-

tion, and rightly it demands that man conform his ideas, at least by general intention, to whatever the custodian of truth explicitly proposes. In the last analysis, of course, the justification for the regulation of beliefs lies in the presupposition that the church has knowledge of salvation and power to obtain it for the individual, which cannot be otherwise obtained.

Regulation of moral ideals.—As man must regulate his passions, his home life, and his beliefs, so must he regulate his moral ideals, if he would progress toward beatitude. The moral ideals of Catholicism are the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance) and the three theological virtues (faith, hope and love. On a more exalted level are the “Evangelical Counsels” of poverty, chastity, and obedience. These last are mandatory only for those who have taken holy orders. They are perfected in the Virgin Mary and the saints and most of all in Christ the Lord. Typical of the idealization of moral virtue which the Catholic Church encourages, in the belief that the contemplation of the highest engenders more successful self-control in the believer, is this prayer to Mary by Johannes Hessen. One verse is quoted:

O let my soul be both
Virgin and Mother.
Pure as the Virgin,
Fertile as the Mother.
Banish everything that is base from my heart.
Grant me high thoughts
And a pure heart.
Fill me with thy Spirit, thy power.
May thy Son be born again in my soul.
Let me too become God-bearer,
God-messenger to my brothers and sisters,
So that thy Son may be born in them too
And thy Kingdom established. Amen.¹¹⁸

The Catholic may not have chosen the religious life. But, in his heart of hearts he feels that the saintly life is the kind he ought to

live. Even while he is still in this world, it is to the saint that he is directed for the ideal which inspires his every step and for aid which can supplement his own attempts at regulation.

Self-regulation, chiefly in the ways we have just presented, complements the internal conviction and the participation in the visible church—all steps on the Christian forensic pathway to self-acceptance. Do they issue in self-acceptance? The first quotation we used, a rule from Rickaby to the effect that happiness lies beyond this world but that in it man can surely prepare by ruling himself, indicates that fullness of life is not anticipated here. And yet, an earnest of beatitude with all that it implies for inward peace and harmony surely belongs to him who treads the forensic path. No more genuine testimony of this could be found than that of the French Dominican, M. J. Congar. He writes:

*The baptized child . . . lives in the Church, receiving all the support and illumination which are to be found in the great Catholic fellowship which, in the Communion of Saints, stretches beyond the bounds of the visible world. Through it he receives not only the teaching of the faith . . . but, in the exercise of his Christian life, he benefits by the support and guidance afforded by the hierarchy in whom is perpetuated, at least in part, the apostolic charisma. While retaining a large measure of initiative and spontaneity his practical life develops within an ordered Catholic whole, regulated as to its broad outline by a larger wisdom and prudence than his own, thus freeing him from a limited and exclusive outlook, enabling him to achieve a balanced judgment and life in veritable Catholic communion, first with God and then with his fellowmen. In his conformity with the rhythm of a social unit where all is devised for the increase of charity and for bringing souls under the influence of the Holy Spirit, he finds besides stability and encouragement, a fullness of forgiveness and fellowship to which a purely individual Christian experience could never attain.*¹¹⁹

CHAPTER THREE

The Meliorist Pathway to Self-Acceptance

No MAN is a more fitting representative of the meliorist pathway to self-acceptance than the keen, vigorous, and radiant founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley. In his now famous vindication of the doctrine of sanctification, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," Wesley declared that for many years he had been preaching, "There is a peace of God which passeth understanding." "Convince me," he challenged, "that this word has fallen to the ground, that in all these years none have attained this peace, that there is no living witness of it at this day, and I will preach it no more."¹ But Wesley did not cease to preach it, nor have many others from apostolic times to the present day. For Christian meliorists are convinced not only that a loving and very personal relationship with God is man's beatitude but that this can be progressively, though not completely, attained in this life. If there are not more who attain this fullness of life it is because it demands all of a man, his fullest co-operation.

Q. How are we to wait for this change?

A. Not in careless indifference, or indolent inactivity; but in vigorous, universal obedience, in a zealous keeping of all the commandments, in watchfulness and painfulness, in denying ourselves, and taking up our cross daily; as well as in earnest prayer and fasting, and a close attendance on all the ordinances of God. And if any man dream of attaining it in any other way, (yes, or of keeping it when it is attained, when he has received it even in the largest measure,) he deceiveth his own soul. It is true we receive it by simple faith. *But Goes does not, will not give that faith, unless we seek it with all diligence, in the way which he hath ordained.*²

We speak of this pathway as meliorist because it teaches with confidence that life can be more and more harmonious for man. This confidence is based primarily upon the reality of a loving God who is everywhere operative as redeeming power, and who actually effects radical subjective changes in willing individuals and groups. Of course, this Christian view does not believe that man can be delivered from making mistakes or that he can escape great temptations or be freed from "a thousand infirmities necessarily connected with flesh and blood."³ But it does believe that man as a creature can find himself increasingly "full of the work of faith, the patience of hope, the labour of love."⁴ Meliorism is pre-eminently that Christian view which thrills to the indeterminate possibilities not only of man but of his world under God. It envisions great and beneficent changes open to man by virtue of his real, if limited, freedom. And, seeing man thus surrounded by manifold resources, all within a harmonious universe and dependent in part upon his effort for development, meliorism endeavors to awaken him to the realization of these possibilities. It stresses the importance of man affirming himself and adapting what he has at hand, and above all it occupies itself with the elaboration of the positive means by which man can realize this greater beatitude.

Christian meliorists regard the New Testament as the principal source of their teaching. Here, for example, they find Jesus declaring, "But if I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is [*has?*] come upon you."⁵ They discover Pauline testimony to the effect that at least "the earnest of the Spirit" is a present possession of the Christian, and that real character changes are to be expected in the life of the believer.⁶ Most especially, they read in John's Gospel of the eternal life which the faithful disciple already experiences in Christ.⁷ Professor R. N. Flew points out that this Christian optimism about life and its possibilities is present but only to a limited extent in every subsequent period of the Church's history. He cites Clement of Alexandria as an illustration. Of him Flew writes, "Clement knows that we are living in God's world, and that it is God's will that we

should have God with us in it.”⁸ Flew also names Basil the Great (c. 330–379), Benedict of Monte Cassino (480–534), Francis of Assisi (1181–1226), and Dominic (c. 1170–1221) among others as outstanding Catholic representatives of the meliorist view.

However, these exponents did not expect radical transformations to take place generally in the life of the laity since they regarded observance of the “Evangelical Counsels” as a *sine qua non* of possible perfection. Thus it is in Protestantism that the meliorist form of Christianity finds its universal and inclusive application, though as Flew points out, “so far in Protestantism the aspirations after ‘perfect love’ have been more prominent in sects and coteries than in the teaching of the great church.”⁹ Yet, in Methodism of the eighteenth century, in Unitarianism of the early nineteenth century, and in the New Theology movement of the later nineteenth century, and in many branches of the Protestant Church today the Christian meliorist pathway finds full expression. Other proponents of this path will be mentioned by name as the view is developed. ✓

Historically, the view under discussion, while it has religious sources in patristic and medieval Christianity, has come to full flower only in the modern period of Western civilization. It has been influenced more obviously by secular developments than the other two views, which were well-established earlier. The rise of modern science and the consequent mastery over the material world which it made possible has fostered Christian meliorism. The concept of evolution has operated upon it in a similarly pervasive way. And no doubt the successful creation of a new and powerful civilization out of what was once an unproductive wilderness accounts for the fact that Christian meliorism finds its widest and most varied expressions in America.

The approach of the advocates of this pathway does not differ methodologically from that of those who hold contrasting views. Preaching, teaching, and counseling are the usual forms which are utilized. And, of course, this education is connected with the church, the sect, or the group, and involves whatever sacraments and ministry are understood to be ordained of God to facilitate the

- divine-human reconciliation. However, in meliorist circles, even more than in rejectionist ones, the stress is placed upon direct and autonomous experience of the individual soul with God. An extreme example is Roger Williams, who declared that for him the true Church was an invisible entity made up of the regenerate—an inward experience without physical form.¹⁰ A more typical point of view is found in the teaching of George Fox to the effect that since every man is “enlightened by the Divine Light of Christ” neither the Book nor the Church is adequate, final, or saving—only the “Light Within” is sufficient.¹¹ As a rule, organized Christian meliorism consciously seeks to construct its services so as to arouse, guide, and reinforce the Godward tendencies of the believer, placing ultimate responsibility upon the individual himself.¹²

THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-AFFIRMATION

THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD

- While all Christians believe with John that love is one of the chief attributes of the Godhead, the view here presented focuses upon God's love as the central and most relevant truth about Him. It is interesting to note that even the medieval mystics, who might be expected to stress the active and out-going love of God since they so earnestly urged and directed man's love to God, have little to say about the divine benevolence. Even Eckhart, the “father of German mysticism,” was not led to impute dynamic love to God's inmost nature. His was an idealistic system in which God, a term which he used to designate the Divine as revealed in Christ and in nature, was basically Deity, a term by which he meant to designate the Divine's unknowableness and passivity. Eckhart taught that God is to be loved not because he is lovable but because he is the ultimate One.¹³

In Martin Luther, James Arminius, the Wesleys, and Charles Chauncy, to name a few, we find increasing emphasis upon active and redeeming love as the chief characteristic of God. Dominant

in the preaching of these men is the idea that God is love and that this is made known in the person of Jesus Christ who incarnates the Father and who makes possible full salvation for all who come to God through Him. Charles Wesley's hymn (written in 1747) is a typical expression of the hope for redemption which this conviction has engendered:

Love divine, all loves excelling,
Joy of heaven to earth come down;
Fix in us Thy humble dwelling,
All Thy faithful mercies crown:
Jesus, Thou art all compassion,
Pure unbounded love Thou art;
Visit us with Thy salvation,
Enter every trembling heart.

One important implication in this hymn and in the whole idea of God as the Divine Benevolence is that it underlines the forgiving nature of God, that is, his readiness to forgive. Charles Chauncy, a Boston divine of the eighteenth century, found this idea of God so little recognized among Christians of his day and believed it to be so important for religion that he wrote in words that speak the mind of Christian meliorists universally:

It is *benevolence*, tempering our other qualities . . . that makes us worthy objects of each other's love, and lays the foundation for that mutual trust between man and man, without which there would be no such thing as public happiness.

And this observation . . . is equally true: Yes, it is so far true, with respect even to the uncreated Supreme Being himself, as that, if we had no idea of him as *benevolent*, we could not *esteem* him, though we might fear him; neither could we place our *trust* in him, though we might in a servile way, do homage to him. *Benevolence* is that ingredient in his character which exhibits him to our view as *amiably* perfect, and worthy of our warmest love, and entire confidence. His other attributes, separate from this, are insufficient to inspire these affections; nor are they indeed at all suited to such a purpose.¹⁴

- The benevolence of God means also that God has a cosmic purpose for the universe, one in which every individual has a part to play. "The true God is no *Deus absconditus*, hidden, withdrawn from our sight," writes a modern representative, "but a Creator that eternally utters Himself in and to His creatures." ¹⁵

The whole meaning of creation is . . . the origination of conscious spirits; for to them alone God can reveal Himself, and from them only can He obtain a response. Everything else, the whole material fabric, is but God's medium, as it were, for the shaping of souls, and we need not involve ourselves in difficulties by thinking of it as something created independently and standing, so to speak, on its own basis. There is, in strictness, no creation—no finite universe at all—till spirits are created. . . . Even spirits are not things that are "made." The bold metaphor of the Creed, "begotten not made," would indeed seem better to suggest the relation of every potential son of God to the Being whose image he bears and of whose nature he is invited to partake. . . . If the ultimate definition of God is Love, the divine life is *essentially* a process of self-communication, a life in and through others, and it is a contradiction to imagine Him existing without objects of that love.¹⁶

In this scheme the Spirit which moves in man is central and eternal. He is also loving and purposeful in a warm way. Harry Emerson Fosdick shows the personalistic character of the view in these words: "When we say that God cares, we mean no vague, diffusive attitude toward a system for limited milleniums and then comes to an uneventful end in a cold sun and a ruined earth. We mean he cares for personality which is his child." ¹⁷

Unlike secular utopian systems the Christian meliorist looks for ultimate, personal fulfillment beyond the horizons of this life. It is recognized that mortal life is not only involved in sickness, want, and trial but that there is neither the permanence nor the satisfaction in it for which man is created. God has put eternity in man's heart. And yet this life does offer opportunity for fellowship, for creative personal growth, and for co-operation with God in the work of the world's redemption. Royce shows the integral im-

portance attached to this life when he writes: "The Divine fulfillment in eternity can be won only through the sorrows of time. . . . The most significant perfections include, as a part of themselves, struggle, whereby opposing elements . . . become clearly conscious."¹⁸ Moreover, there is in this life the all-consuming commission to do God's will. By so doing man shares here and now the life and fellowship of the world to come. Meliorism teaches that "God has a life-plan for every human life," a thought of what each one is to be or may become. In the eternal counsels of His will he knows what he would have each person do with his days and years.¹⁹ The benevolence of God thus implies a large place for man's fulfillment even in the temporal sphere, though it looks beyond it for completion.

THE FITNESS OF THIS UNIVERSE

Granting the contingency of human life and the many uncontrollable factors in it, also the reality of sickness, injustice, ugliness, and death, Christian meliorism is convinced that this is still God's world and fit for the high purpose which He has for it: namely, life in communion with Himself. "We have broad and solid ground in the very nature of the world and of human life for the belief that the world is a spiritual and purposive order," affirms Principal D. S. Cairns, pointing particularly to the intelligibility of the universe and the infinite wealth of beauty in the world of living things.²⁰

If we turn to consider what kind of a world is required to make human good possible, that is, scientific, aesthetic, moral, and spiritual achievement, the meliorists believe that we shall find this world eminently suited. The fitness of the universe is manifest in at least six of its principal characteristics, according to Professor H. F. Rall. There is a certain spontaneity in it, which may be seen in the capacity of every creature for awareness and adjustment. It is a resistant world as well as a modifiable one, "a characterless world, purely passive and wholly non-resistant, would offer no opportunity and be of no value." It is universally dependable, and intelligible. There are opportunities here for social relations and

social solidarity, in short, for fellowship. Provision is made in it for sensitivity, that is, capacity to know pain and experience pleasure on many levels. And, the universe itself is positive and creative, evidencing "the principle of integration and life."²¹

In a world like this, Christian meliorism asks man to regard himself as "the roof and crown." The whole process is vindicated and reveals its significance in man. As Browning sings:

*All tended to mankind
And, man produced, all has its end thus far;
But in completed man begins anew
A tendency to God.*

—from "Paracelsus," Pt. V.

Meliorists see in Jesus the "completed man," whose life and death and resurrection "shows us God, but . . . also shows us man and his possibilities."²² Dr. E. Stanley Jones, one of the most influential of contemporary Protestant preachers, elaborates this meaning of the Incarnation in the following way. First of all, the Incarnation means that human history has meaning, purpose, and goal:

It has significance, for God has put significance into it by showing us its meaning in the Person of Christ; it has purpose in that God is determined to redeem history through History; and it has goal in that the Kingdom of God is to come on earth, so is to be the goal of all our longings and strivings.

Further, the Incarnation makes significant the upward movement through science and education and human uplift, for the Incarnation means, not only God coming down, it means man coming up. A human brain, a human body, a human soul was offered to the Divine to be the vehicle of the coming of the Divine into human life. The vehicle was not despised, but dedicated. This makes sacred all that is fine and noble in the upward urge of man. If God used the finest flower of human life to show Himself, shall He despise other Human life as it flowers in lesser forms in science and art and religion? He stamped all this upward urge with the Divine approval when He used the finest of it for His Incarnational purposes.²³

This "incarnational" view of the universe and of history stands in marked contrast to the forms of Christianity which emphasize the transcendence of God, otherworldliness, or the depravity of man. Here the stress is on the immanence of God, and his guiding, formative Presence in all things. The conviction is that the more clearly man understands his world and himself through the varied means at his disposal—science, art, music, friendship, and most of all, religion—the more possible it becomes for him to realize the fullness of God.

THE CAPABILITIES OF MAN

Christian meliorism today enunciates an evolutionary view of man as well as of the universe, declaring with the poet: "We rise on stepping stones of our dead selves to higher things." Man is flesh before he is spirit, points out F. R. Tennant in the most careful of modern meliorist statements. "Lawless, impulse-governed organism, fulfilling as such the nature necessarily his and therefore the life God willed for him in his earliest age"—this is every man in infancy.²⁴

This is to say that the instincts and impulses, such as hunger and love, are non-moral, neutral, and necessary, as the other Christian views hold. But meliorism emphasizes this with greatest vigor. The human appetites are non-moral. It cannot be said of them, when thinking of man in his unmoralized condition, that in any sense "they ought not to be," says Tennant.²⁵ The conations are neutral, there is no such thing as a good or bad tendency *per se*. There is no intrinsic flesh warring against an intrinsic spirit, rather "the crude material of natural disposition . . . neither good nor evil but the common ground of both."²⁶ Moreover, the basic hungers of man are necessary, biologically essential, and normal. The task of life is to moralize or socialize one's organic nature. Or to put it another way, the task of life is to subject "the seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire," to the molding influence of reflective purpose.²⁷ In this view man is not a fallen creature but one who needs

to rise and whose failure to rise is sin. He is not an originally sinful being although he is at all times bound to some extent by habits of adjustment adopted in earlier stages of his personality growth but unsuited to new adaptations. Characteristic of Christian meliorism, in contrast to the other two views we have presented, is the emphasis upon the idea that man's whole sensual nature is capable of noble sublimation. It is the raw material out of which rational consciousness must erect the temple of the spirit.

Christian meliorism is particularly explicit on the subject of the redeemability of man's erotic impulses. In our day many espouse this view; John Burnaby of Trinity College is one. Writing partly in refutation of Anders Nygren's view of human love as irreducibly contrary to the love of God, Burnaby shows how Augustine and the mystical tradition following him looked upon man's erotic nature as, in an important sense, a *praeparatio evangelica*, not, as Nygren seems to regard it, a *praeparatio daemonica*.²⁸ Augustine was negative in his attitude toward sex. Nevertheless, he made *desiderium*—desire, longing, yearning—dominant in his conception of Christian love.²⁹ "Hope therefore is the associate of faith," he stated, "and then with them is charity also, by which we long [*desideramus*], and strive to attain, and glow with desire, and thirst."³⁰ Thus erotic desire is in part the basis of the search after God as it may be also the stimulus to egocentric activity. It is not to be condemned but directed, nor does God condemn it in this view. Rather, as another contemporary writer phrases it: "All love is craving love and Christian love is a quest after God. . . . The divine grace is the air beneath the wings of human faith and love, which bears them up in their flight toward God."³¹

The total instinctual equipment of man fits him for a possible beatitude here, according to meliorism, because he is also endowed with cognitive power that enables him to see the good in relation to his appetites and work out ways to relate the two. This is Catholic conviction, too, but the Protestant forms of meliorism place more faith in the individual's capacity to seek, find, and sublimate than Catholicism does. Typical of the meliorist view

of individual rationality are the words of William E. Channing who, in a debate with his more conservative friend Henry Ware, declared:

If after a deliberate and impartial use of our best faculties a professed revelation seems to us plainly to disagree with itself or clash with great principles which we cannot question, we ought not to hesitate in withholding from it our belief. I am surer that my rational nature is from God than that any book is.³²

Man is not only endowed with the "Inward Light" but is urged to adhere to it. For example, when the Church declares that its scriptural teachings are the "light that shineth in a dark place," and are therefore normative, Christian meliorism cries out with George Fox, "Oh no, it is not the Scriptures, but the Holy Spirit, by which the holy men of God gave forth the Scriptures."³³ Man is urged to realize that "when God made the human mind, He made an instrument for the seeking and the finding of the truth."³⁴ Lynn Harold Hough, the able exponent of Evangelical Humanism, points out that the critical humanist continually emphasizes the freedom and capacity of intelligence. Indeed it is "the capacity to choose among alternatives in the light of standards clearly seen and clearly held which makes it possible for God to work in and through man in a different sense from that in which He works in the subhuman world."³⁵

The principal endowment of man has yet to be mentioned; namely, free will. He not only has the hungers and the reason which are basic for progress toward beatitude but he has a measure of power to effect this progress. The doctrine of freedom presupposed by meliorism is substantially the same as the Catholic doctrine explained in Chapter Two. Historically the foremost Protestant exponents of the doctrine have been Arminius and Wesley, both of whom insisted unremittingly upon the reality of God's grace in man, working unconsciously within him for his salvation, and the importance of conscious human response to and co-operation with this prevenient grace. Speaking psychologically, the freedom which man has to work his redemption is always motivated and always conditioned by temperament, circumstance, and so on, as

Tennant points out. Yet, while such factors as these determine the sphere within which choice is exercised, they do not determine what choices are made. "As apperception, attention, synthetic understanding, imply an active subject, so . . . do interest, moral choice, volitional energising."³⁶

A heart to love God, a mind to know God, and a will to serve Him are the three pre-eminent capacities which Christian meliorism ascribes to the human personality, recognizing of course that no two persons have them in the same degree or are able to develop them in identical ways.

THE LIFE OF FELLOWSHIP

The fostering of community, with all that this implies by way of regard for and devotion to the interests and the needs of others, is cardinal for the view we are considering. Of course, this is the concern of every form of Christianity but in melioristic forms it receives greatest stress, for God is regarded as working out the Great Design in history, and man is believed to play the dominant creaturely role in the development. Not only is the life of creative, yes sacrificial, service with and for others important from God's standpoint, it is vitally important for man's own welfare. His happiness depends on it. John Oman puts the case this way: "By the nature of grace . . . it is a fellowship of persons who realise their relations to one another through their relation to God and who find their relation to the Father realised in their fellowship with His children."³⁷ This is the perfect life to which Jesus made his disciples aspire, adds William Adams Brown, "a life of fellowship" which expresses itself "in mutual helpfulness," a life in which the good of each brings happiness to all.³⁸

Historically, no Protestant leader emphasized this more than Wesley who, much as he believed in the importance of active membership in the church and faithful observance of private prayer and Bible reading, reminded his congregations that "religion is a higher and deeper thing than any outward ordinance whatever." The heart of it lies in the life of love: "Religion is the love of God and our neighbor," he declared, "that is, every man under heaven.

This love ruling the whole life, animating all our tempers and passions, directing all our thoughts, words, and actions, is, 'pure religion and undefiled.' " 39

At this point Christian meliorism is a combination of two elements which distinguish it from the rejectionist and the forensic outlooks. It couples the high moral demand for altruism with a candid eudaemonism, which does not hesitate to affirm the importance of self-love. It believes that the life of service to others can be correlated with fullest self-satisfaction, indeed that the latter is impossible apart from the former. By contrast, rejectionism makes the high moral demand of *agape* but it does not expect fulfillment of it nor can it allow for any explicit eudaemonistic appeal. The forensic view has a definite place for eudaemonism but it stresses participation in the Church and its objective redemptive rites even more than life devoted to the promotion of fellowship through sacrificial service to fellowmen. Meliorism makes love of others central, affirming that no man, however limited, is prohibited from "this one great necessity,—the possibility of loving." 40

STEPS ON THE MELIORIST PATHWAY

REALIZING GOD'S BENEVOLENCE

Charles Chauncy's contention that without knowledge of God's benevolence man could neither esteem nor trust Him suggests the primary step upon the path to self-acceptance for meliorists. Everything hinges upon deep and personal recognition that God is Love. " 'We love because He first loved us,' " writes Henry Drummond, quoting the First Epistle of John. " 'Because He first loved us,' the effect follows that we love, we love Him, we love all men. We cannot help it. . . . Our heart is slowly changed." 41 No act of will, no mere imitation of those who radiate peace and love, and no rule-following will be sufficient to initiate the needed transformation of the inwardly divided life, Drummond declares. Only that divine-human relationship of love can effect this. And this cannot begin to be realized until man knows that God loves him. 42 Therefore, one must first be conscious of this love.

Realization of God's forgiveness.—The central meaning of the benevolence of God is that He forgives sin and guilt. And forgiveness on His part means, in the word of John Oman, "that all need has gone from us to think anything, either in ourselves or in our situation, other than it is." ⁴³ Far from being condonation, God's forgiveness recognizes the heinousness of sin most clearly. Divine pardon does not mean the overlooking of sin but the love of the sinner despite the sin. As Oman puts it,

Justification . . . deals with sin itself, and not merely with its consequences. . . . Were it only a letter from the father to the prodigal, saying, Come home and nothing will be said about the past, the past would not require to have anything said about it, for its own voice would be loud enough. True forgiveness demands positive manifestation of a love which will triumph over the evil past and silence its voice. The Father must say by His whole bearing towards us, My son, let us share the sorrow and live down the shame together. And that is the meaning of the Cross. It works peace, not as an isolated event in the history of the world, but because it is the manifestation of a redeeming love which works every day and in every event of every day.⁴⁴

The ways in which this first step may be taken are numberless. Many kinds of experience, some of which will be mentioned shortly, may minister to the verification of a man's conviction that God awaits as did the father in the parable to welcome home the penitent prodigal. But, however and whenever it comes about, the experience is one involving contact with the Lord of the New Testament, Jesus Christ. "That God in Christ is willing to forgive is the Christian Gospel." ⁴⁵ Fosdick declares:

When one considers the gods whom men have worshiped, approaching them by bloody altar-stairs, offering their first-born to assuage wrath or win from apathy to favor, he sees, extended to a racial scale, our boyhood's tragedy. *Mankind has been looking at the Father through its ignorance and sin and it has seen him beclouded and awry.* Christ changed all that. By what he taught, by what he was, by what he suffered he has said to man, so that man increasingly has believed it—You are wrong about God.

He does not stand aloof—careless or vindictive; he is not as he looks to you through the twisted lenses of your evil. He loves you. He *cares* beyond your power to understand, and all my compassion but reveals in time what is eternally in him.⁴⁶

(The first interest of Christian meliorism is to put before man the Jesus of the Gospels as the Incarnation of the Holy God, and to stress especially that it is just this Righteous One whose chief delight is to forgive unrighteousness. What man is asked to do first—and always—is to cast himself simply and wholeheartedly upon that reconciling mercy of God which from the first has made him a debtor.)

Paramount as this emphasis may seem in Christian thought, modern meliorists feel that as yet the Church at large has scarcely seen the Gospel in this light. Quite possibly, they suggest, we are only at the beginning of deciphering the implications of the fact that “God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself,” and have so far done no more than open the vein of meaning they suggest. In any case, the great thing is the yielding of the mind to be dilated and reconstituted by the forgiving love embodied in Jesus Christ.

✓ *Realization of God's immanence.*—“The forgiveness of sins is essential, but it is only introductory,” explains Borden P. Bowne.⁴⁷ Along with the realization of God's forgiveness there needs increasingly to go the recognition of the Divine Redeeming Presence in all of life. Man must be helped to outgrow “the conception of religion as a thing of rites and ceremonies, of cloisters and retreats, of holy days and holy places,” and to view it “as the divine principle for all living, whatever the day or the place or the work.”⁴⁸

Meliorists stress the fact that, though man comes in a moment of time to be first aware of God's beneficent presence in his life, God has been there all along, unrealized, His influence to a great extent thwarted. “Whatever there has been of goodness and achievement, however imperfect, has, so far as it is good, come from Him, from His grace and presence in the heart.”⁴⁹ The authors of *The Spirit*, in setting forth a modern conception of God, affirm:

We believe that there is in all men, at least unless they have quenched the Spirit, some degree of personal contact with Him, even if it be but partial and unconscious. The differences in degree are indeed impressive and far-reaching. . . . These differences depend on the extent to which we let God in, on the closeness of the intercourse between our Spirit and God. . . . In the last resort the difference between one man and another must turn upon the extent to which he opens himself to the divine influence which is always there, available in its completeness for every child of God.⁵⁰

Opening oneself to God depends in the main upon conscious awareness of God's identity, that is, of His will and presence. Fosdick, in explaining to individuals how to discover God in their lives, quotes the advice said to have been given Madame Guyon by a Franciscan friar when she was perplexed about further development of her spiritual life: "Madame, you are seeking *without* that which you have *within*. Accustom yourself to seek God in your own heart, and you will find him." Fosdick goes on to counsel that while conscience and ideals are not infallible voices of God these finest human endowments are the channels through which God speaks. "All the best in us is God in us. . . . No man should ever grope outside of his best self to find God. He should always seek the God who is speaking to him in his best self."⁵¹

The New Thought movement provides the clearest illustration in recent times of the way in which "the Beyond that is Within" may be affirmed. According to William James, the psychological principle of this movement is indistinguishable from the Lutheran justification by faith and the Wesleyan acceptance of free grace. "It is but giving your little private convulsive self a rest, and finding that a greater Self is there."⁵² Regardless of the notable diversities of the theological presupposition, Christian meliorists unite in stressing conscious vital affirmation of oneness with God. One of James's correspondents describes this step on the meliorist pathway in a way that would be acceptable to the most evangelical of meliorists when she says:

We must be in absolutely constant relation or mental touch (this word is to me very expressive) with that essence of life which permeates all and which we call God. This is almost unrecognizable unless we live it into ourselves *actually*, that is, by a constant turning to the very innermost, deepest consciousness of our real selves or of God in us, for illumination from within, just as we turn to the sun for light, warmth, and invigoration without.⁵³

SELF-AFFIRMATION UNDER GOD

Awareness of one's possibilities.—When man comes to realize God's forgiving love for him and His presence deep within he cannot help re-estimating himself, as Fosdick testifies. "To be loved by anyone is to enter into a new estimate of one's possible value; to be loved by God in Christ is to come into an experience where our possible value makes us alike ashamed of what we are and jubilant over what we may become."⁵⁴ The next steps on the Christian-meliorist path involve affirmation of oneself under God, often called self-love.

Professor A. C. Knudson contends that the main body of Christian ethics does not agree with the idea, which we see in rejectionism, that the sovereign God demands of man (*agape*) love, that is, completely selfless love. The common Christian view, he writes, is that "there are duties to self as well as duties to others," there is "a legitimate self-love as well as a mandatory love of neighbor."⁵⁵ It has been pointed out that Catholicism holds this view. The Great Commandment enjoins love of self as it enjoins love of neighbor, so both forensic and meliorist exponents declare. Moreover, God loves oneself just as He loves one's neighbor. Thus, "selfhood is a divinely given treasure entrusted to our care. We may not do what we please with it. We may not spurn or neglect it. It has eternal value in the sight of God;" because God is in us and we are in him.⁵⁶ A current pamphlet for Episcopalian laity puts it plainly: "We must love our true selves if we are to imitate God, for God loves us."⁵⁷ A more precise exposition of the kind of appreciation for oneself envisioned and promoted here is given by John Oman, who has said:

By imposing a little more precision upon language than can be looked for in ordinary speech, we might use selfishness for attention to self without heed to others or to the moral nature of things; self-regard for a direct but not blind prudence; and self-love for the search for true blessedness among our fellows and in face of all reality. *Such self-love would be essentially concerned with our salvation, and the quality of it would be determined by the salvation we seek, even as its blessedness would depend on not seeking it through ourselves.*⁵⁸

The characteristic of meliorist self-love is its social orientation: it is always realized in fellowship, in and with other people. This is something that will be developed in the last of this chapter. Here it is most important to note the basis for belief in one's own possibilities: namely, God's benevolent concern for one; and the conviction which this engenders: namely, that salvation is meant for one, that it is right to seek it, and that it is possible to find it for oneself, though not in isolation from one's fellows.

Effortful alteration of life.—All that has been said so far leads up to action on the part of the individual. Of course, man comes into the gladsome fellowship of God by response to His love made known in Christ, and this experience carries with it the hope of an ever higher and expanding life. "But to have real life in God, that begins like a small but vital acorn and grows like an aspiring oak, one must obey the laws that make such increasing experience possible." This means, as Fosdick teaches, that one must put forth his best efforts:

To keep fellowship with God unimpeded by sin, uninterrupted by neglect; to think habitually as though God were, instead of casually believing that he is; to practice love continually until love grows real; and to arrange life's program conscientiously as though the doing of God's will were life's first business—such things alone make spiritual growth a possibility.⁵⁹

The freedom of the will is postulated here just as it is in the Catholic view so that it is not necessary to elaborate it further. Suffice it to say that meliorism does not fail to emphasize the powers of attention, selection, contemplation, and so on, which comprise

the crucial element of freedom in man. It calls for the right use of freedom, and for its application in terms of effort to the alteration of life. "God worketh in us, truly, both to will and to do of His good pleasure," points out Tennant, "but not in such a way that He does the whole work alone. He reveals the ideal, supplies the inspiration, prepares the heart: but the activity which responds, and accepts, which does the real warring against the flesh, is ours."⁶⁰

*God, whose pleasure brought
Man into being, stands away,
As it were, a hand-breadth off, to give
Room for the newly-made to live,
And look at Him from a place apart,
And use his gifts of brain and heart.*

It is important to notice two things about the stress on effort made by meliorism. One is that effort is not considered the psychologically primary thing. The realization of a personal relationship with God the Forgiving Father must come first. But once the slightest conception of the reality of God's love for man as an individual person has come about effort is of great importance. New tastes and purposes are to be acquired, new insights must be gained, old habits may need to be overcome, experimentation in the life of love is in order.⁶¹

The other thing about effort is that meliorism recognizes how very limited a particular individual's freedom to effect change may be, as has been indicated already in this chapter, and this is true also of the Catholic view. It is quite clear that freedom is a matter of degree, that there are some things about life which one cannot change, that finitude, ignorance, untoward environment, sickness and many other factors enter in to block effective alteration of life. The typical disposition of Christian meliorism in this regard, however, is to take a pluralistic view; that is, to presuppose that there are a number of factors in any given situation some of which may be changed by the individual if he is encouraged to bestir himself. We can go back at least as far as John Wesley to see this Christian meliorism insisting on this: "Suffer me to warn you of another

silly, unmeaning word; Do not say, *I can do nothing*. If so, then you know nothing of Christ: Then you have no faith." ⁶²

In our time a scholarly example of the tendency to approach the disharmonious elements in each particular situation with a view to diagnosing the different elements in it and thus discovering the things which may be altered by effort is John C. Bennett's contribution to the Oxford Conference volume, *Christian Faith and the Common Life*. He shows that some types of evil can be dealt with by enlightenment, some by large-scale social change, some by moral and spiritual awakening. ⁶³ Since most situations involve all of these elements meliorism finds good reason for stressing the indeterminate possibilities of beneficent change remaining to man by virtue of real though limited freedom.

This brings us to remark the kind of alteration of life which the view we are discussing presents to man. Actually the meliorist ideal is one which is understood to be open to every normal, willing person no matter what his initial limitations. For the one supremely worthwhile vocation is to be "partaker of the divine nature." As a popular Episcopalian pamphlet expresses the goal: "To be a success in the only worthy sense of that term is to be a saint, one who is on fire with the love of God, learning to trust ever more profoundly in Him, trying to love God and His creatures more selflessly." ⁶⁴ In the light of this vocation—really an ideal for daily living—the most stubborn, unmanageable facts of suffering and difficulty do not block progress absolutely. Meliorists look for inspiration in the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, who triumphed in love despite death itself. "Our faith declares and our experience confirms His victory, for we know that *no single soul need be deprived of this one great necessity,—the possibility of loving and so of fulfilling its humanity.*" ⁶⁵

But does not the strong emphasis upon living the life of love serve to increase the guilt feelings of the man who fails to live by love, as all do to some extent? Meliorism's usual answer is that it does not mean to imply that man is capable of so transcending his limiting, frustrating circumstances by the grace of God and his own co-operating effort that he can be fully loving to God and fel-

lowman in this life. But, it would hold, sins against the Divine Love—are reckoned to be truly sinful only in so far as they are voluntary transgressions of the known law. Two hundred years ago this semi-Pelagian view was explicitly taught by John Wesley.⁶⁶ Today, the ablest contemporary expositor of it is F. R. Tennant, who has defined sin as “imperfect compliance with the moral idea in so far as this is, in the sight of God, capable of apprehension by an agent at the moment of the activity in question, both as to its content and its claim upon him.”⁶⁷ However, few meliorists, certainly not Wesley or Tennant, anticipate that humans can be so perfect that they are wholly free from at least involuntary transgressions. The struggle forever facing man in the moral integration of his non-moral instincts and impulses is too great for this. Man is simply—urged to do the best he can, relying upon God for power to overcome progressively all temptation and depending upon Him for continued forgiveness. Wesley’s words on the inevitability of shortcomings and the continual need of holding to the forgiving love of God are typical of Christian meliorism:

For neither love nor the unction of the Holy One makes us—infallible. Therefore, through unavoidable defect of understanding, we cannot but mistake in many things. And these mistakes will frequently occasion something wrong both in our temper, and words, and actions. . . . The best of men need Christ as their priest, their atonement, their advocate with the Father, not only as the continuance of their every blessing depends on his death and intercession, but on account of their coming short of the law of love. For every man living does so. You who *feel all love*, compare yourselves with the preceding description. Weigh yourselves in this balance, and see if you are not wanting in many particulars.⁶⁸

What is expected is this: man can set himself on the way now to ever higher and expanding life, despite tensions which are bound to arise, if he does what he can, the best he can, to co-operate with God who works in him.

✓ *Seeking guidance and strength from many quarters.*—At the outset John Wesley was quoted to the effect that increasing full-

ness of life demands "all diligence" on the part of the seeking person. Above all, meliorism occupies itself with the elaboration of the positive means by which man can do this. Of course, the Bible and the church are two principal avenues of divine aid and inspiration. Exponents of this view are inclined to regard the Bible much as the rejectionists do; that is, as the peculiar and unique means by which God speaks most authoritatively to man. Certainly for Christian meliorism the Bible is indispensable, and he who treads this pathway is adjured to guide himself with the help of it.

The visible church, being the locus of the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, is also regarded as essential to the full salvation of man. Proponents of this path, as of the other two, are churchmen. But the validity of the church for meliorists lies in the fact that it ministers to the spiritual necessities of individual disciples. The church, declares the Anglican bishop, H. Hensley Henson, is a society organized for the mutual promotion of religious and moral life. "The Church is the sphere within which the gradual moral perfecting of individual Christians must proceed; and . . . the inevitable expression in practice of that process of moral advance is service, 'the work of ministering.'" ⁶⁹ Through the corporate experience of the church, participation in its work and worship, and subjection to its spirit and its wisdom, grace is received. To this end the believer is urged to join the church. D. Elton Trueblood, himself a Quaker, is representative of this pragmatic view of the church. Unsatisfactory as the local institution of religion may be, he declares, the individual who cares about his own spiritual welfare, and about his civilization, will join it or start one of his own. For, the church "is the only organization really working at the job of affecting men's lives in the deep way in which they must be affected if what we prize is to survive." ⁷⁰

The Quakers are notable examples of a third way from which guidance and strength is to be obtained, according to the teaching of meliorist exponents. The traditional practice of silence in the Society's groups, and individually, affords not only mystical communion with God but a way of discovering the will of God for

the practical affairs of life. When Friends meet, silence is a chief means through which the soul makes its approach to its Maker in thanksgiving and prayer, in self-examination and petition for pardon, in concentration upon profitable themes aided perhaps by the repetition of scriptural texts or the verses of some suggestive hymn. Dr. Isaac Sharpless, a Friend and former president of Haverford College, comments on the benefits of silence in these words:

"Sometimes a light surprises" the humble worshiper; his thoughts are led on and upward by a higher Power; new meanings of texts flash upon his mind, a new illumination is given to the path of duty, and in answer to the prayer breathed forth by his inmost soul he feels conscious of a closer union with God, and strengthened for his future warfare with the world, the flesh, and the devil.⁷¹

Organized meliorism encourages all forms of prayer in the church • and in the private place; always, however, the stress falls upon the • intimately personal relationship, as in Frederick Hosmer's poetic • injunction:

*O gift of gifts, O grace of grace,
That God should condescend
To make thy heart His dwelling-place—
And be thy daily Friend!*

*Then go not thou in search of Him
But to thyself repair;
Wait thou within the silence dim
And thou shalt find Him there.
—from "The Indwelling God"*

E. Stanley Jones lists other sources of guidance and strength which have played their part historically in the exposition of Christian meliorism and are increasingly affirmed today: (1) seeking counsel of good people, (2) matching oneself against a sudden opportunity or a need, (3) observance of natural law and the revelations of science, and (4) the exercise of sound moral judgments.⁷² Faithful and intelligent use of these varied resources,

from the Bible to sincere common sense, is continually urged by the proponents of the way here presented. "We must study the order of life, and avail ourselves of all the normal means of influence for developing character and of all the great institutions evolved by humanity on its upward way," declares Bowne, reflecting meliorist conviction.⁷³ Only God can give the increase, but also "God will give no increase unless we plant and water," and, further, recognize the natural order of things "as a part of the divine appointment for our spiritual training, and as the field for our life's work."⁷⁴ All this is implied by Christian meliorism in its advocacy of self-affirmation under God.

CO-OPERATING WITH GOD'S BENEVOLENT PURPOSE

A sustained and growing relationship between God and man is inconceivable from the meliorist standpoint unless yet another, and, in a very real sense, the fulfilling step on the pathway to self-acceptance is taken. This can be nothing else than willing co-operation with God's benevolent purpose in the world, which is to bring all men into creative fellowship with Himself. The Christian faith is no faith in "a God of coddling love," declares Harry Emerson Fosdick.

Faith in God never is elevated and ennobling until we overpass "*God for our lives!*" to cry "*Our lives for God!*" Then at the luminous center of our faith shines the divine purpose, costly but wonderful, that binds the ages together in spiritual unity. To that we dedicate our lives; in that we exceedingly rejoice. No longer do we test God's goodness by our happiness or our ill-fortune; we are *his* through fair weather and through foul. No longer do we merely hold beliefs, we are held by them, captured now and not simply consoled by faith. Only so are we learning discipleship to Christ and are beginning really to believe in the Christian God.⁷⁵

Co-operation with God in the realization of His will means that there is an all consuming task for every human life, one which involves the use of all one's powers. Sacrificial service to fellowman is at the center of this task.

Realizing one's own importance to God.—As God's love for man implies a proper self-love so His earnestness means that every man has a unique place in the fulfillment of the Divine Plan. The great Scottish evangelist, Henry Drummond, is an example of this emphasis. In one of his most popular sermons he expressed the conviction this way:

God has a life-plan for every human life. In the eternal counsels of His will, when He arranged the destiny of every star, and every sand-grain and grass-blade, and each of those tiny insects which live but for an hour, the Creator had a thought for you and me. Our life was to be the slow unfolding of this thought, as the cornstalk from the corn, or the flower from the gradually opening bud. . . . God has taken notice of you, . . . He will let you do something, something peculiar, personal, private, which no one else has been given to do.⁷⁶

In our generation the Oxford Group Movement (now Moral Re-Armament) has made an even firmer emphasis upon this idea. It emphasizes that God has a plan for society and that every individual is necessary for the outworking of the Plan; the important thing for each one is to realize that he has an indispensable part to play and therefore to seek God's Plan for his own life first.⁷⁷ The theological doctrine behind this position is that man himself is a creative power not fully controlled by God, capable of resisting God.

Using all of one's powers.—The purpose of God cannot force but it does challenge the integration of the instincts and impulses as well as the rational consciousness to the all-consuming task of bringing in the Kingdom. This is graphically presented by E. Stanley Jones, who writes that the Great Commandment fulfills man's total being in so far as it is followed, as nothing else can. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart [the affectional nature], with all thy mind [the intellectual nature], with all thy soul [the volitional nature], and with all thy strength [the physical nature]." The whole man is to do the highest thing in life, to love, and to love the highest being in life, God, Jones points out. "Supreme love of the supreme Person gives meaning, goal,

and integration to life.”⁷⁸ The second half of the Great Command is complementary. It fulfills human nature on the interpersonal side. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor [the gregarious instinct] as thy self [the self-preservative instinct].” The two sides of the “royal law” are inextricably bound up: “Love to God and love to man are not different, but one.”⁷⁹ In all of this there is important place for the sex drive. It is not denied physically but controlled under the law of reverence for the personality of others and the self. And beyond the physical, “the sex instinct is sublimated into creative activity, creating new souls, new movements, new hopes, new life. For, love is creative intrinsically.”⁸⁰ In continued response to the mighty love of God man finds what Horace Bushnell once called “the expulsive power of a new affection.”

✓ As Davies says, “Not all self-assertion is egoistic. There is a self-assertion that can be altruistic and objective.” This altruistic and objective self-assertion is a definite fact when the self is converted from its own ends to the ends of others. The self is not wiped out—it is heightened and strengthened and made more creative than ever.⁸¹

✓ *Sacrificial service of fellowman.*—The ultimate step on the Christian meliorist pathway to self-acceptance is full willing service to God through service to fellowman. This is so clearly implied in the preceding elucidation of meliorism that it needs only to be stated succinctly here. This is the fruit and, in a way, the root of growing fellowship with God, for the investment of life in the promotion of community fosters kinship with the Divine source of love. The meliorist never fails to press the importance of this step upon the disciple. “If one would be a Christian,” declares Fosdick, “he must believe in, pray for, and labor toward the coming of God’s Kingdom in the world. This is the central passion of a fully Christian life, its guiding star, its regulating standard.”⁸² Moreover, again in Fosdick’s words, “Victorious personality is not the fruit of cloistered piety. It is the accompaniment of full devotion to God’s Kingdom:

*I ask no heaven till earth be Thine;
No glory crown while work of mine
Remaineth here.*

*When earth shall shine among the stars,
Her sins wiped out, her captives free,
Her voice a music unto Thee,
For crown, more work give Thou to me.
Lord, here am I!* ⁸³

In reviewing the whole meliorist outlook one thing stands out; it is the sense of community which pervades it. The individual finds his fulfillment in the group, the church, the society, the stream of history, the cosmos itself. He finds it in so far as he gives himself to the service of God in and through these various extensions of community. Professor H. R. Mackintosh puts his finger on this very characteristic of Christian meliorism when he writes: "The pardoned man has made the discovery that fellowship is the all-inclusive secret of human life; and that this fellowship, through which alone self can be realised, embraces all who are objects of God's love." ⁸⁴ Indeed, he adds, "to be blessed in pardoned fellowship with the Father is to be conscious of the impulse, which will not be denied, to share our lives with all for whom God cares. Thus a vital connexion exists between forgiveness and the Church, or rather *all mankind*." ⁸⁵

Co-operating with God in the family.—In studying the rejectionist pathway we saw that responsibility for rearing a godly family is a most important form of service to God. Likewise, in following along the forensic path, it became quite clear that Catholicism stresses regulation of sex and family life, with emphasis upon training children to obey. In so far as there is a different concern from either of these on the part of proponents of meliorism—primary concern for the family as such being common to all forms of Christianity—that concern may be said to be for the child and its place in the family. In meliorism there is a note of deference to the child, of concern for its full development, which goes further

than the other Christian views. In short, the family is seen as the special and most important sphere of co-operation with God, primarily because it is in the family that new personalities are born and molded.

The outstanding pioneer of this view in the past one hundred years of American Protestantism is without doubt the leader of the New Theology movement, Horace Bushnell. His book, *Christian Nurture* (1846), challenged the prevailing conception of Christian education, which assumed the child to be a sinner, taught him the heinousness of sin, and endeavored to bring about his sudden conversion at the time of puberty or later. The child should grow up a Christian, and never know himself as being otherwise, Bushnell argued.⁸⁶ The home, he said, is the place to begin teaching Christianity. But, this training must not be expected to succeed if it consists of "teaching, lecturing, watch, discipline," and so on, as the Church has generally assumed. Rather, "it is the family spirit, the organic life of the house, the silent power of a domestic godliness, working, as it does, unconsciously and with sovereign effect—this it is which forms your children to God."⁸⁷

Among other specific suggestions to parents, *Christian Nurture* suggests that they "speak freely to their children, at times, of their own faults and infirmities"; and, instead of always lecturing their children on peccadilloes and sins, "it would be better, sometimes, to give a lecture on their own."⁸⁸ The burden of Bushnell's eminent work is that Christians should awaken to their responsibility and opportunity to facilitate the Spirit's sanctifying work in their children from earliest infancy by making the home "the church of childhood."⁸⁹ Here, in contrast to all patriarchal conceptions, the emphasis falls upon the parents' obligations. The Old Testament precept; "Honor thy father and thy mother," is not ignored, but the New Testament addition: "Fathers provoke not your children to wrath," is given prominence.⁹⁰ While justifying strong and decided government in families, "the real aim and study must be to infuse into them [i.e., children] a new life, and, to this end, the Life of God must perpetually reign" in the parents. Since "a reign of brute force is much more easily maintained than a reign

whose power is righteousness and love," meliorism exhorts the parents, in the words of Bushnell: "You must live in the light of God, and hold such a spirit in exercise as you wish to see translated into your children."⁹¹ To be sure, all this is in large measure common property of Christians today, who may hold forensic or rejectionist viewpoints otherwise. Their debt is to the meliorists like Bushnell, however, who have introduced these interpretations of family responsibility and child-centeredness into the mainstream of modern Christianity.⁹²

At the beginning of this chapter the example of John Wesley was cited as one outstanding exponent of the Christian meliorist pathway to self-acceptance. His conviction that a peaceful life of increasing abundance can be the possession of the man who seeks God with all diligence has been explored with particular attention to the actual steps that are recommended if such salutary adjustment is to be found. It is fitting to turn to a contemporary leader of the Church that Wesley founded for a statement about the kind of self-acceptance to be found upon this path. This is the statement—it is indeed a testimony—of one of the most influential Methodist ministers of our day, E. Stanley Jones. He declares:

We have seen life gathered up into one central grand meaning—that meaning is Christ. We feel that He represents Life and only as lesser life gets into contact with Him does it live. *We offer Him to the inwardly disrupted as the One who can put them together and keep them together.* For it is no temporary Pollyanna healing which He offers—*He offers what men need so desperately, namely, forgiveness, reconciliation, assurance*—assurance that at the heart of things is a Heart, that God loves and cares and His love will not let us go. *Moreover, He offers no spiritual coddling as the remedy, for He offers the Kingdom of God as the strenuous Cause for which a man may live, and if necessary, die.* The man now feels he is no longer orphaned, alone, estranged, he is related to Life and that Life is warm and tender and personal. . . . He [that is, Jesus] does not lay on us a set of rules—and duties, rather He establishes a relationship—a relationship with God. He says to us, "Son, behold thy Father,"—He reveals

God to us as a Father and man to himself as a son; and when once we grasp that central fact, then everything else flows from it like a fountain from a hillside fed by eternal springs. *Life now has infinite meanings, infinite goals, and infinite resources. And deepest of all, life has now an infinite fellowship, infinite and yet very personal, for it is all very personal in Christ.*⁹³

*This is the "new naturalism"—a naturalism that brings life from its compartmentalisms into unity—the unity of the material and the spiritual, the secular and the sacred, the personal and the social—the unity of all mankind under a single government—with God as Father and men as brothers. Deepest of all it brings a man into unity with himself, delivering him from all resentments, all fears and anxieties, all self-centeredness and all guilts and complexes and inferiorities.*⁹⁴

CHAPTER FOUR

A Psychotherapeutic View of Self-Acceptance

TODAY THE VARIOUS FORMS of the Christian religion and of other religions are not altogether unique in their concern for the welfare of the human spirit. Medicine, in the form of dynamic psychology, is also committed to the cure of souls. Actually there is no direct historical connection between Christianity and the rise of contemporary psychotherapy. The latter originated on the Continent in the 1880's with the work of medical men like Pierre Janet, Jean Martin Charcot, Joseph Breuer, and especially Sigmund Freud. Its present development can be attributed in large part to the theories of Freud and the ex-Freudian psychoanalysts, such as Carl G. Jung, Alfred Adler, and Otto Rank.

There is little in the method of dynamic psychology that parallels the sacramental services, the teaching both religious and moral, the practices of piety, and the institutionalized fellowship so characteristic of Christianity in general. Indeed, the procedures of dynamic psychology and the approach of the psychotherapist to the individual are in striking contrast to the procedures and the approaches of organized religion. We shall note the methodology of dynamic psychology, and also several of its chief conceptions, the ones which have greatest bearing upon the psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance, in the introductory part of this chapter.

While there is notable dissimilarity of means between these two disciplines it is becoming increasingly evident that there is a remarkable similarity of ends, despite the fact that this is continually and insistently denied by able proponents on both the religious and the medical sides. One physician has formulated the congruence of ends in these words:

The essential function of psychotherapy is the same as that of every religious community: *religio*, binding back, giving the individual a refuge in something suprapersonal, redeeming. . . . As psychotherapy, its only concern is that the sufferer shall find a form of security for life, of self-realization, of unity with something greater than what his illness recognizes as himself—Nature, fellow-man, culture, community; principle of harmony with God, with universal life, to which all the foregoing are approaches.¹

A theologian who sees Christianity as the ally and the psychological completion of psychotherapy's work describes the correlation in the following way:

✓ Psychotherapy, like religion, is concerned with persons, and not with mental disorders. . . . And in dealing with persons we come into touch not merely with their memories or their instinctive reactions, but with their whole system of moral choices. Above all, as Freud himself has taught us, we are concerned with their most intimate and vital personal relationships. It is only in the religious account of the world that these find their full significance. For the love of man, which is the key to all moral and spiritual value, is a thing transient, a shadow that departeth, unless it rests upon love undying, really, eternal, the love of God.²

How far there is agreement between the various forms of the Christian religion on the one hand and the related schools of dynamic psychology on the other hand is a theme too vast for this study, which must be limited to an examination of Christian paths to self-acceptance in the light of psychotherapy. Here we shall make use only of findings which have become common property of most schools of psychotherapy; that is, the Freudian school and the others which have arisen in the process of modifying and developing Freudian theory and practice. The psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance presented in this chapter is based upon this general knowledge. After introducing the method of dynamic psychology and several principles of particular importance for the understanding of a psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance, we shall present actual case histories in which healthy self-acceptance is lacking

and which shed indirect light upon the components of this phenomenon. Following this presentation the components of true self-acceptance from the standpoint of psychotherapy will be explained. The fifth and concluding chapter will be devoted to examination of the three Christian pathways to self-acceptance in the light of this psychotherapeutic view.

By way of orienting ourselves to the psychotherapeutic view of things we must take account of the approach which the therapist makes to the individual and the context in which he "teaches" his view of self-acceptance. As we have said it is a context quite different from that in which the various forms of Christianity function. First of all, the therapist is not a priest or a minister or a teacher but a physician. Most psychotherapists are doctors of medicine, despite Freud's justification of lay analysts. These men are trained in somatic pathology and in psychiatry. In the course of their psychiatric training they have usually undergone psychoanalysis themselves. This is a requirement for admission to professional societies of psychotherapists, and it means that the doctor has gone through a more or less intense emotional adjustment in his own life before he started out to help others along the road to spiritual well-being. ✓

Thus, by virtue of his training and experience, the therapist approaches the individual diagnostically. The individual is a patient whose mental or spiritual difficulties represent illness. The therapist seeks to diagnose this illness, inquiring at length into the nature of the specific difficulties, and tracing apparent causes and effects. The interest here is not reform but rehabilitation. Whatever advice is given takes the form of prescription for health rather than the form of exhortation to "live" differently or instruction as to the ways by which salvation may be found. This does not mean that the medical psychologist ignores religious and moral values since health, like salvation, depends to a very significant degree upon the achievement of integration into the community. X
But in psychotherapy the individual patient and his well-being is put first, in relation to the cultural environment. The therapist admittedly serves the patient himself in the therapeutic work and not somebody else, such as the wife or husband, the son or mother,

✓ the culture, the church, or the God whom the therapist may worship. In short, the aim of the psychotherapist is to increase the individual's capacity to function, to enable him to utilize his powers with greater freedom; how these powers are to be exercised is another matter.

In his White Foundation lectures Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan outlines the methodological procedure of a psychotherapist in a way which clearly shows the contrast between the usual methods of Christianity and the other religions and medical psychology.³ Psychotherapeutic work is conducted by means of personal interviews held usually in the therapist's office. Often the patient lies down on a couch during the analytic hour, in other cases, however, he sits facing the therapist, or it may be that he walks about; all this varies. The medium of treatment is conversation, with the patient encouraged to do most of the talking.⁴ From the physician's point of view the interview is a directed inquiry. "The interrogation proceeds in so far as possible from a given point in a direction easy for the patient to follow."⁵ For example, a patient enters the office, is greeted in a friendly manner, and asked his reasons for appearance. They center in the fact that the patient dislikes leaving his house because people stare at him. Why do people stare at you? He does not know but appears to be very uncomfortable. Are they acquaintances or strangers who stare at you? Still he does not know and seems unable to say more. Obviously the patient is not sure he can trust the doctor with further revelation of himself, "transference" takes time and it requires the building up of a highly confidential relationship.

Here a further aspect of the psychotherapist's approach is manifest. It is not only inquiring but it is specifically and provocatively so. The therapist wishes to get the patient to reveal practical, not theoretical difficulties, so as to bring them out into the open as fully as he is able. In the clinical procedure there is little direct questioning about general convictions and opinions. What is wanted, as Sullivan points out, is knowledge of the patient's nature and problems through "the synthesis of indicative statements that have been made by him in highly personal references." For instance,

the patient may finally say, "People stare at me because I am so ugly." Without affirmation or denial the physician accepts the patient's explanation, for this is definite indication of his inner feelings. Privately he may agree, the patient is ugly. However, specific and provocative interrogation soon reveals that the patient is concerned not with a generalized and long-standing ugliness but with a specialized ugliness which consists in a recent change that has taken place in his mouth, such that his lips have become Negroid. This matters, and it considerably alters the frame of reference within which the therapist had thought of the patient's ugliness.

As the interview proceeds the therapist expects, desires, and endeavors at every moment to perceive quickly the changes in the relationship between him and the patient. This is very important because nothing about this relationship is static, everything changes in velocity and in organization. The doctor wants to find out what these changes are in the patient's attitude and conduct, and how they reveal his character structure. To recur to the example, let us say the therapist remarks that he sees no reason why people should stare at the patient. At this remark the patient may relax, an indication that there is already within him some possibility of trusting another, some readiness to believe that there are those who do not react to him by staring. On the other hand, the patient may stiffen at the doctor's comment, thus indicating that he suspects the therapist's sincerity. In either case the reactions of the patient in consultation continually reveal attitudes and actions which the therapist endeavors to understand and interpret at least to his own satisfaction and from time to time to the patient, in so far as he can take it without relapse.

Another characteristic of the psychotherapeutic method is the principle of accommodation which is employed. The therapist adjusts himself to "the prevailing tendencies." In other words, as Sullivan explains this, if the patient comes to a point where he will say no more about why people stare at him and reacts in a stiff, suspicious manner, the therapist accepts the fact that this line of inquiry is ended. For therapeutic reasons it is necessary to take another tack and he does so. The therapist understands that it is of ut-

most importance not to give way to any irrational performance such as might be called out by the patient's refusal to talk. He does not wave away the line of questioning now come to an end with an Olympian, "Oh, very well, it is of no moment." Nor does he fold his psychic hands in mute acceptance of a juvenile patient who will not cooperate. He simply takes another line of inquiry.

Summing up the approach of the psychotherapist to the individual we may say that it is explorative and explicative, rather than normative and educational as is typically the case with religious approaches.* The method is diagnostic, making use of sympathetic rapport between patient and therapist.

✓ We turn now to a brief presentation of several working principles of dynamic psychology which are of particular importance for the understanding of a psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance. The first of these principles is the one known as repression; the second, ambivalence; the third, the determinative influence of interpersonal relationships, that is, the idea that the individual character develops in dynamic interrelation with the significant other persons in his environment. The fourth principle has to do with the existence of the correlation of attitudes toward the self and toward others, and a fifth conception is that of flexibility: the individual can alter his basic attitudes toward himself, toward others, and toward life in general.

✓ Repression is the process by which shameful, troublesome, or painful strivings are excluded from consciousness and thus being denied direct satisfaction are left to operate in the unconscious. It is almost true to say that each dynamic psychologist has his own formulation of repression. Common to all, however, is the concept of conscious personality at war with unconscious desires or impulses with the result that the individual manifests contradictory and disharmonious attitudes toward himself and others. To the extent that an individual is neurotic, writes Karen Horney, he is

* The difference between religious and psychotherapeutic methods has very important implications for all the Christian approaches to the individual, especially for approaches where self-acceptance is an end. This methodological difference, as it affects the achievement of self-acceptance, will be examined with care in the fifth chapter.

compulsively driven this way and that by incompatible tendencies which he does not recognize because they are deeply repressed: "a neurotic conflict in all its essential elements is always unconscious." ⁶

It is important to recognize the difference between repression and restraint. As Dr. J. A. Hadfield explains it, repression is an involuntary, unconscious process in which the complexes are so repugnant that far from being accepted they are not even recognized. The individual will not admit his impulses even to himself. For example, many people repress their sex feelings. But restraint is a conscious process in which the instinctive desires are accepted and recognized as natural and right but are not given full expression in conduct. The restraint of one's strivings is a voluntary act in the interest of redirecting them to higher ends. From the standpoint of religion and ethics as well as that of mental health, Hadfield points out, it is better to accept the impulse of sex, fear, or whatever as a definite part of oneself, and so to be in position to control it than it is to be obsessed with it by continuing to repress it. ⁷ We may note also that repression figures in the production of guilt feelings. Repressed memories and wishes are so charged with emotion and desire that they exert their influence covertly, not only by twisting conduct into unusual forms but by overshadowing the mind with the sense of guilt especially at times when they achieve satisfactions which the conscious personality does not wish to allow. ✓

A second principle of importance to this study is that of ambivalence. The primary conception of ambivalence is the presence within the individual of contradictory attitudes (love and hate) toward the same object; Freud's associate, Eugen Bleuler, originated this term, and Freud used it in this way. An extension of the concept has been effected by Franz Alexander and Thomas M. French, among others, who describe ambivalence in terms of conflict between infantile dependence and mature independence. ⁸ Carl G. Jung has also developed an independent interpretation of the idea in terms of the "spiritual principle" which exercises itself against the "primitive instinctual nature." ⁹ In his view the opposing ✓

✓ tendencies are complementary, not contradictory. (The goal of life is the "integration of personality" which consists in the harmonious development of the opposites in one's nature (introversion-extroversion, thinking-feeling, sensation-intuition, masculinity-femininity).¹⁰) However the concept of ambivalence is interpreted, whether or not it is believed to be grounded in metaphysical reality, and no matter how far the conflicting tendencies are thought to be resolvable—Freud is pessimistic but Jung is optimistic—the fact that the individual (especially the neurotic and the psychotic) manifests contradictory attitudes and trends is of primary importance for the work of psychotherapy.

X ✓ The acceptance and understanding of one's particular ambivalences is necessary for increased spiritual well-being. Horney points out that it is not neurotic to have inner conflicts, for they are inevitable. One may, for instance, want to be alone and also want to visit a sick friend; one may have to decide between studying medicine and pursuing a musical career; or one may wish to be a lover and at the same time realize that someone in trouble needs his care. The dangerous, damaging factor in conflict is unawareness of it. Ambivalence must be admitted and understood if spiritual health is to be maintained or improved. Neuroticism is struggle with conflicting tendencies which are not recognized as such.

✓ —To experience conflicts knowingly, though it may be distressing, can be an invaluable asset. The more we face our own conflicts and seek out our own solutions, the more inner freedom and strength we will gain. Only when we are willing to bear the brunt can we approximate the ideal of being the captain of our ship.¹¹

✓ —The principle of relationship may be stated as follows: the individual develops in dynamic interrelation with the other individuals in his environment. Especially determinative for character formation are the relations with significant others (that is, parents or parent-figures and siblings) in the first years of life. Credit is due largely to Freud for the postulation and validation of the fact that mental disease not due to organic changes is due to injurious

experiences in interpersonal relationships. Freud believed that the Oedipus Complex is the kernel of neurosis. He taught that frustrating desire of the little boy to possess his mother inevitably disturbs the whole personality, so much so that all subsequent emotional difficulties are repetitions of the original failure to resolve this conflict. The Oedipus-conflict theory presented medical psychology with a clue that has guided its work up to the present time: namely, that familial relationships, especially those in infancy and childhood, are determinative for personality development. The various schools of psychotherapy differ in the particular types and sources of emotion to which they devote principal attention but the conviction of the decisive nature of interpersonal relations upon the individual is common to them all. "Psychiatry," explains Sullivan, "*is a study of processes that involve or go on between people*." The field of psychiatry is the field of interpersonal relations, under any and all circumstances in which these relations exist."¹² When one speaks of personality one is not referring to an isolated human organism; personality arises only in the complex of interpersonal relations in which one lives.

Today the cultural anthropologists are saying that the entire culture into which an individual is born operates determinatively upon him. Thus the relevance of the concept of relationship is made increasingly significant for the dynamic psychologist.

Culture is seen [by the cultural anthropologist] not as a set of external impacts and catastrophes to which an organism, whose normal functioning is just like the functioning of a member of a different society, is subjected, but, *as a principal element in the development of the individual*, which will result in his having a structure, a type of functioning and a pattern irritability, different in kind from that of individuals who have been socialized within another culture. In this conception, immersion in a culture, through continuous intercourse with individuals all of whom have been similarly immersed, sets up in the developing organism a large number of tendencies which become steadily more irreversible . . . in the sense that the total functioning of the individual is dependent upon the systematic interrelationships between a large number of tendencies.¹³

This concept of the dynamic interrelation of the individual with his society will be illustrated, along with the other principles reviewed here, in the case histories.

4 A fourth principle of dynamic psychology bearing crucially upon this study of self-acceptance is that of the correlation which is understood to exist between the attitudes of the individual toward himself and toward others. As Dr. Erich Fromm puts it: "The attitude towards others and toward ourselves, far from being contradictory, runs basically parallel."¹⁴ In explanation of this he writes:

Love for others and love for ourselves are not alternatives. Neither are hate for others and hate for ourselves alternatives. On the contrary, an attitude of love for themselves will be found in those who are at least capable of loving others. Hatred against oneself is inseparable from hatred against others, even if on the surface the opposite seems to be the case. In other words love and hatred, in principle, are indivisible as far as the difference between "objects" and one's own self is concerned.¹⁵

Fromm cites an example which shows how this principle operates in the individual, and which also demonstrates the functioning of the relationship-principle. The example is of a parent who continually impresses upon his child that he must not be "selfish." "Don't be selfish," the parent says to the child again and again, implementing the words with gestures, deeds, and disapproving attitudes at sundry times and under varying circumstances in the home. Consciously, says Fromm, most parents would connect selfishness with egotism, inconsiderateness, and lack of concern for others. Factually, however, they generally mean more than this. Not to be selfish implies not to do what one wishes, to give up one's own desires for the sake of those in authority, namely, the parents, and later, the authorities in society. Illuminating its psychological meaning (not understood by the child, of course, but most assuredly felt by him), Fromm continues:

Aside from its obvious implication, it ["Don't be selfish"] means, "don't love yourself," "don't be yourself," but submit your life

to something more important than yourself, be it an outside power or the internalization of that power as "duty." "Don't be selfish" becomes one of the most powerful ideological weapons in suppressing spontaneity and the free development of personality. Under the pressure of this slogan one is asked for every sacrifice and for complete submission: only those aims are "unselfish" which do not serve the individual for his own sake but for the sake of somebody or something outside of him.¹⁶

Now the self may be made up of such attitudes as this, for the infantile self takes reflected appraisals of significant elders to itself and makes them its own. Indeed, the child in the first years lacks the experience and the equipment to do anything else. Out of the deep need for security, for a modicum of comfortable integration, for some expression of his potentialities, he tends to accept parental appraisals of his worth, first as they are conveyed empathetically, later as they are communicated by words, gestures, and deeds. To be sure, most youngsters are not so unfortunate as to meet unalloyed derogation or continual hostility from their parents and their siblings. Usually the individual experiences a mixture of attitudes: affection, indifference, and dislike, although one kind of experience generally predominates. To the extent that his experiences are contradictory he forms ambivalent attitudes toward himself. But whatever the dominating feeling about himself happens to be, the self tends to perpetuate it and defend it throughout life. Anxiety tends to preclude the experience of anything which might correct or modify the direction of growth of the self, whose organization—be it always remembered—represents the integrative function of the personality, however inadequately.

The direction and characteristics given the self in infancy and childhood are maintained year after year at an extraordinary cost, so that most people in this culture, and presumably in any other, because of inadequate and unfortunate experience in early life, become "inferior caricatures of what they might have been."¹⁷

The appraisals which make up the individual's attitude toward himself and which are gained for the most part in the early years

are reflected in his appraisal of others. Another way to put the case is this: one can find in others only what is in the self. How this works out may be seen in another example; namely, a patient who is kept waiting for ten minutes.¹⁸ The patient enters the room wild with rage at the offense done to him by the doctor, a reaction familiar to therapists. Extreme cases can be observed in psychotics, whose disproportionality is still more striking. Psychotic hatred will be aroused by something which from the standpoint of reality is not at all offensive. The event is intolerable only from the standpoint of the patient's own feeling. So in the case of this angry patient. What he has is a "character-conditioned hatred," an "idling" hostility that is ready to express hatred on the slightest provocation.

In childhood this basic hatred was brought into existence by certain people, but later it has become part of the personality structure and *objects play but a secondary role. . . . The idling hostility is always there; its outside objects change according to circumstances and it but depends on certain factors whether I myself become one of the objects of my hostility. . . .* Character-conditioned hatred is something radiating from an individual and like a searchlight, focussing sometimes on this and sometimes on that object, among them myself.¹⁹

✓ There are many forms of hostility to others besides open antagonism—criticism, fault-finding, avoidance, "loving" domination, competitiveness, and so on. Each of these phenomena has its correlative form of hostility toward the self—self-criticism, inferiority feeling, masochistic "love," rigid work standards, and so on.²⁰

For an individual whose familial background has been positive, favorable, and loving, the attitudes which he shows toward others and to himself will be basically parallel also. He will love others and he will love himself. Of course, it is a more difficult matter to discuss love because it appears to be a comparatively rare phenomenon in this culture, and it is exceedingly difficult to grasp the true meaning of it.²¹ Fromm's definition of love is this: "Love is affirmation of life, growth, joy, freedom." Love is "*passionate affirmation*," something in which the whole personality takes part as a whole—intellect, emotion, and senses.²² As there is character-

conditioned hatred in individuals so there can be character-conditioned love, basic sympathy as one might call it, readiness to love.²³ The two conditions needed for the ability and the readiness to love are: experiences of love from others as a child, and the absence of all those factors which make for the existence of character-conditioned hatred or an outlook close to it.²⁴ While parents are supposed to love their children, true love, love of an affirmative kind which fosters the unique expansion of the young child's life, is the exception rather than the rule. But when parental demands and allowances are such as to foster love in the child, he develops readiness to affirm his own life, happiness, growth, and freedom and that of others. "If an individual has this readiness, he has it also toward himself; if he can only love others he cannot love at all. In one word, love is as indivisible as hatred with regard to its *objects*." ²⁵

In summary, we see with Horney that "the relation to others and the attitude toward the self cannot be separated from one another." ²⁶ Two points may be underlined. First, the positive correlation exists here because the contents or attitudes of the self are evolved in early interpersonal relations, where parental approbation and disapprobation, reward and punishment, determine the disposition of the personality. The child is forced to make his parents' attitudes his own in order to integrate comfortably into the family community. Therefore, an affirmative, loving disposition is predicated upon the child's reception of this affirmative kind of love from his elders. To grow up with a readiness to love himself and others he needs to have received this from the significant others of his infancy and childhood. Second, if such benevolence is experienced, it may be counted on that the individual will regard others benevolently. As Sullivan puts it: "If there is a valid and real attitude toward the self, that attitude will manifest as valid and real toward others." And, he adds: "It is not that as ye judge so shall ye be judged, but as you judge yourself so shall you judge others; strange but true so far as I know, and with no exceptions." ²⁷

What we have called the principle of flexibility has to do with the conception of the possibility of alteration of basic attitudes

toward himself, toward his fellowman, and toward life in general. This is one of dynamic psychology's working assumptions. Far from holding that human nature does not change, the therapist is aware that it is changing all the time for better or for worse. His psychotherapeutic experience indicates that significant changes for the better can be wrought in the individual who takes the appropriate steps in the direction of such change. The interest of the psychotherapist is not so much in the fact that this can be accomplished in the life of the individual but in *how* it can be accomplished. Nevertheless it is important for us to note what Hadfield pointed out two decades ago: "The importance of psychological re-birth nowadays virtually lost by the Church, is being rediscovered in psychology"²⁸ Not only the importance but the definite possibilities of re-birth are now certified though never guaranteed by medical psychology. Horney suggests that the goal of therapy might be formulated in terms of increased capacity for volitional expression, especially for the expression of love and friendship. She uses the words of John Macmurray to define what she means by love; it is "a relationship . . . which has no purpose beyond itself; in which we associate because it is natural for human beings to share their experience; to understand one another, to find joy and satisfaction in living together; in expressing and revealing themselves to one another."²⁹ All this rests, as Horney explicitly states, "upon the belief that human personality can change."³⁰

The dynamic process by which the alteration of the personality pattern comes about would be described somewhat differently by each psychotherapist. However, what does happen, in so far as the sympathetic diagnostic method of dynamic psychology succeeds, is an "expanding of the [patient's] self" (Sullivan's phrase). The individual comes to deal more freely with his ideals and values; he begins to acknowledge his repressed tendencies; he allows himself to look at them and increasingly to understand their meaning for his life. In successful psychotherapy the patient as known to himself becomes much the same person as the patient behaving with others. This is psychiatric cure. To be sure, there remains a great deal of experience and education before this individual can learn to live

harmoniously with satisfaction in the community to which he belongs. Indeed, it may be impractical or even impossible to achieve this more abundant life, this collaborative participation with others, because of circumstances beyond personal control. Inevitably the problem is one of circumstances inherent in the individual's culture-complex, and it is reflected in all the people available for interpersonal relations. But whether adequate community is fully achieved or not, "the person who knows himself has mental health."³¹

Reviewing the chief elements in this experience of character transformation, according to Sullivan's explanation of it, we may note the following: friendly relationship with a wise and trusted person; verbalization of one's feelings without censorship; reflection upon one's past difficulties with a view to the light they throw upon current problems; enlarged acquaintanceship with oneself; increased sense of liberation.

We may cite a second representative statement, a summary one formulated by Prinzhorn:

What acts in psychotherapy? In the first place, the *fullness of understanding of men, the leadership, the psychopathological experience, the wide view of life and the freedom from the private-ego proper to the psychotherapist*; in the second place, the *agitation, manifesting itself as transference*, of the patient tormented by loneliness, uncertainty and anxiety, the degree of the transference depending chiefly on the leader and on the special tone of the personal harmony; in the third place, the *methodical thoroughness* of the therapist, together with the diagnosis of the psychosomatic, and especially of the physically assailable, symptoms; in the fourth place, the transition to a *way of life suitable for the patient* (proceeding from practical life-technique to problems of culture and restraint, and so onward in religious ties). More deeply considered the effective agent in all this is: *that the therapist, in virtue of the Eros paidagogos which inspires him, helps, as mediator, from the isolation that is full of fear, to wholeness of life, to new comradeship, to the world, perhaps to God*. Without this form of the erotic, no psychotherapeutic curative action is possible. A *psychotherapist cannot help, nor a patient recover,*

*if this vibration is absent, or if it does not correspond to the special note of the situation.*³²

In this description the curative or ameliorative factors would seem to be: availability of expert and tolerant advice; availability of dependable and friendly fellowship; diagnostic efficiency, including medical treatment if necessary; extended consideration of personal difficulties and possibilities in the light of their unique individual context.

The element to be stressed in whatever changes are effected is the same in all kinds of psychotherapy: namely, L what Alexander and French have termed *emotional re-education*, something which can be accomplished only through *actual experience of a new type of relationship*, whether during treatment in the transference relationship or parallel with the treatment in the daily life of the patient.

While the patient continues to act according to out-dated patterns, the analyst's reaction conforms strictly to the actual therapeutic situation. This makes the patient's transference behaviour a one-sided shadow-boxing, and thus the therapist has an opportunity to help the patient both to see intellectually and to *feel* the irrationality of his emotional reactions. At the same time, the analyst's objective, understanding attitude allows the patient to deal differently with his emotional reactions and thus to make a new settlement of the old problem.³³

So much for the analysis of psychotherapy's principle of flexibility, the concept of the reality and process of definite, beneficial personality alteration. Having introduced dynamic psychology's method and five of its chief conceptions which have special bearing upon a psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance we shall turn to the case histories.

RELEVANT CASE HISTORIES

The following case histories are intended to illustrate several kinds of mental illness in which healthy self-acceptance is lacking. They are also meant to indicate the process by which psychotherapy

helps such individuals to achieve real self-acceptance. These cases show that self-rejection, the psychological opposite of self-acceptance, enters into the genesis of many types of mental illness. Self-rejection is denial of some aspect of natural potentiality in the human organism necessary for its harmonious development. The self-acceptance needed and achieved in some measure in each of these cases is that which allows for acknowledgment and integration of the rejected aspect of the personality. Following this presentation we shall explicate the meaning of sound self-acceptance from a psychotherapeutic point of view.

The selection of these particular case histories was guided by the religious and ethical significance of their presenting symptoms. In the first case, hostility is the dominant symptom; in the second, ambitiousness; in the third, compliancy; in the fourth, repressed sexuality; in the fifth, inordinately expressed sexuality; in the sixth, excessive self-indulgence; and in the seventh, self-sufficiency. With the exception of the third and fourth cases, it is obvious at once that Christianity has been markedly concerned with these ills. Hostility is a form of anger and represents ill will; ambitiousness is often another name for covetousness; inordinate sexuality is the much-talked-of lust; excessive self-indulgence is a large term for gluttony; self-sufficiency in any marked form may contain definite elements of pride. But while dynamic psychology regards these characteristics of the individuals in the cases as manifestations of mental illness Christianity has generally approached such phenomena moralistically, it has called these symptoms sins or expressions of sin. The differences between religious and medical psychology in their understanding of the soul and in their treatment of its ailments are symbolized in psychotherapy's application of the term symptom to the same phenomenon which Christianity customarily calls sin. The significance of these two points of view in so far as they relate to evaluation of the Christian pathways to self-acceptance will be a subject of the fifth chapter.

In reading the cases it is important first of all to note the self-rejection, that is the rejection of vital aspects of the personality, which each involves. It is also important to read the cases with an

eye to ascertaining the process of self-acceptance which took place, and the components of this self-acceptance. Furthermore, it is important to mark the transformations in interpersonal relationships which issued from the healthy self-acceptance, once it was achieved in some measure. Of necessity the case histories have been greatly condensed, even more so than they are in the books and journals from which they have been taken.

A CASE OF HOSTILITY ³⁴

"Man is bound under pain of mortal sin to keep the mighty passion of anger under control," declares a modern Christian manual of morality. "Anger (*ira*, *iracundia*), broadly speaking, is a craving for vengeance." ³⁵ This is the case history of a forty-two year old businessman whose mental illness was symptomized by just this "craving for vengeance." He had a "mighty passion of anger" which he did not keep under control.

When the patient came to the therapist, a long history of extreme irritability combined with a domineering, intolerant attitude was revealed. In recent years these attitudes had expressed themselves in uncontrollable jerking motions of his arms (these were discovered to be abortive rage attacks, inhibited blows). One of his most dramatic memories was of the time when, on his return from college after his first long absence from home, he dared oppose his father for the first time in his life during a minor argument. They faced each other ready for actual physical combat, the patient feeling that, since now he was physically stronger, he could certainly subdue his father, who had tyrannized him ever since he could remember. However, he inhibited his blow; he submitted to his father.

While he failed to finish this fight, and gave in at the last moment rather than hurt his father, the patient had continued to fight everyone else in his milieu. His irritability with his friends gradually excluded him from every social circle. His imperious, aggressive conduct toward his business associates made things difficult in an otherwise productive sphere of activity, for he was an able executive. Through the years his intolerant behavior at home had

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become so difficult to bear that the patient's wife divorced him, taking their son with her. But after a year and a half they were remarried. The patient did not cease to display extreme and unreasoning hostility in his domestic life, however, and at the time the treatment began the wife was again considering separation.

The early life of this man provides the explanation for his hostility. As has been mentioned, he had a domineering father, a self-made man of violent temper and unlimited self-confidence, who tyrannized the family. The father had always been extremely critical in his attitude toward the boy; he had intimidated him with regard to sex especially; he exercised authority over him not only in a violent but in an arbitrary way. To complicate the situation for the boy, who admired his father's power while he rebelled against his use of it, the mother, a protector to whom he had been very close, died when he was ten years old.

Even from this brief sketch it is apparent that the hostile man who came to the psychotherapist was still a frustrated "youngster," pathetically and vainly endeavoring to show himself and the world that he was not inferior.

In the treatment of this severe case of personality maladjustment, the therapist allowed the patient the freedom to review the injustices and the frustrations which he had suffered at the hands of his father throughout his infancy, childhood, and adolescence. He encouraged the patient to talk freely about the things in which he, the patient, was interested and expert; namely, the glass-manufacturing business and sports. In contrast to the father, the therapist openly expressed admiration for certain of the patient's qualities—his quick mind, his physical skills, his sophistication—realizing how much it meant to a person who had been intimidated all of his life to experience permissive and encouraging treatment. He allowed the patient to decide on the frequency of the interviews, giving him the freedom to lie down, sit up, walk about, smoke, and generally act as he liked during the sessions. Further, the therapist emphasized repeatedly the limitations of psychiatry and of his own knowledge, making his suggestions and interpretations extremely tentative, encouraging the patient to express his disagree-

ment and to accept only that which he himself judged correct. In every way possible, he afforded the patient opportunities to *experience* the fact that he was no longer a little boy who had to be afraid of a tyrannical father but a full-grown independent man with real abilities, who did not need to hate and compete any more.

The effects of this treatment were salutary. The reporting therapist says that it was as if this man in his forties were, within a few days, going through the process of maturation normal during adolescence:

In the treatment situation he found himself opposite a person in authority who did not browbeat him, who assumed an objective, helpful attitude while minimizing his own role. When, in spite of this, the patient developed competitive feelings and realized he could not justify them, he became confused. This gave the therapist an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to the patient his aggressive competitive impulses, not as reactions to a domineering father, but rather as manifestations of his own need to appear important and strong.³⁶

The analyst, whom he immediately installed as a father-image, consistently refused this role and treated him as an equal, thus making rebellion pointless and fearful submission absurd. . . . Excessive paternal intimidation had barred him from reaching this maturation—or, more precisely, had perpetuated the insecure, partly competitive, partly submissive attitude of adolescence. . . . A new, encouraging experience was capable of counteracting the inhibiting effects of the earlier family influences.³⁷

The patient's interpersonal relationships benefited in a parallel manner. Indeed, as dynamic psychology conceives it, man is not capable of having one attitude toward himself and a different one toward "objects" outside of himself. Improvement was first noted in the patient's relations with his son, to whom he began to behave not as a rival any longer but as a benevolent father—the way he felt the analyst had treated him. His wife completely dismissed the idea of separation because of his amazing emotional transformation.³⁸ His jerking arm motion stopped entirely, for he was able to surrender the hostile feelings engendered by his old feelings of

inferiority. By the same token he gave up his general irritability and asocial inclination so that his friends came back. This helped him to develop further emotionally, for with such a change in his own attitude, he experienced new attitudes on the part of those around him. The treatment consisted of twenty-six interviews over a ten-week period. While the prognosis for continued improvement was favorable, the reporter of this case points out that in many cases (of which this was one) the policy is to suspend treatment in order to allow the patient to proceed on his own, in the hope that he may thus gain confidence and independence.

A CASE OF AMBITIOUSNESS ³⁹

Christian concern over ambitiousness is well-known. For ambitiousness is often another name for covetousness. "Covetousness or avarice (*avaritia*, *philargyria*) is an inordinate love of earthly things, an immoderate desire to possess, keep, and increase them (*tenacitas*)." ⁴⁰ There are two sides to extreme ambitiousness: the subjective side is the inordinate desire for preferment, superiority, recognition; the objective side is manifest in antagonism, opposition, competition. The following case typifies these attitudes.

The patient was a fifty-one year old scientist, outstanding in his field, who came to the therapist for relief from a severe depression. A national convention of scientists, at which he was to present the results of three years' work upon a highly significant piece of research, was imminent at the time he came for treatment. He did not want to appear at the convention and had decided to give his paper to his collaborators to read. At this time, however, his research was not completed; he added with evident satisfaction that no one else could fully master the mathematics of his discovery and that if he withdrew no one would be able to complete his work. He countered this immediately with the statement that, of course, if he became able to work again he would help his collaborators finish up, but he wanted no fame or recognition. The patient recurrently told the therapist that he did his work always and only for "human welfare."

The obvious ambivalence of this individual manifested itself

✓ during the first interview. The therapist pointed out the contradiction in his attitudes: he had been zealous for his work, now he had extreme distaste for it; he avowedly wanted to serve humanity, yet he obviously was gratified that he alone could complete the important research.⁴¹ The therapist bluntly informed the patient that his protestations of altruism were defenses against guilty feelings of selfishness, of which everyone had a little; he also spoke in general terms about the unfortunate presence of competitiveness in every field of activity.

At the second interview the patient was markedly improved in mind and body. He remarked upon the revelatory significance of the first session. He said that he had never before thought of himself as a competitive person, except in the field of sports, but that now quite suddenly he saw that his whole life seemed to center around competition. He could not remember competing with his father in infancy, but he vividly recalled endeavoring to "best" his brothers.

The significant element in this patient's history is seen in the fact that he was the very late son of parents both of whom had been married before and each of whom had had six children by former marriages. The father was sixty-eight and the mother forty-six at the time of his birth. The patient found himself therefore in the emotionally trying situation of the latecomer. Moreover, he felt that he had been spoiled by his parents. In early childhood he had suffered from a mild infantile paralysis and was small and puny. Treated as a weakling by the whole family, he had felt that only by some extraordinary achievement could he bridge the hopeless gap between himself and his older brothers. In addition to all this, the failure of his own first marriage hurt his pride. His wife was unfaithful, drank a good deal, and finally deserted him, stealing from the house one night and taking their two year old son with her. A second marriage worked out happily, with two children of whom he was very proud.

At the time he came to the therapist his own sexual decline, an unavoidable part of his own aging process, revived his need to prove

his powers and increased his neurotic ambitiousness. Even more fundamental at this time was the suppressed awareness that he would soon have to give way to younger men in his professional field, a grave thing for one whose need for recognition was so intense.

The treatment of this patient has already been intimated. In two interviews extremely rapid and favorable results were achieved. The therapist was able to discern the patient's problem so accurately, formulate his interpretations so precisely, and enlist the patient's confidence so completely from the very beginning that a revelatory process quickly ensued. In the light of his childhood situation, the therapist could show the patient why the extreme ambitiousness was present and why certain situations intensified it. The patient remarked that he was impressed by the therapist's approach to emotional problems, that he had not realized they could be treated in such a rational manner.

Once his faith in the therapist's capacity was developed, as in this case it quickly was, the patient could be led to face his old feeling with a new attitude. When the self's synthesizing power is great, it is often sufficient that the therapist merely turn the spotlight upon old conflictful emotional situations which the weak infantile self had not been able to face and from which it had withdrawn. Obviously this was the answer to the speedy recovery of the scientist. Such insight does not develop, however, unless the patient re-experiences intensively the once repressed emotions. This he did. When finally he had exclaimed that his fear of youth must be sheer insanity, a discriminatory judgment was set up by which he could distinguish between the old situation in which his insecurity was born and the present one in which he actually had nothing to fear.

The patient's own words to a friend express his changed attitude:

The analyst picked out of my life's history little pieces, assembled them in the same way that you put a jigsaw puzzle together and made a picture, a vivid picture which I could see plainly—namely, that I was exceedingly vain and yet at the same time I hated

vanity (and I do), that I often did things to punish that vanity without any recognition on my part of the motivating cause or compelling factor.⁴²

A few months after the treatment the patient informed the therapist that he had finished his research, and presented the results at the national convention. He had also been liberated from depression. Eight years later, the therapist learned that the patient had weathered a new crisis which came as the result of inheriting some money; on several occasions he had suffered mild depression, but it had not stopped his work. Now he had intense desire to rewrite his thesis so that people could derive more benefit from it, and he was about to retire to California to put the results of his investigations in final form. It seemed evident that he had to a considerable degree outgrown his former destructive competitiveness with others as well as his punishment of himself through disabling depression by an increased ability to appraise what he had accomplished in life and the worldly recognition which had been given him.

A CASE OF COMPLIANCY ⁴³

Very significantly there is no capital sin in the Christian codes which parallels the pseudo-co-operativeness that medical psychology discovers in many cases of mental illness. The compliant person in Western culture meets no condemnation, and does not usually appear to be maladjusted. As Horney observes, "his values coincide anyway with approved-of social or Christian virtues."⁴⁴ The following case will demonstrate the unhealthy, neurotic character of the person whose dominant trait is compliancy, pseudo-co-operativeness, "unselfishness."

In this case the patient was a thirty year old woman, who was suffering from an acute depression over her pregnancy (then in the seventh month) and needed immediate, direct help before the baby was born. While the immediate cause of her depression was this second pregnancy, which made her feel inferior and "dirty," she said that all her life she had suffered spells of depression and feelings of inadequacy.

Her conduct had always been most "exemplary" from the early age at which she began to act as mother to the other children in the family. She took charge of the home while her mother took courses at the college where her father taught (as a professor of philosophy) or taught school herself. Instead of going to college when she finished high school, the patient had stayed at home to care for the younger children. Then, when the next younger sister, the father's favorite, was ready to go to college, the patient went out and worked for two years to help finance her. Now that she was married and had a seven year old daughter, she felt that she should give up her own music and devote her time to training the daughter to be a concert pianist. She was similarly "unselfish" with her husband, operating on the assumption that as his wife she should benefit him without thinking of getting anything from him for herself.

Two dreams bring out clearly this compliant attitude. "A man gave me two eggs. I was delighted and took them home to cook for supper. However, two guests came in and I had to give them the eggs, so I didn't have anything to eat myself." And the second dream, during a period of considerable sexual tension: "I was out on the street in my nightgown, without shoes on. I burst into a shoe store and asked the man for a pair of shoes for my baby."⁴⁵

It is evident that this woman, although approved by those who knew her, was inwardly miserable. Her most common reaction to the therapist was the expressed fear that he would find her case hopeless. What maladjustment characterized this exceedingly sacrificial but thoroughly unhappy woman that can explain why she who "lost" her life for others had not found happiness herself?

One noticeable thing about her early environment was the function of mothering the younger children which she took upon herself, a task made necessary by the fact that her own mother had to teach school some of the time to augment the family income. This tended to deprive her of the normal opportunity to pursue her own youthful interests. Moreover, she found herself deprived of her father's love to a great extent because the little affection of which he was capable was given to her next younger sister. The

patient's reaction was to shove this sister into prominence by calling attention to her superiority; in doing so she played down her own high intelligence, longing yet fearing to hold first place with her scholarly father. Her reaction was in part dictated by her father's moralistic teaching that it was wrong for her to do what she wished. Having anything for herself meant that she took it from others, especially from her rival sister.

Another factor in her home life was the puritanical attitude of both parents toward sex and the body. The children were never told a word about sex. In fact, all matters pertaining to the body were taboo. Even at sixteen the patient could not believe that a certain nice woman teacher ever went to the bathroom. She refused to believe how babies were born when a friend told her, and was disgusted with her mother for confirming it. She would not admit, even to herself, that the sexual act could occur.

Especially significant for her in the light of her second pregnancy was the connection which she had formed early in life between child-bearing and sin. The patient had always been told that any physical suffering was the result of badness; a stomach-ache meant she had eaten too much of the wrong food, a sore throat, that she had gone without her rubbers. Thus she connected her mother's suffering at the time of pregnancy and childbirth with wrongdoing. She could not remember ever having seen her mother pregnant—although the mother had borne five children after her—but she remembered vividly one actual birth in the home. She associated sexuality in general with wickedness. This outlook caused her further to depreciate herself not only as a mother but as a woman.

Still another determining characteristic of her childhood and youth was an intense ambitiousness which her parents had, especially the mother, for all the children. They were taught that they were superior to their schoolmates. The patient felt that her mother had always wanted her to have a career rather than to marry. The patient felt this so keenly that she had intense guilt feelings toward her mother for marrying and having children instead of being frigid and pursuing a career. This was revealed in

a dream, which is significant because it was repeated later on with an interesting change. "I was climbing a mountain of ice which was very slippery, trying to get to the top. As I rounded a curve I saw my mother and grandmother standing on top and I felt very guilty toward them that I had not succeeded in making it."⁴⁶ The dream referred to her mother's ambitions for her.

This patient's neurosis was rooted in two conflicts: she was unable to accept maturity because of her dependent attitudes, and she could not allow herself to succeed in any social or intellectual way because of her guilt feelings. Certain early traumatic experiences which debased her concept of sex and the body further inhibited her, while her relationships with her parents served to convince her that she had been only a worry and a deprivation and a disappointment, particularly to her mother. The load of guilt which she was carrying from all this made her a person who could not tolerate the slightest thought of personal pleasure or success: it was simply wrong to please herself at all.

Under these psychological conditions, the therapist tried to help the patient to understand how anachronistic was the authority to which she gave adherence. She endeavored to help her learn to trust the validity of her (the patient's) own wishes, to break away from the dictates of a conscience taken over from the parents, and to live her life as a mature person. In order to effect this change it was necessary first to activate her suppressed hostility and her guilt toward her parents and her sister. The therapist's permissiveness was a radically new experience for the patient. She found encouragement to admit hostility toward her relatives and guilt about sex. Moreover, there was support from the therapist when ideas of broadening her interest to include conscious consideration of herself began to utter themselves. It may be noted that all along she had had unconscious thoughts about herself, as evidenced in fantasies of breaking up the marriages of her friends by succeeding socially and intellectually with their husbands. Also, when the therapist had helped her to work through her real desires, she found that she really wanted a husband and children, which, to be sure, she already had, but could not freely enjoy for the reasons given.

The following dream shows the patient's dawning realizations of her restricted life and her effort to grow up:

There was a ridge of snow and ice with a gap in the middle of it. I knew if I could climb up the ridge to the gap and go through it I would come to the following scene at the beach, a scene I actually saw when I was sixteen; a man struggling to put a bathing slipper on a young girl's foot, both of them red and embarrassed. When I actually saw this, I wondered how a girl could allow a young man to take such a liberty with her. In the dream I didn't know whether I'd make the grade, or whether I would slide back.⁴⁷

She commented that this dream reminded her of the dream of the icy mountain, and she recalled that on this same beach she had been kissed by a boy when she was an adolescent. Another memory was that a married man once made advances to her while she was in college.

The interpretation of this dream, as suggested to the patient, was that she was afraid to be born (pass through the gap) and separate herself from her mother because she was afraid that a father-figure (a married man) would prefer her to her mother. She was dreaming about entering into a new stage of life.

Her dream anticipating her liberation from her repressions later materialized. Her depression lifted. Later she wrote the therapist that she did enjoy her husband and her children (during the treatment her second child, a girl, had been born) much more now than formerly. In the last session she declared that she was tired of her destructive fantasies of breaking up the marriages of her friends and would like to turn her energies into constructive channels. In that same session she announced that she had dreamed she made a great hit with her brother-in-law by being very intelligent. She began to engage in social activities with freedom and pleasure.

The treatment of this case lasted a little over a year, and totaled forty-two interviews. The reporting therapist points out that the best proof of therapeutic accomplishment in this case will be found in the patient's attitude toward her own daughters as they come into maturity. As it stands, this case is a good illustration of libera-

tion from over-conscientiousness, from compliancy which served no one richly and shattered an able personality. Moreover, her liberation might be reliably depended upon to facilitate the daughters' freedom, and marital relations with her husband. Her release from pseudo-co-operativeness meant capacity for richer interpersonal relations.

A CASE OF REPRESSED SEXUALITY ⁴⁸

It seems historically accurate to say that Christianity is seldom if ever concerned about the danger of repressed sexuality, although there is no end of concern over the dangers of inordinately expressed sexuality. Yet this case of repressed sexuality may be taken to illustrate one of the common personality maladjustments of Western culture. That it is a *maladjustment* may be clearly seen in the life of this patient.

The patient was a woman of thirty-five years, who came for treatment because of vaginismus (tearing pain during intercourse) and fatigue from overwork. In the first interview she frankly admitted that she still felt, emotionally, that "sex was bad" although intellectually she had accepted it as something which should be pleasant. It was clear that inability to enter fully into the intimacies of married life with her "feelings" and with her body greatly impoverished both wife and husband.

Investigation into the patient's past revealed that she and her two sisters had been reared in a home where rigid puritanism prevailed. Until she went to college, her social experience had been restricted to the closely knit family life and to church activities. Dancing, card playing, smoking and drinking were all taboo, and sex life of any kind was never mentioned. She could remember no sexual curiosity or activity as a child. Upon the onset of menstruation her mother had told her that the menses would occur regularly and explained how to care for herself at the period but offered no explanation of the meaning of the function.

The patient was the favorite daughter of her father who called her his "little boy," insisted that she dress in overalls, and taught her carpentry, his avocation. She in turn adored her father, and

told him when she was still a child that she would never marry but would stay at home with him. She had no conscious hostility toward any member of the family. Indeed, she professed love for everyone, declaring, "One can find something to love in all."

She married a man whom she had met at a church party and who had an upbringing similar to her own; her parents approved of the match. She had envisioned wedded life as an affectionate idyll, which God would eventually bless with children. On the wedding night she was horrified by her husband's advances and had said to him, "If my mother and father had known what kind of a man you are, they wouldn't have let me marry."⁴⁹ She eventually submitted to intercourse, but only after her husband had wooed her tenderly for several weeks and had explained to her the relation of sexual intercourse to child bearing. The relationship was always painful to her; after vaginismus was too severe for coitus.

Her husband had never been very successful financially. At the time of treatment he was co-operating with the patient's father in a business project but was making no more than expenses. The patient had been supporting them both for two years on a meager salary for clerical work. She had to work long hours, often in the evenings, and did her housework after business hours.

In the treatment of this case the therapist and the patient discussed changes in the patient's attitude which had taken place in the recent years toward the moral standards of her parents. It appeared that she had already loosened her attitude toward sex, dancing, and card playing. The therapist explained the manner in which parental requirements tend to rule the unconscious if not the conscious mind of the child, even in adult life, with the result that the individual develops unconscious protections against violation of these requirements. The vaginismus might have developed as just such an unconscious protection against really normal sexual desires. Wishes to discontinue therapy might be another unconscious protection. The patient expressed distress over her own wish to "dig out the dirt" and confessed that she had thought fleetingly that really she was too busy to keep weekly appointments. Remembering the warning that she might wish to break off therapy,

she had deliberately made herself think about all the "dirty things" in the intervals between sessions. Facing these issues she was surprised to find that she felt less ashamed of sex thoughts and more eager to learn the truth about such things.

In one interview, the patient laughed about her absorbing interest in sex information, "I'm making up for my ignorance as a child, when I should have been taught."⁵⁰ This statement afforded opportunity to discuss the hostility which children often develop toward their parents as a result of repression and deprivation. It finally became clear that there was repressed hostility in this girl who professed to love everyone: toward her mother, who was still smothering her with attention; and toward her sisters, who had more independence than she. She now began to suspect that she had been the favorite child only because of her consistent obedience and conformity. The therapist told her that it would be excellent for her health, as well as for the success of her marriage, if she could admit normal hostility and assert a little of her independence.

One of the early indications that this approach was helping to change her attitudes was given when the patient reported: first, she had had intercourse twice without pain and with some pleasurable sensations, although as yet without orgasm; second, she had spent Sunday with her husband on a picnic instead of attending the usual family dinner.

Subsequently the patient was able to discover that masculine identification was another one of her methods of unconscious protection. The patient herself suggested that perhaps she played a masculine role even now with her husband. She earned a large share of the living expenses and also helped with his work by giving advice, checking accounts, and so on. The therapist pointed out the element of masculine protest in her symptom, and showed her that vaginismus constituted a deeply hostile attack against her husband since it thwarted his sexual satisfaction. In respect to her playing the role of the man in the family, it was suggested that she might enjoy being less active, letting her husband do his own work except when he definitely asked for help. In the time thus freed she could indulge herself in pleasures long denied. She confessed that

she longed to read novels but did not because she always felt as if she were wasting time.

The closing phase of the treatment revealed definite steps toward independence upon the part of the patient, in which the therapist played a supportive role. The patient discussed a philosophy of life she was developing, the gist of which was the pursuit of personal happiness accompanied by avoidance of hurting people. Instead of making duty the core of her life, she was giving some place to pleasure, even though she continued to protect herself by a good control of her hostility. Although their sexual relations continued to be about the same, she was optimistic about the future. Her husband had read the book on sex information which the therapist had given to the patient, and requested a conference with the therapist for the purpose of discovering what he could do to facilitate his wife's development. The therapist encouraged the husband to accept his wife as a less repressed individual now, and to feel free to experiment in their sexual relations. He was also given much credit for his tolerant attitude toward his wife's treatment.

Of special interest in this case is the type of permissiveness manifested by the therapist in regard to sexuality. It was not an uncritical attitude although it was non-condemnatory. The causes of the patient's rigid standards were frankly discussed, and the general attitude of society toward sex was brought in. Tentative suggestions that the patient might experiment, but carefully, with richer life experiences were made. With a patient of strong ego capacity, such as this woman possessed, the transference relationship can become a frame in which the individual can allow repressed impulses to come to expression not in a primitive, unrestrained manner but rather in a socially acceptable way.

Six weeks after the termination of treatment, the patient returned to report that her pain and vaginismus seemed cured, and that she had experienced orgasm. She told of much contentment in her social life, most of which was now away from her parents' home. She also said that she was much less fatigued. She was helping less with her husband's work and so had more time for sleep and rest

as well as recreation. This treatment had consisted of seven interviews at weekly intervals. It must be observed for our purpose here that the therapy resulted in marked change in the patient's appraisal of her own feminine sexual nature and in increased capacity to function as a creative personality and a loving wife.

A CASE OF INORDINATELY EXPRESSED SEXUALITY⁵¹

The phenomena of manifest sexuality have received detailed attention from the various forms of Christianity through the centuries. Marriage has been honored as a sacrament or a holy rite partly because of the recognized importance of channeling sexual activity. Extra-marital indulgence has been surrounded with prohibitions, warnings, and punishments for many obvious reasons. Koch may be cited again as the representative of a typical view of the nature of inordinate sexuality or lust, and the gravity with which it is regarded by Christianity:

Lust (*luxuria*) is an inordinate desire for the pleasure which has its seat in the organs of generation. Sins of lust may be internal (thoughts and desires) or external (words and acts). *In these sins there is no smallness of matter, but every act of wrongful indulgence in venereal pleasure, if directly sought or consented to, is grievously sinful.* . . . If an impure thought, word, or act is freely willed or, *a fortiori*, if it is deliberately excited, it is a mortal sin. . . . External acts, such as immodest touches, looks, etc., are mortally sinful if due to lust. . . . Lust or impurity is a sin which ought "not so much as be named" among Christians. It involves the most serious consequences for the individual as well as for society.⁵²

The patient in this case was the very incarnation of the attitude and conduct described as lust. Moreover, as will be seen, he admittedly courted "impurity." As the patient described it, he led a "purely sensual life." His external sexual acts were frequent and intentional.

The patient was a young man in his twenties, a photographer by trade, who came of his own accord to the therapist for assistance. Obviously under psychological stress, he complained of a "block-

ing" which prevented accomplishment and enjoyment in every area of his life except the sexual. He described his difficulty as a periodic but persistent depression often accompanied by excruciating abdominal pains. Because of the blocking he lacked interest in making the necessary contacts for his independent photographic business and consequently ran into difficulty at home, where his parents continually chided him for his lack of industry. He also reported that his interest in writing and music had been seriously affected. He was spending most of his evenings in night clubs, where he drank heavily, danced with "pick up" girls, and found special satisfaction in voyeuristic experiences during the floor shows.⁵³ It was only in voyeurism, he said, that he had no blocking at all. For that reason he carried on an extensive program of promiscuity. The patient's attitude toward his self-indulgent habits was expressed in the statement: "I feel that sex is very fundamental in life and that the least a man can do is to be a good copulator; that should be one of the fundamentals." ⁵⁴ While he expressed no guilt feelings for his inordinateness, explaining that he got an "artistic kick" out of using his "amatory technique," the patient was extremely anxious about his generally unsatisfactory experiences in the other areas of his life.⁵⁵ He told the therapist that he would rather be dead than live as he was now.

While this case history reveals little about the patient's childhood, enough is revealed to indicate a rigid moralistic training. He recalled vividly, for example, a time when his mother whipped him for talking with a playmate about the sexual characteristics of different animals. Both parents were "religious." The father in his youth had gone on a "fast" to make himself more spiritual. And in his maturer years he had retained an ascetic attitude toward life which demanded uncompromising repression of everything related to sex, derogation of money as the root of all evil, and exaltation of the importance of long, hard work. The patient reported that he could still remember a nightmare which he had had as a small boy. He had read a book about Pike, the Western explorer: "I dreamed that I was ascending Pike's Peak, and when I reached

the summit, there was my father, looking very, very stern. His aspect was very intensely forbidding.”⁵⁶

Another well-remembered dream typified one part of the patient's abnormal sexual experience in childhood.

I had a popgun, and just as I was holding it, it mysteriously floated away from me with no apparent cause, and that terrified me too. I think the symbolism is clear there. . . . The warning of my father about ascending the Peak. And then the phallic symbolism of the gun being taken away from me in a very mysterious and terrifying way. Those dreams have always lingered with me. I must not have been over—not over six years old, anyway.⁵⁷

He was frequently scolded and punished for masturbation, and indulged in homosexuality unbeknown to his parents.

The father (evidently a teacher) was buried deep in his books most of the time. The patient felt that his own mother, a talented, intelligent, and emotionally warm woman, was deeply frustrated by her husband, and that, because of this, she had “always been somewhat possessive” of the patient himself. However that may actually have been, the patient at the time he came for treatment had great difficulty in adjusting to social situations. Even in his sexual relations he feared intense, prolonged friendships, and made a policy of dropping each girl before she dropped him. He did not feel that he was capable of accepting significant, long-term responsibilities in any sphere.

From the beginning of the treatment both the therapist and the patient were aware of the fact that the latter had real potentialities for achievement, if the source of his conflict or blocking could be located and resolved. He was gifted as a writer, he was independent, superior in intelligence, and keenly bent upon making a success of himself. On the other hand, even in the first interview and progressively later on, the patient realized that he lacked the needed confidence to change his neurotic way of life. He was afraid to take the risks involved in changing. He put it picturesquely: “Right now, the part of my personality that wants to change is outvoted.”⁵⁸

The immediate task of the therapist was to be a dependable and sympathetic companion in this struggle. The therapist fulfilled this responsibility not by openly encouraging the patient, except in rare instances, but by holding firmly to a policy of clarifying the patient's feelings without judgment. At every point the therapist endeavored to let the patient steer the course, thus fostering independence within a definitely encouraging relationship.

The clarification of the patient's feelings was in itself a main service of the therapist in this case. Through sympathetic listening and appropriate, simple recognition of feelings, the patient was encouraged to go more and more deeply into the topics under discussion. The ultimate outcome of thus objectifying the patient's feelings was eminently useful to him. He was able to see just how he was living his life at present, envisage different ways in which it might be lived, and count the cost of each alternative. The therapist did not try to "sell" the patient a choice or to make one pathway seem the more desirable. The choices were faced in all the black and difficult aspects of each decision. The neurotic solution was seen as a thorny and painful solution, "but there's such a nice rose along with it."⁵⁹ The creative solution was seen as almost impossibly difficult, but with important values of self-respect, greater achievement, greater long-time satisfactions. Out of this clear vision of what was involved the patient made his choice—and made it independently.

The treatment also involved helping the patient to take responsibility for the alternative he chose. At first he was inclined to regard the neurosis as something outside of himself, for which he could not or would not take full responsibility. The therapist's interpretation gradually helped the patient to discover that the neurosis was his own, that only as he could accept it and recognize it could he resolve it. In the beginning interviews the patient had expressed an utter helplessness and weakness; he could do nothing; he needed help. Later on, there came the realization that perhaps he himself would have to "provide the energies."

The culmination of this treatment was decided by the patient himself when he began to insist that he felt "the surge of improve-

ment." He reported the ways in which he planned to begin working in a defense plant during the day, carry on photography as a side-line in the evenings, and work on a novel, a sort of "thoughtful tragedy" with social and psychological implications.

The patient's development of self-esteem was noticeable. He informed the therapist that his own view of success did not mean mastering every situation but being able to take the ups and downs of life. He defined the goal of life as "the feeling that you have a stout ship, as it were, that could take all sorts of weather, and not pay so much attention to the weather as to the ship itself."⁶⁰ He had arrived at the point where he was relying no longer on the therapist but on himself to "seek out every and all healthy situations and enter into them," as he put it.

How this new attitude toward himself affected others may be illustrated by his description, in the final interview, of his meeting with an old girl friend, one with whom he used to get a "large number of neurotic satisfactions." He had endeavored to win her back: "I found myself desiring to get new and healthier satisfactions with her, rather than go back to her on the old basis."⁶¹ In the current relationship he discovered that he reacted to her differently than he had in the days before his treatment: it was the old situation, but he was reacting to it differently—"You can react to it neurotically, or you can react to it healthily."⁶² Heretofore he would have treated such a relationship hedonistically, even though he recognized that as neurotic. Now his self-respect no longer allowed him to do this. He had made the choice between neurotic satisfactions and the satisfactions of greater achievement and self-respect; he had made the resolve that he would take "the hard way," because the current way offered only "a series of brief satisfactions with long intervals of great dissatisfaction."

Specific results of the treatment included the disappearance of the persistent blocking and the accompanying abdominal pains. Less and less time was spent at night clubs; the compulsions with regard to drinking, voyeurism, and promiscuity were resolved. He began to enjoy evenings at home, especially when he could sit down to his writing. He took a full-time job in industry, where he felt he

could make definite contributions and at the same time advance himself.

This treatment consisted of eight interviews extending over a period of three weeks. The reporting therapist believes that the practical changes in the patient's life indicate clearer understanding of his own personality traits, especially the neurotic elements in it. Moreover, the patient did find opportunity through treatment to make some important decisions as to what he would do about these conflicting tendencies within himself. He was afforded the opportunity to make positive plans to resolve them. Evidently he attained greater confidence in his ability to direct his life, a self-esteem accompanied by a new regard for others, such as his old girl friend.

However, the patient is not believed to have achieved full insight into the genesis of his excessive self-indulgence, and certainly in this brief period of therapy he did not solve all of his mental or spiritual problems. Dynamic psychology does not claim to work complete cures, whether the treatment is of long or short duration. As will be shown later in this chapter, there are manifold limitations in the life of every individual, such as age, peculiarities of character structure, material circumstances, and the society in which he must live out his temporal life. Moreover, there are recognized limits to what the particular psychotherapist himself can do with any particular patient. Increasingly today psychotherapy is limiting itself in terms of the individual patient, and varying its techniques in consideration of realistic boundaries of possibility.

A CASE OF EXCESSIVE SELF-INDULGENCE ⁶³

Excessive self-indulgence is a large term which includes gluttony, one of the capital sins. As described by Koch, "Gluttony (*gula*) is an inordinate desire for earthly goods in general and food and drink in particular." The case described illustrates the "inordinate desire for drink," although, to be sure, as in all the cases cited, a number of factors are involved. "Drunkenness as a habit (*ebriositas*) is deserving of the *severest censure*, because it involves waste, destroys family life, creates dissensions, causes crimes and diseases, and en-

tails the physical and moral ruin of individuals, and sometimes of entire nations." ⁶⁴ The female alcoholic in this case involved herself and her family in some of these very results because of her drunkenness.

The patient, a woman of fifty-six, willingly consulted the therapist upon the advice of her oldest daughter. She came because of chronic alcoholism which had become increasingly severe over a period of ten years. She was quite aware of the effect which her behavior was having upon her six daughters, but she did not make the common protestation that she had taken her "last drink." She was not at all certain that she would ever be able to stop drinking. Although she was now a slave of alcohol, the patient said that in the first forty-five years of her life she had never sought it of her own accord. Only when her husband insisted on her taking a cocktail with him before dinner, or when the social situation demanded it, had she taken a drink—and then never more than two. About ten years ago, however, she had started drinking at home, usually within the confines of her own room. Her misuse of liquor became embarrassing especially to her husband; her silly behavior after two or three cocktails enraged and humiliated him, and increased their estrangement. For the past three or four years she had kept herself at home in a comatose or semi-comatose state most of the time, utterly unable to care for her children or household.

This woman had lived all her life in a large middle-western town where her family belonged to the wealthy set. After a finishing-school education, travel, and debut, she was married. Her husband, an ambitious, dynamic man, fifteen years her senior, was already successful in business at the time of their marriage and in the following years became very wealthy. The patient, who had always been genuinely devoted to her husband and whose happiness lay in satisfying his demands, received in return the knowledge that she was the beloved wife of a man (seemingly strong) who was a leader in their community. She never questioned his intellectual opinions; like a good Victorian wife, she accepted him as lord and master and carried out his orders—in the house, with the children, in their social life, and in her political convictions.

One wish of her husband, however, she could not gratify: his narcissistic desire to have a son. She was not robust physically and would not have had a large family voluntarily; but in an attempt to satisfy her husband's obsessive insistence on a son, she had had six children—all daughters. At the birth of each daughter the husband became more and more resentful of her failure to bear him an heir. To the birth of his sixth daughter, he reacted with extreme rage; to spite and punish his wife, whom he held responsible for this unkind trick of fate, he disappeared from home for three weeks. The onset of the climacteric closed the door forever on the possibility of the patient's giving him the son he so pathologically desired. The patient found herself the object of an abiding hostility.

About the time of the birth of the last daughter, the husband insisted on building a large suburban residence. The patient hoped to win back her husband's love and admiration by planning the arrangement, furnishing, and managing of this new home, but she was ignored completely. Every particular of the construction was his planning, and all the details of its management were dictated by him. This had made the patient feel a complete failure as a wife; not only had she failed to give her husband a son but now she was deemed incapable of planning and running her own home.

A few years after the establishment of their elaborate suburban home, the stock market crashed. Gradually the husband sank into a severe depression finally requiring institutionalization. This happened four years before the patient sought treatment. Meanwhile, she was overwhelmed by the entire management of the large house for which it was becoming impossible to find servants, and by the responsibility for six daughters who should, according to her tradition, be given debuts, education, and socially acceptable husbands. She realized more acutely than ever her lack of strong maternal affection for the girls. Her whole emotional life had been centered in her husband and, until he failed her completely, she had not even felt the need of an intimate woman friend or confidante. She felt now that she was entirely alone, and a complete failure both as a wife and as a mother. For this solitary, beaten woman excessive indulgence in alcohol appeared as a desperate effort to solve (or es-

cape) her problems. The results of the therapist's treatment indicates the symptomatic character of this patient's "gluttony."

After the patient had described the onset and progress of her drinking in the first interview, the therapist immediately suggested that some person close to her must have hurt or failed her in some way to make her need the comfort of alcohol. At once the patient disclosed—for the first time to anyone—the distress and bewildered resentment she had known when, at the birth of each child, her husband had blamed her for not bearing him a son. Instead of loving consolation for her own disappointment, she had been subjected to his bitter rage and vituperation. The therapist, in this case, supported the patient's resentment. In this repetition of the patient's traumatic experience with her husband, the therapist's attitude was the opposite of the one shown by the husband. Therefore, it acted as a corrective emotional experience. The patient found mature sympathy, this gave her sufficient confidence to give up the support gained by drinking.

Besides the therapist's permissive attitude toward the patient's grievances, a sense of freedom from guilt was facilitated. This was made easier because in this particular case the therapist was a woman about the same age as the patient. This meant that a mother-figure (the therapist) permitted her to activate her real feelings while still being accepted. It mitigated her guilt considerably to utter it freely in a relationship which at once was, manifestly, that of two friendly equals and, unconsciously, that of a child finding guidance and love from a parent.⁶⁵

Most important in the treatment was the restoration of the patient's self-esteem. This had been badly shattered by her experiences as a wife and mother. The therapist avoided any mothering, dictating, or advisory attitudes. She did not at any time reassure the patient about the drinking or warn her of its possible recurrence, as this would have been interpreted by the patient as an expression of doubt concerning her newly regained mature behavior. After the patient announced in the second interview that she felt no further desire for alcohol, drinking was not mentioned again. As another token of her confidence in the patient's capacity to act and decide

for herself, the therapist allowed the patient to determine the frequency of the interviews. In terminating the treatment the patient took the initiative. This attitude toward the patient was the exact opposite of the husband's depreciatory condemning treatment. As a result of the difference in the attitudes of the therapist and the husband, a psychological healing took place in the patient's self.

The outcome of this treatment was auspicious from the first interview. At the time the patient began to take charge of the household again, attempting to find adequate servants and displaying surprising energy. She made the daily visits to her husband in the hospital with far more equanimity than ever before. Toward her daughters she demonstrated an increasingly genuine attitude of maternal affection: by the time of the eighth session, she was planning a debut for one daughter; she was encouraging another to marry a suitable young man.

For half a year after treatment the patient thrived, she did no drinking at all, and was well except for some vague gastro-intestinal symptoms. Suddenly, she died of carcinoma of the gastro-intestinal tract. The daughter who had suggested that her mother consult the therapist wrote a letter thanking her for making it possible for her mother, before she died, to reinstate herself in the eyes of her children and friends. Her mother's ability to stop drinking and lead a normal life before her death was a tremendous comfort to the daughters.

A CASE OF EXCESSIVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY ⁶⁶

The nature of Christian concern for excessive self-sufficiency is symbolized by the fact that, in so far as it is synonymous with pride, it is regarded as the foremost capital sin. "Pride (*superbia, ceno-doxia*) is inordinate self-esteem or love for one's own pre-eminence, coupled with a desire of inducing others to accept the exaggerated opinion one has formed of oneself." Pride takes many forms: vanity, presumption, ambition, and arrogance.⁶⁷ One of the chief neurotic trends of the patient in this case is well described by this definition of pride.

This patient was a forty-one year old Protestant minister, tall and

physically the picture of health, who began treatment after an acute nervous breakdown. At that time he was prostrated, entirely unable to sleep, and suffering severe pain in both knees. He cried a good deal in despair, afraid that he would never be any good again. He was frequently excited and angry, at times irrational, and seized by a terrific fear whenever he thought about resuming his ministerial duties. After twenty days in the hospital with expert care, and a month's rest at a resort taking hydro- and electro-therapy treatments, he was pronounced physically fit but warned that he was on the verge of a complete "mental breakdown." Under advisement he arrived at the psychiatric clinic.

Upon arrival he still complained of the symptoms for which he had been treated in the hospital and at the resort. Moreover, psychological examination showed a character that would be described in common parlance as prideful, boastful, egotistical. Among other things he described himself as "a big shot" in his church and city. For all this, he was obviously a sick man; his excessive self-sufficiency (paranoid trend) was a sign of severe mental illness.

The biography of this patient is harsh and loveless in outline and content. The patient was the eldest, and for twelve years, the only son of very poor German parents. The father, a blacksmith and onetime sheriff by vocation, was a physical giant of a man. He was godless and profane, and his word was law to the patient, who feared violent death at his father's hands if he even so much as tried to explain his innocence when accused. On the boy's fifth birthday, the father aroused his expectations by promising to bring a birthday present from town. He returned with a heavy rawhide whip, as a ghastly joke at which he laughed heartily, and, thenceforward, the whip hung over the living room door.

The father suffered a paralytic stroke at forty-one (the same age at which the patient broke down, with non-organic leg pains and prostration similar to paralysis), but his cruel intimidation reflected itself in the patient's attitude toward other men. For instance, after seven years of missionary service in India, he returned to serve as second assistant pastor in a church of four thousand members in a large midwest city. The pastor of this church, who played a very

important part in the patient's difficulties, was the "Reverend Brown," another physical giant with a booming voice, a dominant personality, and an "X-ray eye which bore right through you." Unfortunately, the Reverend Mr. Brown had involved himself in illicit relations with the choir leader of his church, and the patient had a part in terminating the scandal, which ended when the big man was forced to resign. However, the patient came in for bitter denunciation from his former chief. Brown said the patient was doomed to failure, would never succeed, never amount to anything, and would go to pieces sometime. This happened to repeat almost the same words the patient's father had used in times past. Despite this intimidation first by his father and then by this father-figure, the patient did succeed in several churches thereafter, until he "broke down" at the age of forty-one.

The patient had been unable to find love even from his mother. She was erratic, irritable, unsympathetic, and showed him no affection. Although the mother was not a religious person and later opposed the patient entering the ministry, she taught him a prayer which he said nightly until about the age of seven, when he discontinued it. In adolescence he had few relations with girls; in college he took otherwise dateless women out in groups. He had planned to be celibate, like a priest, but changed his mind in seminary when he was told that every graduate should get himself married before the first pastorate in order to protect himself from designing females in the congregation. Also, a wife could help him a lot in his work. When he finally did become engaged he had himself sterilized, with the rationalization that he and his wife were going into missionary work in the jungles and he did not want her to run the danger of pregnancy. The surgeon who did the operation assured him that it would not interfere with his sex desire or power, to which the patient replied that he didn't care and, in fact, had hoped it would. He promised God at this time that he would not abuse his privilege of being sterile by indulging in excess. However, in spite of this resolution, he did have a few pre-marital relations with his fiancée, with tremendous guilt and remorse.

The patient's childhood and adolescence was further complicated

by a number of traumatic sexual experiences: intense and consciously pleasing homosexual experiences with a neighborhood gang at seven years of age; seduction by an eighteen year old cousin at about the same time; repeated threats of castration by the crowd of men who loafed about his father's blacksmith shop; a habit of masturbation which lasted clear into seminary years. The conflict aroused by this practice was the main theme of his first private prayer-life. He addressed God directly concerning it because he did not feel that he dared go to his parents.

In the treatment of this case the therapist persistently endeavored to get the patient to talk about himself and his real feelings. Fundamentally this was never accomplished in a year of treatment. The patient's habit was to avoid this by talking either about the great need of the world for salvation or his own record of achievement. The first day, for instance, he remarked that his primary concern was salvaging human souls going on the rocks, and that nothing upset him so much as to waste a day while hundreds were dying unsaved. He bragged about the way in which he had built up his church (he actually had doubled the membership and accomplished a number of other impressive feats), spoke of plans he was devising for revamping the entire transportation system of this country, a problem on which *other* geniuses were no doubt also working, and so on. A dream in which his disguised self was doing many things, such as playing the piano, singing, and traveling around a circuit lined with microphones, symbolized his "narcissistic self-regard." However, these feats were only possible for him because of his connection with the Lord, so he declared. Whenever the patient became aware that he was showing pride he depreciated himself and gave God the credit. Indeed, his belief in God required that he prostrate himself continuously and most abjectly. He said that he was only strong as the Lord deigned to work through him.

It seemed to the therapist that the father had so completely repressed the patient's potentialities and broken his spirit that he could never dare to recognize his own real reaction (one of hate) to his father and all father-figures. At first the therapist tried to show the patient how he had dealt with his guilt and hate by renouncing

them, by denying his masculinity, and by accepting a passive, masochistic submission to a divine father-figure. But the patient would not hear of it. He could not recognize his character-conditioned hatred. He constantly and vociferously denied hostile feelings against anyone. He declared that he had long ago decided that hate must be abolished from his life. He said that he had determined to be so active in doing good that he would "have no pep left for doing evil." One of the healing effects of the treatment was the unparalleled opportunity afforded him for the ventilation of hostility; of course he utilized this opportune relationship unconsciously. The therapist was deprecated in every way possible: he was pitied, as one who did not believe in God; he was prayed for, as one who needed to be saved; he was accused of scoffing at God's grace (the patient had told the therapist that he was praying for grace to say the right things in analysis, and the therapist had replied that not even the Lord should interfere with the rule of free association).

However, the patient's hostility was never admitted by him. It was so markedly dissociated that the therapist resigned himself to the fact that the patient's ministerial activity and his particular religious attitudes would always be necessary for him as a solution for his tremendous guilt and hate, as well as for narcissistic satisfaction. This resignation was due in part to the fact that the patient had already been under treatment for the better part of a year and was beginning to be apprehensive about losing his pastorate. Believing that he could be returned to work in a relatively short time, if further fundamental character changes were not attempted, the therapist concentrated on the attempt to point out the irrationality of his fears of persecution from the Reverend Mr. Brown, or God. He was able also to point out wherein the patient constantly defeated his own purposes by unnecessary self-punishment, especially overwork, which resulted in his being a poor example of the benefits of religion. He helped the patient to see where he was imposing his own fears and unhappiness upon those he wanted to help, instead of rendering them any real aid in fighting the

battles of this life. This approach seemed to offer the best chance for rehabilitation of the patient, and it was found that interpretations of this character brought definite results.

The last two months of treatment were largely devoted to material relating to the patient's return to the church and to plans which he was eager to talk over with the therapist. He had many ideas of doing more for the adolescent members of his congregation. Another proposal dealt with helping the needy of his flock in other ways than merely by praying with them and exhorting them to fortitude. He made out a new work schedule including time for relaxation, mowing the lawn, and adequate sleep. The idea came to him that he and his wife should take a two-week's trip to the mountains before returning to their parish.

As to himself the patient reported that he was sleeping much better. He volunteered the statement several times in the last months of treatment that he was growing more flexible and open-minded in his view points. Sexual failures became less frequent and sexual successes more enjoyable. He began to like social evenings with friends, playing games and conversing—something he had not done for years. He admitted with considerable insight that much of his self-denial and self-punishment was carried out with the selfish motive of thereby gaining favor with God. On the other hand, he avowed that he was entitled to a little happiness on this earth and a little credit for his achievements.

The treatment lasted just about a year, with several sessions each week. Three subsequent years of work in his parish found the minister still carrying on without another breakdown. The reporting therapist points out that his improvement might be interpreted only as a relief from the acute paranoid outbreak, caused by the patient's unfortunate association with the Reverend Mr. Brown, rather than a thoroughgoing cure of the long-standing paranoid defense, which was so clearly interwoven with his religious beliefs.

THE COMPONENTS OF HEALTHY SELF-ACCEPTANCE

In the light of the case histories, the correlation between attitudes toward oneself and toward others attains added significance, especially for religion and ethics. Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan's axiom: "As you judge yourself so shall you judge others," is clearly illustrated in these cases. The hostile businessman, acquiring more confidence in his own abilities, began to treat his wife and his son and his friends in a more benevolent fashion. The scientist, who was so covertly competitive because of a felt need for recognition, reappraised his own achievements and simultaneously developed a more gracious attitude toward the younger men in his field, whom he had formerly viewed as rivals. A similar alteration took place in the attitudes of the compliant woman. Coming into a more independent and a freer feeling toward herself, in which she was no longer afraid to admit her hostility to others or her concern for her own happiness, she created a richer and more responsive relationship with her family. The outcome was the same, in principle, in the rest of the cases—a striking parallelism appeared between the attitude toward the self and that manifested toward others, both before and after treatment.

✓ This empirical evidence would seem to justify, if not require, religious and ethical consideration of and emphasis upon self-acceptance. For, a healthy self-acceptance is the psychological *sine qua non* of good interpersonal relationships. Long ago Aristotle expressed this principle in these words. "Friendly relations with one's neighbors, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself."⁶⁸ In this second main section of the chapter, we shall explicate the meaning of self-acceptance from a psychotherapeutic point of view by delineating five components of this phenomenon, which Aristotle describes as friendly relations with oneself from which friendly relations with others seems to proceed.

These elements of self-acceptance now to be presented are really basic features of the healing process. They are parts of the

experience of accepting oneself, and, in the case of the individuals featured in the foregoing histories these components were appropriated with the help of the psychotherapist. In the ideal therapeutic relationship, these components are operative and developing at every moment. Still, it is possible for therapists to delineate "stages" in the treatment, during which particular elements predominate. For example, what we have called the expression component, sometimes called catharsis, generally predominates in the first "stage" of treatment.

The role of the therapist in helping the individual to achieve greater self-acceptance is essentially that of the *Eros paidagogos*, as Hans Prinzhorn puts it. The physician "tutors" or leads the patient into healing experience, so structuring the relationship that the various elements of self-acceptance may be experienced by the patient. He does this by his attitude and spirit, by what he says and by what he refrains from saying, by listening, reviewing, and interrogating. In these subtle ways the therapist really "teaches" self-acceptance. Successful psychotherapy is an emotional re-education in which the patient gradually comes to regard himself and others in the light of the components which go to make up sound self-acceptance.*

EXPRESSION

It is important for the individual to bring the painful, unlovely, and fearful elements, and the guilt-ridden desires of his inner life to consciousness, and to express them, in order to find a greater measure of self-acceptance. One analytical term for this process is catharsis (cleansing). The process is often referred to as application of the "release principle." The term expression component is intended to represent the same important process in therapy.

Carl G. Jung stated the importance of expression or release when he wrote:

* These five elements were not found as such in any material. They are heuristically conceived for the purpose of better understanding what is involved in healthy self-acceptance. That the healing experience, represented by these components, takes place in successful psychotherapy will be documented by reference to therapists themselves, and to the cases presented in this chapter.

It seems to be a sin in the eyes of nature to hide our insufficiency—just as much as to live entirely on our inferior side. *There appears to be a conscience in mankind which severely punishes the man who does not somehow at some time, at whatever cost to his pride, cease to defend and assert himself, and instead confess himself fallible and human.* Until he can do this, an impenetrable wall shuts him out from the living experience of feeling himself a man among men. Here we find a key to the great significance of true, unstereotyped confession—a significance known in all the initiation and mystery cults of the ancient world, as is shown by a saying from the Greek mysteries: “Give up what thou hast, and then thou wilt receive.”⁶⁹

So long as the individual is unaware of or refuses to recognize the impulses active within him, so long he will misunderstand himself and meet with dissatisfaction in life situations. Only in so far as he can admit to himself his anxiety, hostility, and guilt—and express them—does the need for defensive reactions disappear and integrated living become a possibility.⁷⁰

An explicit example of the bearing which the expression component has upon self-acceptance is found in the case of the young photographer (the case of inordinately expressed sexuality). It is illuminating to have his exact words:

[Therapist:] Well, how goes the battle today?

[Patient:] I got your point right after I left the office the last time. *The notion came to me that all aspects of the personality should be owned—that is, should be regarded as myself,* and I was under the impression that if the neurosis were regarded as an undesirable alien and I kept making a deportation struggle that there would be a resentment there and it would just entrench itself all the more deeply.

[Therapist:] M—hm.

[Patient:] So I thought perhaps that this approach might be better—that is, we would say that we were all citizens as it were, and what are we going to do to make it a better country—working together?

[Therapist:] M—hm.

[Patient:] So I've—in other words, I realized that to try to

shove it out of me, as it were, would be resisted as—well, it would just be like—*sort of like getting rid of a valuable portion of the personality*. I mean, after all, it's my nervous energy there—

[Therapist:] M—hm.

[Patient:] —and any attempt to shove it out or get rid of it would be an amputation, as it were, of the personality, so that—

[Therapist:] You feel that perhaps it is a part of you after all.

[Patient:] Yes, and that I ought to change those—*that is, to look upon the therapy as a change in personality rather than a getting rid of*. . . .

[Therapist:] M-hm. And has that—you'd like to look at all the intellectual aspects of that—*has that made any difference in your—feelings about things, and so on?*

[Patient:] Well, I've adopted a non-intellectual concentration of it in my odd moments. *I try to achieve a feeling of unity toward all aspects of my personality*, and at the same time, not necessarily take them as they are without trying to change them, but rather *to make the me include all aspects*. And it's a sort of *a getting together with the negatives*, and I don't know exactly *how to make them change into positives*, but at least I decided *not to try to shove them away*. . . .⁷¹

The last statement of this patient indicates that mere acknowledgment is not enough. The discovery of a new way of life that could really satisfy, as his present one did not, demanded more than mere expression could supply. However, by expression the patient did come to see what seemed at first to be unprofitable and unacceptable as part of himself which he could continue to disown only at the cost of inevitable conflict (a "deportation struggle" would only "entrench" resentment). The more he realized this, the more he came to surmise that "the negatives" were a "valuable portion of the personality," which could be constructively related (he did not yet know how) to the rest of himself. The psychological fact is, as Hadfield has said, *"It is only in so far as we admit our instincts that we can control and sublimate them."*⁷² X

As may be seen in the case studies, the therapeutic relationship is especially structured to facilitate this aspect of self-acceptance. Dr. Joseph O. Chassell describes the psychotherapeutic treatment

as the opportunity to express in a secure setting hostile or any forbidden impulses, learning that it is safe to accept one's own spontaneous self, and, later, to take responsibility for it.⁷³ Good psychotherapy encourages, but does not strictly guide, expression. Attention is directed not only to words and to behavior but to dreams, fantasies, art, and to all kinds of verbal sequences including slips of the tongue and hesitations. The therapist seeks to give maximum opportunity for the individual to express all feelings freely. Freud's formula: "Where there was id, there shall be ego," expresses the ideal here. Medical psychology holds that awareness of one's real feelings and a sense of ownership of those feelings is of primary importance for normalcy, for self-acceptance.⁷⁴

As we have mentioned in the explanation of the concept of repression, there is a difference between repression and restraint. The case of the sexually repressed woman illustrates the damaging effects of failure to express sexuality, for example. She resisted digging out this "dirt." Her initial tendency during treatment was to follow the old pathway of repressing sex impulses. Dimly aware of the pain and unhappiness which such repression was causing, however, she took advantage of the unusual opportunity to investigate sex. After a while she was able to admit sexuality as definite part of herself. Now, she could guide it in an enriching way to the end that it brought her and her husband closer together. In other words, once she no longer had to repress it, she was in a position to restrain it. Prior to that time no control was possible. An indispensable part of self-acceptance is this "psychological acceptance," as Hadfield terms it:

The principle of psychological acceptance is therefore as important in morality as in the treatment of nervous ills. It provides us with two essentials: (a) it enables us to control our impulses which we cannot control as long as we repress them; (b) it puts at our disposal instinctive forces of great power for the building up of character.⁷⁵

RESPONSIBILITY

It was mentioned that expression or release is insufficient by itself. A healthy self-acceptance involves a readiness to take charge of newly admitted impulses. If the aim is the dynamic organization of desires through attitudes which are acceptable or useful in integrating the organism and its environment, it appears that real self-acceptance involves a dynamic broadening of the ego to include the elements heretofore repudiated. In other words, the individual must willingly integrate these rejected aspects of the personality into the dynamic system of attitudes and strivings comprising the ego.

In one sense, the responsibility component of self-acceptance is merely the extension of the expression component. It is the willingness to acknowledge all one knows himself to be, not in the therapeutic relationship alone or for a moment but now, henceforth, and forevermore, so to speak. Dr. Joshua Loth Liebman has written that people have a way of hanging different pictures of themselves in separate rooms. In one room they hang all the portraits of their virtues, done in bright, splashing, glorious colors, with no shadows and no balance. In another room hangs the canvas of self-condemnation—a kind of grotesque Dorian Gray caricature—painted quite as unrealistically with dark and morbid greens, blacks, and no lights or relief. The task, says Liebman, is to bring the pictures together, to make them one.⁷⁶ The relationship of the expression and the responsibility components in self-acceptance may be said to be: (1) seeing the different pictures, and (2) drawing a new portrait for life which is truly representative.

Responsibility not only means readiness to live without pretension, it means a disposition to make the most of one's real self. | X
Horney has called attention to the fact that the neurotic does not wish to assume such management of his real self, for he has not accepted himself. She observes that responsibility is very difficult for him because he does not know what he is doing or why he is doing it, and what is more, he has a keen subjective interest in not knowing. He employs all manner of evasive tactics: denying, for-

getting, belittling, inadvertently supplying other motivations, feeling misunderstood, or getting confused. The neurotic tends to exclude or to absolve himself from the consequences of his actions, blaming his difficulties upon his wife, his business partner, his therapist. One of the consequences of taking responsibility for oneself, of course, is the possibility of having to admit failures as one's own fault. The neurotic cannot do this. He has "a hidden feeling of omnipotence," on the basis of which he expects to do whatever he pleases and get away with it.⁷⁷ [The achievement of self-acceptance involves this sense of responsibility both for the *fact* that one is *what* he is, and for making the most of his real self henceforward.

The assumption of such responsibility is one of the goals of therapeutic treatment—on this clinical psychologists are agreed. Summarizing a round table on psychotherapy, Dr. Goodwin Watson reports:

We have all stressed . . . the importance of keeping responsibility for choice on the client. Growth occurs especially as he becomes able to achieve "integration of will," making his own decisions and carrying out the implications of new insights earnestly, responsibly, and with increasing independence. As Doctor Allen put it, "*It is what (clients) do about themselves that is therapy.*"⁷⁸

This aspect of psychotherapy may be illustrated by two brief interchanges taken from the treatment interviews with the young photographer. The first one shows the meaning of *assuming responsibility for what one is*:

[At the end of the third interview] [Patient:] Do you want to leave any thoughts with me to dwell on between times, or don't you use that sort of technique?

[Therapist:] Oh, sometimes I do, but I often find it doesn't mean very much.

[Patient:] M-hm. I see. You just want me to come in and talk about the things that I feel—

[Therapist:] Yes. I might make this kind of a suggestion—that when you find your symptoms rather bad or leaving you—I mean

either way, when they're coming on or leaving you—the more honestly you can ask yourself, "What's this getting me?" the more progress you might be able to make.

[Patient:] That's a good thought. *Just to take the full responsibility for my feelings—say, "I'm the one that's making myself feel this way, and what is this feeling getting me—what good is it doing me?"*⁷⁹

This next interchange indicates the patient's increasing *readiness to make something of what he has come to know himself to be*, to take charge of himself as never before:

[Patient:] Now . . . I felt there might be a tendency perhaps on the extreme to adopt too much of a Popeye attitude—"Well, I am what I am, and that's all I am," and well, that's that. That's all right philosophically, but I don't think it would be all right psychologically.

[Therapist:] Well, particularly not since you do feel quite strongly, I think, that there are pretty diverse forces, or forces working toward diverse goals, as far as you're concerned. You can't pretend more unity and more satisfactoriness than is there.

[Patient:] Well, what I meant was I didn't want to get a placid self-satisfaction out of it by saying, "Well, I am what I am." I don't want to get self-satisfied, otherwise there won't be any motivation for a change. (*Pause.*) . . . [*Here patient tells of an important step he took in his photography business. Then,*]

[Therapist:] That sounds like quite a step.

[Patient:] Well, I believe it is. Heretofore I've had to have circumstance more or less force me, or some outside force to sort of prod me into things, but *I took the initiative.*⁸⁰

One of the most significant features of therapeutic practice is this recurrent opportunity for choice-making. For example, the therapist often confronts the patient with the choice of the time for the next interview, or leaves it up to the patient whether he will sit up, lie on the couch, or walk about during the session.⁸¹ Often enough such seemingly insignificant chances to assume responsi-

bility nonplus the patient. Such choices as these, of course, are but the beginning, and they need to be followed by the assumption of responsibilities which have greater and greater significance. In the case of the sexually repressed woman, the therapist first helped her by treating sex feelings normally, and allowing her to admit the presence of hostile impulses against her parents. Yet it was a more significant stride toward fuller self-acceptance when she was enabled by these first steps with the therapist to take charge of her domestic life. One day she came into the therapist's office bringing two items of news, which she offered as if she were presenting a gift to the therapist: for the first time, she had had intercourse without pain; and, she had spent Sunday with her husband on a picnic instead of attending the usual family dinner. In this event, and all other comparable ones, in which the individual confronts a decision he must make and which no other will make for him, there is the possibility of a whole new attitude toward the self and toward others. Dr. Louis J. Sherrill might have been describing this woman's new life and its major feature when he declared:

*It is not too much to say in psychology that the first assumption of genuine responsibility coincides with the rebirth of a self; and in the case of a person who has already established an inadequate pattern of living it may mark the beginning of the death of an old self and the rising of a new one."*⁸²

In true self-acceptance expression and responsibility cannot be separated. It is psychologically impossible for the individual to redirect his life apart from clearer recognition of his impulses. The "will" is impotent apart from the admission of anxiety, hostility, and guilt. Since the ideas of "will" and "will-power" appear frequently in the Christian views of self-acceptance, it is not amiss to refer here to medical psychology's view of them.

When the therapist emphasizes the importance of keeping responsibility for choice on the client, it might seem at first glance that he refers simply to the wisdom of appealing to some unmotivated authority in the patient's being. Most assuredly, dynamic

psychology believes that the individual is capable, at least potentially, of altering his responses and attitudes toward himself, others, and life in general. However, freedom to choose or free will is not centered in an appeal to some sort of mysterious, arbitrary authority, which sits aloft and issues commands categorically for the self to obey; nor does the will act independently of the self. Rather, the will is regarded as the organized personality in responsible action.

The conception of the will as the activity of the organized self throws light on many religious and ethical problems. First of all, it explains why the will meets constant opposition in the maladjusted individual. It does not serve those aspects of the personality which are excluded from the ego (that dynamic organization composed of the tendencies acceptable or useful in integrating the organism and its environment). In other words, there are excluded from the will those elements which are repressed or otherwise undeveloped. Whether one calls the repressed instincts and impulses counter-will or, with Augustine, corrupt will, it is clear that, psychodynamically, the unadmitted aspects of the personality actively press for satisfaction, thus frustrating the will of the individual. "Since there is a constant antagonism between the organized self and the complexes and instincts, so there is necessarily an antagonism between the will and the impulses, a conflict of greatest importance in morality and in psycho-pathology."⁸³ The task of psychotherapy is to help the individual "broaden the ego," as Alexander and French put it, to allow union with the newly recognized impulses in common purposes.⁸⁴

Another significant problem, which the idea of will as the function of the organized self clarifies, has to do with the familiar impotence of the will. In conducting the ordinary affairs of life the will reigns supreme; that is, the conscious personality satisfactorily dominates the impulses hostile to its characteristic mode of integration. Nevertheless, impotence of will shows up under at least two conditions: (1) when the complexes or instincts are excessively aroused, as when we are chased by a bull, and (2) when the self is not all endangered or not stimulated, as when we are fatigued, grief-stricken, or fearful.

This impotence of the will cannot be explained as long as we maintain, on theoretic grounds, the absolute freedom of the will to determine all mental activities; nor can it be explained as long as we regard the will as the activity of the *whole* psychological individual. But as soon as we regard the will as the function of that part of the whole which is organized, the facts both of the strength of the will and of its impotence, are adequately explained.⁸⁵

As the will is in bondage so long as the ego excludes vital impulses so it is potent in so far as the whole personality is incorporated; that is, in so far as the ego includes the id. For medical psychology, freedom of the will means freedom of the self to function harmoniously. This depends upon the degree of personality integration. Hence, the dynamic interrelation of the expression and responsibility components in healthy self-acceptance; for the individual is capable of taking responsibility, that is, free to make choices, in so far as he understands and accepts his whole motivational equipment.⁸⁶ Choice may be said to be an activity of the intellect or reason directed by the search for satisfactions. In the last analysis, integration of the will or free will comes from the individual's choice of alternative, available courses of gratification. Dynamic psychology is concerned with the facilitation of choices by which the total organism can be most completely satisfied, in so far as that is possible within the patient's limits. But sound self-acceptance is needed for freedom; and it involves acceptance of all the tendencies of which one is aware, and readiness to integrate them in the light of the possible attitudes and actions in the given situation. Hadfield writes:

When, again, in psychotherapy, emotional complexes are liberated, whether of sexual emotion, fear or ambition, the liberated instinctive emotions are brought under the dominion of the will and organized into a stronger self. There is, indeed, nothing so dramatically interesting in psychotherapy as to observe a patient under treatment pass through an emotional storm at the revival of some forgotten fear or sexual horror, and then emerge into calmness of mind in which he experiences an extraordinary

relief and freedom. Such freedom can be brought about not only by the liberation of repressed complexes and instincts in analysis, but can also be secured by the presentation of an "inspiring" ideal able to produce such a revolution of soul that not only the sentiments, but those emotions that we attached to morbid things are aroused to attach themselves to the new ideal. This is what normally takes place in religious conversion.

*Nevertheless, there is nothing, not psycho-analysis not even religion, which can exonerate a man from building up his strength of character by the exercise of will, i.e., by the individual's experience of assuming responsibility as heretofore explained. Analysis must be fortified by synthesis, suggestion by determination, religion by moral endeavor.*⁸⁷

APPRECIATION

Self-appreciation may be described as the favorable, critical estimate of one's possibilities. There is a kind of "faith" in one's own potentialities which is indispensable. Fromm affirms: "Faith in growth and realization of what now is only potentiality is one of the most important factors in human relations. As a matter of fact, *it is the most important attitude in any parent, teacher, or psychoanalyst.*"⁸⁸ An important aspect of self-acceptance is faith in oneself, belief in one's own developmental possibilities. However, as medical psychology sees it, this appreciation of oneself must be critical. It must involve careful judgment of oneself; that is, it must recognize and accept the limitations of development.

The case histories indicate how individuals came to appreciate their potentialities. The depressed scientist discovered that he could go on with his work and find positive satisfaction in it, even though he was getting on toward the retirement age. He saw, further, that he might make use of his retirement. The alcoholic woman experienced a really new relationship with the therapist, one which inspired her to take a new lease on the life remaining to her. The frightfully maimed personality of the prideful minister seemed to offer little hope of change. Yet the last two months of treatment were devoted to a spirited re-direction of his life and thought. What happened in each of these cases illustrates this

principle of appreciation: favorable, critical estimates of self were undertaken.

✓ The first important thing to note is that they were favorable. Fromm might describe their experience as "the experience of growth." Its result is faith in oneself, and faith in others (these two cannot be divorced any more than love for oneself and love for others can be divorced). What we call appreciation is "the recognition of potentialities and the vision of their unfolding."⁸⁹

The relationship of the three components of self-acceptance so far discussed might be molded into the following formula: true self-acceptance requires that the individual *express* his impulses and *assume responsibility* for their integration, and do both of these things in the light of the realistic *possibilities* which such experience opens up to him. The most important thing about therapy, Dr. Frederick H. Allen suggests, is not so much what caused a problem, but more what the person is able and willing to do about it—not in words, but in actual experience, in concrete situations. *If change occurs, it comes from within the person through affirmation of the positive and creative feelings which were set in motion when he asked the therapist for help and more clearly envisioned in the therapeutic process.*⁹⁰

✓ However, medical psychology emphasizes that appreciation of oneself must not only be favorable but critical; it must involve careful judgment of one's possibilities, if proper self-acceptance is to be achieved. In a very enlightening discussion of "the idealized image" (other names for it include ego ideal, narcissism, super-ego), Karen Horney points out the dangers of uncritical estimation of the self, which is characteristic of the neurotic.⁹¹ The elimination of the idealized image seems to be crucial for successful psychotherapy precisely because the false estimation of one's powers and qualities fulfills so many functions. The idealized image substitutes for realistic self-confidence and realistic pride. It serves to make the individual feel superior in some way to others without actually being so. It operates as an excuse for not attaining worthy purposes in everyday life, although as such it contains the only ideals that have meaning for him. This is one particular reason why the

neurotic holds on to his idealization; without it he would have no relevant goals. The image also disguises real conflict within the individual: "If in our private mirrors we see ourselves as paragons of virtue or intelligence, even our most blatant faults and handicaps will disappear or acquire attractive coloration."⁹² The more elaborate and rigid the idealized image the more disruptive the conflict can be inferred to be, declares Horney. Positively, the idealized image performs still another function: it represents a "kind of artistic creation in which opposites appear reconciled."⁹³

As a striking illustration of a very rigid idealized image, we may refer to the case of the prideful minister, whose conviction of himself as an obedient servant of the Most High and a lover of all men was so strong that a year of treatment did not make it possible for him to admit of any hostility toward others. Yet he exercised it against the therapist all through the analysis. What the idealized image accomplished for this poor individual was inner alienation, self-disruption. This case drives home the very important point: "We cannot suppress or eliminate essential parts of ourselves without becoming estranged from ourselves."⁹⁴ The idealized image is a mighty barrier against true development. The task of the therapist is to make the person aware of his idealized image in all its detail, and to assist him in gradually understanding the way it operates to hide limitations. The idealized image is certainly favorable toward the self but it is not critical; therefore, it does immeasurable harm. For health's sake it must be replaced by a careful judgment of one's real possibilities, which are not so impossibly great as those envisioned in the image.

Today medical psychology is more and more aware of the importance of the fact that man's nature has limitations, and that no self-acceptance is healthy apart from the realization of one's limits. This recognition has expressed itself in the general tendency to vary techniques of treatment in consideration of such factors as age, peculiarities of character structure, material circumstances, and the society in which the individual must live out his life.⁹⁵

An illustration of practical recognition of limits as utilized in therapy is given by Dr. Gotthard Booth. In his work with parkin-

sonian patients he finds the problem of dependence to be acute, "because active, successful achievement forms the center of their individual religion. They are constitutional Calvinists." It often helps such patients to discover the meaning of their paralyzed condition; especially, "that they neglected all their lives the part of human existence which needs and enjoys external support and care." If they accept their need for dependency as a meaningful part of their existence, the "guilty drive toward action at any cost" is allayed, and improvement is noticeable.⁹⁶

There are limits both to what psychotherapy can do and to what the particular individual can accomplish.⁹⁷ Real appreciation is the aspect of self-acceptance which takes these facts into account. This is favorable, critical estimation of oneself. The idealized image must be destroyed in order that the true self may be envisioned. Booth believes that dynamic psychology must overcome a "secondary" concern for the individual patient, which has been caused by a primary interest in an abstract ideal of "maximum psychological health." He finds the Freudian formula: "Where there was id, there shall be ego," to be an ideal, rather than a simple possibility, in most cases.⁹⁸ He writes:

It has been my impression that a great deal of the "unsuccessful analyses" of breakdowns and suicides among analysts and analyzed patients has been due to a lack of understanding for human individuality. *What the empirical human being can achieve is self-limited by the nature of the given organism. Behind the original psychoanalytical concept of "complete analysis" or "depth analysis" there has been an optimistic fantasy about human nature as being "good" and knowing what is best for it. . . .* It is noteworthy that the practical use of psychoanalysis has been much improved by limiting psychotherapy to objectives defined in terms of the individual patient.⁹⁹

One of the most important limitations to be taken into account for healthy self-acceptance is the individual psychosomatic constitution. Booth reports that "there are specific limitations of equipment regarding the basic functional spheres of health"; this is indicated by the uniqueness of every person's action patterns

(demonstrated in handwriting examination), and by every person's form of experience (demonstrated through the Rorschach Test). In some respects there is a notable parallel here between this emphasis upon the inevitability of suffering and failure in modern psychotherapy and the Christian stress upon the persistence of disharmonious and sinful elements in the lives of the redeemed. We shall deal with these two emphases, their similarity and difference, in the next chapter. From the psychotherapeutic point of view, however, it must be pointed out that the capacity to suffer and to face life's pain frankly is fully as important as the capacity for enjoyment and productivity. And there are kinds of suffering which have nothing to do with illness, and yet which form an integral part of meaningful human existence. Choosing between desirable alternatives involves this kind of suffering. The principle of appreciation, so far as the individual experiences it, enables him to see all this "dark side" of life and of himself as well as the "light side," and to integrate both sides—the sacrifices and the achievements—into an approach to living that is neither unrealistic nor hopeless.

The experience of this kind of appreciation may be seen to some extent in each of the cases of this chapter. We may cite the hostile man. He was able, finally, to appraise himself rightly, not as a little rebellious "boy" but as a capable adult. His new appreciation had tragic elements in it. For one thing, he had the inescapable memory of the vicious circle he had furthered for forty-two years, harming his loved ones and alienating his friends. For another thing, he could not avoid further disillusionment about his father, and renewed hostility against him. The sympathetic imagination can easily supply other sobering elements involved in his therapeutic awakening to reality. His idealized image was shattered; the new appraisal of himself was less pretentious, far humbler. Yet his new portrait allowed him to be positive and constructive, no crushing self-condemnation was in it. This is what is meant by appreciation of the dark and light elements in one's life and personality. This is an integral part of healthy self-acceptance.

BENEVOLENT RELATIONSHIP

The experience of a benevolent relationship, in which the significant other person manifests dependable good will, is an important element in the gaining of self-acceptance. In the introduction to this chapter, the importance of relationships, especially those of infancy and early childhood, was pointed out. It was shown also that the attitudes of the self are largely determined by the interpersonal situation, the attitudes of significant elders, in the home first of all, at school, and in the community at large. In so far as the crucial interpersonal relationships lack the quality of benevolence the child himself lacks it. In adjusting to the harshness, the pampering, the indifference, or whatever parental relations prevail in his early life, the child develops a character structure unprepared for harmonious and independent relations later on. This generally happens when a child is forced to be submissive, is overwhelmed by "kindness" as though he could do nothing for himself, or is ignored and has to fight for recognition and security. The child's struggle with such types of frustrating relationship all too often results in

the weakening or paralysis of the person's originality and spontaneity; the weakening of the self and the substitution of pseudo-self, in which the feeling of "I am" is dulled and replaced by the experience of self as the sum total of expectations others have about me; the substitution of autonomy by heteronomy; the foginess, or, to use Dr. Sullivan's term, the parataxic quality of all interpersonal experiences.¹⁰⁰

For healthy development of the personality, interrelations are needed which are characterized by benevolence or love, the "affirmation of life, growth, joy, freedom." This type of home situation appears to be rarer in Western culture than it is pleasant to think. In part the lack of it is evidenced by the comparatively infrequent appearances of benevolence in adult interpersonal relations.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the psychotherapist has to supply it, in so far as he can. Benevolence may almost be called the redemptive component in therapy. Hans Prinzhorn has put it in a similar way by saying that

without the erotic element no psychotherapeutic curative action is possible.¹⁰² What benevolence does in a relationship is to foster the three components already mentioned (as well as a fifth, yet to be described): expression, responsibility, and appreciation. For benevolence alone can provide what Goodwin Watson has called that one condition for effective therapy: the provision of "*a security which fosters spontaneity*."¹⁰³

A security which fosters spontaneity is what the therapist endeavors to provide. As we have pointed out, benevolence is just what the mental patient has not found in his early years at home and in other relationships. Of course, this benevolence is not pampering. The case histories bear witness to the fact that the patient is thrown back upon his own resources, given opportunity to think his own thoughts and express his own desires. But this is made possible by the good will of the therapist.

In the truly benevolent relationship at least two factors are present. For one thing, the attitude of the helper is that of expecting the individual to do his part, but he is willing to help in whatever is beyond the individual's ability. Moreover, in the benevolent relationship the significant elder expresses the belief that the individual has potentialities, and says in effect, I want to affirm your self-realization as I want to affirm my own.

Perusal of the case studies in this chapter will not reveal a single parent who structured his relationships with his child (later to become a mentally ill patient) in such terms. In each case, the parental attitudes required very different integration on the part of the child from that which true benevolence would have elicited or demanded. Whether the particular relationship was one of harshness, pampering, or indifference, or a mixture of these, the parental attitudes conveyed to the child non-benevolent feelings: You must do your part but I will not help you in whatever is beyond your ability; You are impotent and I do not expect you to amount to much; I am not free in my own life and I cannot allow you to be free either. To have to adjust to such attitudes in order to get on with those upon whom one is dependent obviously means that there must be a substitution of a "pseudo-self" (Fromm) for

the real self. This fell work, rising out of non-benevolent relationships, was undone to some extent in the cases cited by the psychotherapeutic relationship. Until this specialized good will entered into the life of the patient a proper self-acceptance remained impossible.

CHOOSING GOALS

✓ We have already discussed how important it is for the individual to acknowledge his whole self, and to take charge of it for better or for worse. It was then emphasized that making and carrying out decisions is crucial for the increase of self-confidence. More must be said now about the implications of choice-making for self-acceptance, especially since psychotherapy involves positive and often far-reaching decisions about goals for living. It is well to repeat that the word choice, as used in dynamic psychology, does not signify a new, mysterious force, which enters into the situation to alter it miraculously. Rather, choice is simply the act of deciding which alternative shall be taken, whenever the individual is faced with more than one way of satisfying his needs and desires.

The place of goal-choosing in the achievement of healthy self-acceptance may be illustrated in the case of the young photographer. Gradually he came to face the fact that he did find satisfaction in his neurotic activities. But it also became clear that he found happiness in "healthy" activities, which elevated his self-esteem. In other words, he came to the place in psychotherapeutic treatment where everything hinged on evaluation of two ways of life. This comes out with special clarity in the following interchanges:

[Therapist:] I think that it is a real choice, and different individuals take different roads. There are, as you know, certain satisfactions connected with, well, with evading life, with building up things that make it unnecessary to go out and fight some of these battles and assume some of these responsibilities and so on. Some people choose that road. On the other hand, there certainly are satisfactions connected with the tougher road too.

[Patient:] I think that my religious conditioning has made me sort of dependent on some kind of a cosmic sign. Originally

I had to depend upon God's approval. As I lost a belief in a personalized sort of deity, then I sought signs from nature and other things like that. But I must learn to assume my values without the justification of the outside. That boils down to what I really want. (*Pause*) I think it's a pretty close battle.¹⁰⁴

[Therapist:] It is a tough choice any direction you look, isn't it?

[Patient:] Yes. It would seem that my neurosis is definitely a thorn, but there's a nice rose along with it. And the healthy satisfactions seem to be more flimsy, not so much meat to them. And, of course, that's all a matter of evaluation. I know that *I could evaluate—that if I changed I could evaluate the healthy satisfactions and be non-interested in the unhealthy satisfactions, but (laugh) that means a change in me—I'd have to have a change before I would evaluate them differently. In other words, new evaluation is change.*¹⁰⁵

Obviously this patient's whole way of life was being weighed in the balance. He was considering nothing less than the goals of life. Would he choose goals which give immediate and temporary satisfaction only? Or, would he choose goals which offer delayed but more permanent satisfaction? For him, if not for all patients, psychotherapy involves deep-going consideration of ends, in an atmosphere which provides maximum opportunity for objectivity. Moreover, as these excerpts indicate, self-acceptance includes frank recognition of alternative courses and goals—recognition necessitates choices.

The fact that life-goals are involved in the process of therapy brings up more points of special interest for religion and ethics. First of all, it may be asked, what is the relation of individual goals to objective standards? Does medical psychology regard the choosing of goals as a wholly individual matter? Is right and wrong to be left to the individual's judgment? The most general answer of psychotherapists would probably be in the negative if for no other reason than because the individual does not live to himself but in relationship with other individuals. Personality adjustment necessitates individual consideration of others, such as family, friends,

society in general, and their standards. The therapist functions so as to help the patient realize this. Moreover, whatever goals the individual chooses reflect the milieu in which he lives. He erects his goals from the alternatives of satisfaction which his milieu offers. Thus the ultimate goals of the individual are not likely to be foreign to cultural interest.

• However, the very existence of medical psychology testifies to
 • the fact that there often is acute conflict between the individual's
 • impulses and his prevailing interpersonal goals, as introjected in
 • his superego. This means that the goals heretofore accepted by the
 • individual now operate "daemonically," destructively. In so far as this is the case, it can only be because these goals fail to satisfy the individual's total personality. They have dictated the rejection of some aspects of natural potentiality in the organism necessary for its harmonious development. Recalling once more that these unsatisfactory goals originally were accepted by the individual as a helpless child, when he had to respond to the significant others about him because his whole security depended upon it, we can understand the reason for the frequent inadequacy and destructiveness of personal goals and standards. Dr. Oskar Pfister reminds us that "the moral code enters our conscience in an apodictic manner. It requires blind submission."¹⁰⁶ The maturation process demands revision of these infantile goals in terms of the developing potentialities of the organism. But such adjustment does not mean the abandonment of objective standards. It simply means their reinterpretation according to maturer insight and different circumstances. In principle, such modification enhances the significance of the place of religious and moral ideals. If, as Pfister writes, good psychotherapy helps to replace the false, accidental, and often foolish notions inspired by the superego, with clarified life-goals, the acquired wisdom of religion and ethics is plainly invaluable.¹⁰⁷ But, be it noted, only in the light of the individual's personal situation, with his particular problems, responsibilities, and limitations in mind, can the most satisfying (and the most "moral") life-goals be chosen.

→ This leads to one of the positive contributions of medical psy-

chology to religion and ethics, one which must be taken into account in the fifth chapter. It has shown that religious and ethical demands are most relevant when they are treated as ideals related to every stage of life, but not as rules of conduct which must be obeyed by everybody at all times. The basis of this idea is found in the psychologist's discovery that every age-level and personality-type, indeed each individual, seems to have his own particular limits and potentialities, so that what is right and suitable for one life may be wrong and unsatisfactory for another. Applying this concept to stages of human life, Hadfield explains:

The fruit of the new phase is always fresher than the withered blossom; life can only keep young by always advancing. The man of thirty keeps fresh by surrendering his athletic championships to develop his individual power and character; the healthy young mother is infinitely younger than the girlish "spinster" of the same age. The woman of forty-five, whose interests have been for twenty years centred in her family, will remain young only by advancing to the phase in which she lets her interests spread to the wider concerns of human life around her. The man of fifty-five never need be "on the shelf" if he voluntarily leaves the struggle for power to younger men, and is content to contribute to society the wisdom gained in the ripe experience of the years. There are fresh instincts ready to spring forth at every re-birth of life, like the young phoenix from the dead ashes of the old. By welcoming these we remain young, by advancing with age we achieve perpetual youth.¹⁰⁸

When the compliant woman was able to re-evaluate her masochistic type of love in the therapeutic treatment, she discovered that there was a more satisfying alternative goal in the form of a creative relationship with those she loved. What is more, she discovered that, while it may have been fitting to anticipate a career in childhood (out of deference to her mother), her present circumstances suggested a different goal, namely, marital companionship and a home. Thus duties and obligations appear differently at different ages and under different circumstances. So dynamic psychology underlines the principle that religious and ethical standards—

and ideals, if they are to elevate and not depress the individual, must be used as goals for living and as norms for discriminating judgments, but not as requirements for everyday conduct.

We may summarize the psychotherapeutic view of the nature and importance of choosing life-goals with the conclusions of Pfister. After many years of therapeutic work, involving religious as well as psychoanalytic practice, he declares that psychoanalysis puts definite limits upon the use of general standards, upon raising them to general rules with categorical precision, and upon the expectation of their immediate realization by the individual without regard to his present situation. "It has found that the rule which raises one person to higher levels may lower another in health and moral vigor." To be sure, it is everywhere accepted that ethics should erect general norms. But, most important of all, consideration must be given to the moral capacity of the individual. "Man is not here for the sake of ethics but ethics for the sake of man." ¹⁰⁹ The aim of every psychoanalytic transaction deserving of the name, he firmly asserts, is "to replace the ill-advised [superego], with a clear and noble-piercing voice of conscience." ¹¹⁰ And, he adds, even if the physician is as little able to reach this goal as the minister, he must come to an understanding with it.

With regard to the goal-choosing component of self-acceptance, still another emphasis of medical psychology is relevant for religion and ethics. For sound self-acceptance the choosing of goals must be something which is done by the individual himself. Psychotherapy points out that in the last analysis no one can choose another's goals for him anyway. The individual may be influenced by the therapist as well as by others; he can be threatened, cajoled, or pleaded with, and he may succumb. However, the kind of self-acceptance so necessary for good interpersonal relations cannot be achieved by authoritarian methods. On the other hand, if the benevolent, permissive, non-authoritarian relationship prevails, others can greatly help the individual in making constructive choices. In the final analysis, it may be asked whether this type of decision is not "moral" in the highest sense of that word inasmuch as it represents truly *volitional* expression.

In conclusion, self-acceptance is indispensable for harmonious interpersonal relations. One can only accept and affirm others in so far as one can rightly accept and affirm oneself. Healthy self-acceptance has at least five components, which have been separated for theoretical purposes. These components are: expression of real motivations, willingness to assume responsibility for satisfying these motivations through integration, appreciation of one's possibilities and limitations, experience of benevolent interpersonal relations, and choice of goals for living.

The results of such self-acceptance are found to be most salutary for the individual, as well as for the groups to which he belongs. The case studies illustrate how the presence of the components of self-acceptance actually effects radical personality changes and more constructive interpersonal relations. It is obvious from these case histories that medical psychology approaches an end strikingly similar to one which Christianity endeavors to achieve—reconciliation with oneself and others. The fifth chapter will examine the three Christian pathways to self-acceptance in the light of this psychotherapeutic view of self-acceptance.

CHAPTER FIVE

Christian Self-Acceptance in the Light of Psychotherapy

✓ THE CASE HISTORIES of Chapter Four indicate the success of modern medical psychology in helping people to achieve healthy self-acceptance, as the first three chapters represent Christianity's successes in the same salutary work. The simple fact that contemporary psychotherapy is doing this work so thoroughly and so effectively presents a tremendous challenge to all forms of organized religion. For the cure of souls is historically a distinctive task of the Church and its ministry. Yet, in our time, the medical psychologist has come to be regarded as the expert in this very work to which religion has given principal attention through the centuries. Anton T. Boisen, himself a minister and a pioneer in practically relating religion and psychotherapy, declares: "The specialists in medical psychology are rapidly becoming the Protestant confessors."¹ If this is so, it would seem all the wiser for Christianity to enrich its views and increase the effectiveness of its procedures by taking account of this new ministry to the mentally ill—psychotherapy.

We may formulate the challenge of medical psychology to each form of organized religion this way: how will it relate itself to these new understandings and resources? Will it seek to make full use of them in performing its own functions? Or will it stand aloof from them in so far as this is possible? Will it choose to minister to people in ways which promote mental health? Or will it prefer to leave them indifferently provided for in this respect?

Obviously, the conviction of this writer is that psychotherapy has demonstrated an effectiveness of method and a validity of principle from which representatives of religion and their people can greatly profit. Particularly in relation to the theme of this study

there is much that may benefit the religious approach and its offerings to man. Three distinct contributions to an understanding of self-acceptance have already been made by medical psychology, which has demonstrated its importance, explicated its nature, and worked out effective ways of helping the mentally ill to achieve it. All three contributions can directly or indirectly benefit the teachings and the approach of religion and its representatives.

First and foremost, dynamic psychology has demonstrated the crucial importance of self-acceptance for spiritual well-being. On the basis of clinical experience, we know the destructive effects of repression or self-rejection. Each of the case histories reveals its own pathetic form of refusal to recognize some aspect of natural potentiality in the self necessary for its harmonious development. The implications rising out of this new understanding of the fact that self-acceptance is vitally important for inner harmony of the soul are manifold. Likewise, the importance of self-acceptance for interpersonal relations is clearer than ever before. Considerable attention was devoted to this significant concept in Chapter Four, and it has implications for religion and ethics: it supplies the empirical material for revising and enriching such important religious and ethical formulations as those of worship, service, selfishness, and love. In this chapter we shall have occasion to utilize psychotherapeutic insights into these and other matters of religious concern. At this point attention is called simply to the fact that psychotherapy has brought the importance of the idea of self-acceptance into the ken of modern man with unprecedented completeness and authority.²

The second contribution of psychotherapy has been to explicate the nature of self-acceptance. This is predicated upon a fuller empirical understanding of the nature of the self than any conception current before the rise of dynamic psychology, though certainly some ancient and medieval anthropologies anticipated this view. The self is regarded as man in the totality of his personal life. The self is seen to be essentially a dynamic psychic unity. The word which Freud used for man considered in this psychological way was *psyche*, which in psychoanalysis came to mean the sum

total of man's biological functioning which is not localized and limited to any one of the anatomical and physiological units of the individual.³ "The psychic apparatus is just what it etymologically means," explains Gregory Zilboorg. "It is the apparatus, biological in nature, through which filter the conative and cognitive elements of the human personality."⁴ Thus Freud, and medical psychology after him, rejected the old dichotomy of body and mind and affirmed a view which "considers man in his totality and tries not to overlook the spirit in that animal that he is, or the animal in the spirit that he has."⁵

The self or psyche is partly conscious and partly (by far the greater part) unconscious. It is charged with energy, and works, reacts, and behaves continually in response to stimuli. These stimuli come from without (from the outside world and especially from other people) and they come from within (from the instinctual drives). The instinctual drives stem from special organs and from the organism as a whole. Zilboorg suggests that these drives may be identified with the "life force," or the *elan vital*, or whatever it is that makes a living thing a living thing, be it an ant, a lion, a snake, or a man.⁶ In any case, the drives are the energies of the self, "the psychological content of the psychic apparatus is a struggle of images, self-contradictory fancies, the battle of drives plastically and dynamically represented."⁷ Naturally these drives are ever striving for satisfaction and development. The result is that the self is constantly functioning in interaction with the environment, shaping its relationships and being shaped by them, toward certain ends of fulfillment which may be clear or obscure, real or fantastic, social or antisocial, conflicting or harmonious. It is the function of reason, the intellect, or the rational consciousness (ego is the Freudian term) to relate the energies of the psychic structure to the objective structures of reality so that they find fulfillment. In so far as this very complex and never-ending task is accomplished through the mental unity of consciousness psychic health is maintained; in so far as the various desires and impulses of the self fail to find satisfaction or are repressed mental illness occurs. It has already been remarked how interpersonal relationships, especially

those of the first years, may condition the strivings of the young organism so that it has to reject vital aspects of itself in order to integrate itself comfortably with the environment upon which it is so completely dependent. The fact that these repressions or complexes represent vital elements of the self means that they will not down without disrupting the essential unity of the self.

• In these terms, healthy self-acceptance has come to mean the
• disposition of the individual to recognize the various drives and
• impulses which are struggling within him without crippling guilt
• or fear because of what he finds them to be. Self-acceptance in-
• cludes the recognition that one's tendencies, as they operate within
• him, are intrinsically neither good nor bad, neither right nor wrong,
• though the expression of them may be either good or bad, right
• or wrong. True self-acceptance is chiefly characterized by the recog-
• nition that one is a relative, finite, and quite imperfect creature
• composed largely of unconscious and therefore in themselves un-
• controllable energies, but that this same self, with all its limitations,
• represents powers which may be worked together by the rational
• consciousness in truly fulfilling ways, if they are neither exaggerated
• nor minimized unduly. In other words, self-acceptance is that
attitude which refuses to disparage or ignore any "part" of the
self as evil because it regards them all as capable of utilization if
properly understood and related.

For example, a healthy self-accepting attitude does not repress sexual impulses, neither does it allow them immediate and unrestrained expression. These impulses are recognized for what they are, and the endeavor is made to take account of them in relation to the over-all functioning of the self as it pursues its purposes amidst its daily relationships. Likewise, a healthy self-accepting attitude does not follow the dictates of the conscience blindly nor does it attempt to ignore them, even if that were possible. The conscience is recognized in its actual ambiguous character, and the individual endeavors to analyze its irrational rigidities and laxities as well as to heed the positive ideals which conscience represents.

Carrol A. Wise has said:

✓ A sick soul is one that is so ridden, either by impulses or a negative conscience or by a conflict between the two, that it is not free to express its potentialities and abilities creatively; . . . a saved soul is one that has succeeded in organizing impulses and potentialities, with the help of a positive ideal, into a living whole that feels at home in its world.⁸

The creative resolution of inner conflict is predicated upon the readiness of the self continually to adjust and organize its own urges, feelings, and ideas in terms of the total personality and in movement toward accepted goals or values which promote the satisfaction and growth of the whole man. An anonymous poet with an introspective turn of mind once wrote:

*Within my earthly temple there's a crowd:
There's one of us that's humble, one that's proud,
There's one that's broken-hearted for his sins,
And one that unrepentant sits and grins.
There's one that loves his neighbor as himself,
And one that cares for naught but fame and self,
From much perplexing care I would be free
If I could once determine which is me!*

- Figuratively speaking, sound self-acceptance might be described as
- readiness to know the crowd within oneself and willingness to include each one of that crowd in the creative fellowship of the self.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that such a friendly relationship with oneself is not an attitude needed only in times of crisis or adversity. Man is a dynamic psychic unity, thus self-acceptance is an imperative in every moment of existence and for every period of life. There is never a time in life when the individual does not need to take account of the various energies and representations of energies which activate him. Nor is there ever a period in life when the disposition to give each its due consideration in the light of the total personal situation is not essential to man's well-being.

- 3-1 The third contribution of dynamic psychology to the teachings and approach of religion lies in the realm of methodology. At the beginning of Chapter Four we elucidated the psychotherapist's

method, calling attention to the fact that it does not involve sacraments, preaching, or worship of any kind, that it does not employ religious and moral suasion or prayer, and does not involve an institutionalized fellowship. The approach of the therapist is individualized in the extreme. It is explorative and explicative; in short it is diagnostic, making use of sympathetic rapport between patient and physician. In the psychotherapeutic procedure it is presupposed that the individual is sick, that the trouble lies largely in unconscious areas of the self, and that he must work out the solution to his problems for himself, the therapist helping, of course.

The chief aim of the sympathetic diagnostic method is to expand the awareness of the individual concerning the real factors in his own psychic structure; he must do the re-directing according to his own ideals once he is capable of doing so. The *sine qua non* of succeeding in the overcoming of the difficulties is, to quote Sullivan, "the synthesis of perceptions and prehensions as to the problem situation into a perception of that in which one is involved." And, "this usually calls for the release of one's alertness from inhibiting influences," which are manifestations of the ego and the superego.⁹ That this freedom from inhibition and expansion of awareness is crucial is clear in the case histories. The individual needs somehow to find the freedom to face himself more fully and to explore his mind more thoroughly. It is the whole approach of the therapist, his expert advice, his dependable and friendly fellowship, his diagnostic efficiency, his extended consideration of personal difficulties and their peculiar context, and most important of all his non-condemnatory or benevolent attitude—it is all this which serves to foster the patient's needed sense of liberation. Within such a relationship the individual can reduce the intensity of his self-rejection and his hostility toward others. He can learn (or dare) to pass judgment upon himself in terms different from those he inherited from past significant elders. He can seek, find, and understand those elements within himself which have heretofore been too shameful, troublesome, or painful to acknowledge.

Contrast this approach to the individual with the normative, educational approach of the religious worker. Utilizing such methods

as preaching, teaching, and confession and absolution, the typical representative of religion meets the individual with a more or less flexible formula for salvation already in his hand. He has been trained in the rudiments of this way of salvation by his church and in the ministerial offices connected with its propagation. However, he has no knowledge of those whom he leads other than that which he has gained from his own experience as a human being, which may be considerable or inconsequential. Moreover, since the priest approaches man with the conviction that he is the representative of the way, the truth, and the life, as revealed to his church or to him by God, and that this way is efficacious for all, he would not be disposed to follow a similar procedure to that of the medical psychologist, even if his training were of a more empirical type. The outcome of the religious representative's orientation is this: he considers sympathetically the plight of the individual who faces him, and he recommends the adoption of another attitude or course of action calculated to overcome the particular difficulty. In effect, the priest says to the one who seeks his help: If you will think this or do that instead of what you are thinking or doing, you will be all right. This is a normative, educational method of therapy. No doubt it has had an important function in transforming the lives of men. The Christian views presented in the first three chapters have propagated themselves down through the centuries largely by variations of the normative, educational method, although it might be argued that in differing degree they have all utilized the explorative, explicative method indirectly.

X ✓ In the light of dynamic psychology's methodology, however, it appears that the customary religious approach is severely limited, and that the three Christian pathways could increase their effectiveness by consciously appropriating a number of its elements. For one thing, the way the psychotherapist encourages the individual to talk out his difficulties freely would seem to be a technique easily adaptable to pastoral procedure, though perhaps not to some clergymen's predilection or their theory of how to save souls. Psychotherapy has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that communication is an invaluable aid to increased self-awareness. Sullivan goes so far as to

say: *"One has information about one's experience only to the extent that one has tended to communicate it to another—or thought about it in the manner of communicative speech."*¹⁰ To be of maximum aid to the distressed person requires a clinical training which the religious worker seldom has and often many more hours of consultation than he can afford. Yet, in whatever work he does with the individual, it would seem that the representative of religion could more profitably serve his particular need (even if he regards his need simply as that of accepting more fully the particular way of salvation which he represents) by first learning more about the psychotherapist's artful listening, which draws out the individual, revealing more and more of his real conflicts, and facilitates acceptance and utilization of whatever advice is forthcoming from the trusted listener.

Closely aligned with increased use of conversation, with the sick soul encouraged to do most of the talking, is a second psychotherapeutic technique which the priest could use profitably in his work with individuals; namely, refusal to rush in with blame or condemnation. In so far as the pastor believes that he knows a way of salvation for man, and that this way is willed by God, he represents implicitly some measure of condemnation to the individual who has failed. Indeed it is difficult to see how any clergyman can completely avoid giving the impression that he is judging the individual. However, with our present knowledge that condemnation often proves futile and harmful the pastor should beware of it, although we do not deny that emotionally healthy individuals may profit by discriminating disapproval.

That the clergy is realizing this fact and making use of it is evident in the pastoral counseling material now coming off the presses. One representative of religion puts it this way:

Our first contribution to those mentally or emotionally sick (and thousands are on the verge of such sickness who need to be held back from it) is to rescue them from morbidity and defeat by the kindly grace of God. . . . People in this borderland between health and sickness, between moral health and sin, need to be surrounded with the atmosphere, not of guilt, but of faith.¹¹

The way in which the psychotherapist searches beneath the surface for generative causes suggests a third modification of the traditional religious methodology, which tends to deal merely with symptoms of mental illness. For the most part the priest focuses on the obvious acts of the individual, on manifest attitudes which both he and the individual are aware of and on thoughts which occupy his awakened mind. For instance, if the hostile businessman or the sexually inordinate photographer in Chapter Four had come to a priest, it is likely that the center of attention would be the symptoms, anger or lust. If the priest had tried to deal merely with the presenting symptom in such a case, he would only have complicated the individual's personal problem. Spiritual direction today as in the historic past is given almost entirely upon the basis of what is clearly known to both the individual and his pastor. To some extent the pastor can and would do well to do differently. Hadfield has said:

The crux of the difference [between the methods of the confessor and the psychoanalyst] is this. Assuming that the character is very largely influenced by unconscious complexes, the psychoanalyst gets down to these and roots them out. This is not done in the routine work of the priest, who in the nature of his work deals almost entirely with conscious troubles. This is not so radical as the psycho-analytic method, and therefore not so permanent in its effect.¹²

If the representative of religion clearly realizes that extraordinary or reprehensible behavior may be symptomatic of unconscious difficulties, which can be dealt with only in terms of the psychotherapeutic method, he is in position to help the individual by *not* judging him, by *not* burdening him with advice from which he cannot profit, and by referring him to the therapist whose method can effect cure.

This leads to the recognition of the limits of religion's methods for healing, in itself a most important factor in increasing religion's effectiveness. If representatives of religion do not discover that there are definite limitations to the normative, educational method the members of their congregations will continue to seek out the

so what? → "religious but not useful building"

psychotherapist's office instead of the church where that is possible, or simply give up looking for help on such a matter from the church, or stick it out and be more harmed than helped. It must be realized that the traditional religious method is useless in so far as the individual is compulsively frustrated. Dynamic psychology has revealed the wide range of mental illness where the individual has no freedom at all to do what he wills. Here freedom to function as one would is blocked by repressed complexes in struggling conflict with the conscious organized self. Where this is the situation the individual can do no differently than he is doing; he is rigid, unfree, in bondage. Medical psychology today is helping to delineate the areas within which the normative, educational method is efficacious—that is, where the individual is free—from those in which it only defeats its purposes—where the individual is not free. Already it is clear that such cases as those in Chapter Four (take the alcoholic woman as an example) are beyond the range of ordinary ministerial methods. We may only hope that in time such clinical training will be available for clergymen as will enable them to recognize the extent and the limits of their pastoral procedures so that no troubled individual will seek aid only to receive unusable advice, harmful judgment, or impossible injunctions. Happily, many seminaries are extending their training in pastoral care and counseling to include the new psychiatric knowledge. And since 1930 the Council for Clinical Training has been providing hundreds of clergymen with internships in general and mental hospitals and correctional institutions so that they may get working knowledge of religion's role, responsibilities, and limitations.

It was suggested earlier that various forms of Christianity have utilized explorative, explicative methodology unconsciously. This is certainly true in so far as religious symbols have been used creatively; that is, as they have served to express "insights into relationships and values that concern the whole personality."¹³ Dynamic psychology has exposed the powerful significance of symbols as expressions of unconscious feelings and ideas. While it has made use of symbols analytically it reminds representatives of religion that symbols may be used synthetically as expressions of

realities and processes in man's inner life, thus promoting integration and wholeness.¹⁴

Here is a major contribution to religion, one which many believe is sorely needed; namely, the suggestion that religion make fuller provision for what Horace L. Friess has called its "imaginative side."¹⁵ For the most part today, Protestant forms of Christianity are symbol-poor. And all forms of Christianity, Catholic and Protestant, may ask Wise's question of themselves: have we "grown inept in the use of this instrument?"¹⁶ The constant temptation of religion is to literalize, absolutize, or even to revolt against and discard symbols. To do any of these things destroys the healing functions of symbols for the believer. Modern psychotherapy points the way to the deep need of man for meaningful wholeness which only religion can provide. But to provide it religion must "discover anew the meaning of life, . . . embody that meaning in symbols that may be intelligible and powerful to modern man, and . . . develop techniques capable of transforming personality and of leading men out of the night and into the day."¹⁷

THE THREE PATHWAYS RECONSIDERED

What use can the three Christian views make of dynamic psychology's contributions to knowledge about self-acceptance? If it is so minded, at what points can each pathway enrich its view through assimilation of the new knowledge? We have already suggested methodological alterations which all forms of organized religion might incorporate, but it is even more important to consider the ideology of the pathways in the light of psychotherapy's revelations. Each appears to have its peculiar strengths, which will be pointed out, and each has its weaknesses, even dangers, so far as the fostering of mental health is concerned. Careful scrutiny reveals that the total teaching and practice of each form of religion contains self-correctives, which could further be developed through careful consideration of the lessons that dynamic psychology offers. If we need precedent for suggesting that a secular scientific enterprise

should be allowed so to influence and alter Christian doctrine, we can only say with Walter Marshall Horton:

Granting that theology's primary responsibility is to interpret and test the unconscious wisdom which resides in religious experience we must nevertheless go on to insist that this process of interpretation and testing is a two-sided affair, in which science has as much the duty to point out the vagaries and fanaticisms of religion as religion has to point out the limitations of science. . . . If religion's dreams are to be translated into sober actuality, science must aid.¹⁸

THE REJECTIONIST PATHWAY

Its encompassing conception of sin.—A chief emphasis of rejectionist proponents is the reality and the extensiveness of sin in the life of man. As we have seen, this Christian view emphasizes that sin is not a matter of special acts or particular omissions but a fundamental egocentricity involving the whole personality. Man's sinfulness is seen as something for which he is responsible and yet as something which is an inevitable accompaniment of his anxious existence. To the end of his days man finds himself misusing his freedom as he searches for securities and satisfactions which this world cannot supply. And always he remains a sinner, self-centered, egocentric. The representatives of this view obviously feel most strongly that there is much to be gained by the individual's recognition of his radical sinfulness.

It is striking to find in dynamic psychology what Zilboorg has called the empirical counterpart of this doctrine of original sin. He writes:

Without knowing it in advance, Freud soon discovered that he was studying the psychological reactions of man *in the state of sin*; he was at once confronted with the anxiety, the sense of guilt, and the sexual conflicts which burdened his mental patients. He discovered that there is no man living who is not burdened with what he called "the precipitate of the oedipus complex—man's perennial, unconscious sense of guilt."¹⁹

Seen in this light, the stress upon the reality and the extensiveness of sin (or, what is fully as important, the sense of sin) in the life of man is exceedingly realistic, and holds the possibility of being of greatest therapeutic usefulness.

For one thing, the follower of the rejectionist pathway will not be allowed to build up any "spurious sense of self-righteousness," as David E. Roberts puts it.²⁰ For his attention will not be focused upon a certain few symptoms of his sinfulness as though once they were overcome he had resolved his problems and could count on an inner peace and harmony incompatible with his actual egocentricity. Rather, the individual will be encouraged to confess continually that he does those things which ought not to be done and does not do those things which ought to be done; or in still more ultimate terms, that he lives not in God but far from God! ²¹ He will be led to expect that while his life can, by the grace of God, be free from crippling fear and guilt, his continuing self-centeredness will involve him in error, failure, further conflict, and sin. Rightly preached, this view has the power to make a man aware of his own prejudices, rationalizations, and pride, thus enabling him to avoid what Niebuhr has called "premature completions of life," and saving him from "the intolerable pretension of saints who have forgotten that they are sinners," in short, preventing self-deception.

More important still, the rejectionist stress on sin may afford man fullest opportunity to recognize the worst within himself. We know that the relation between sin and guilt is psychologically indeterminate, that, for instance, man may feel guilty about things of which he is not guilty at all. This is almost always the case with the mentally ill. We have seen that successful psychotherapy involves an increasing awareness of the painful, unlovely, and fearful elements and the guilt-ridden desires of the inner life. A religious view which does not hesitate to recognize the very worst in man is at least potentially capable of helping him to face the worst about himself. The grave difficulty here, however, is that in "preaching sin," as contrasted with psychotherapeutic encouragement to recognize inner evil, there is no knowledge of the appropriateness of

the emphasis. What the preacher says about sin may help one listener to see himself more clearly and even stimulate him to practical amendments on the basis of the new insight, while another hearer may be harmed by the same words, convicted of sin but helplessly. One thing is clear from the knowledge dynamic psychology offers on the subject: all preaching of sin should be done within a framework which proclaims the free and forgiving grace of God. Presented in isolation, the doctrine of man's sinfulness can only result in further self-rejection on the part of those who take the teaching seriously. Furthermore, the minister himself ought to be very clear about the psychological function of his doctrine. This would undoubtedly help him to use it for the liberation and transformation of troubled minds rather than for the deepening of the sense of guilt, as has so often been the result in the Calvinistic past.

Another therapeutic function of the Christian rejectionist view of sin may be the preclusion of that inner division which comes from pitting an avowedly "good part" of the self against a supposed "evil part," for example, reason against impulse. The follower of this pathway knows that he is sinful through and through, that his reason is as weak and unreliable as his flesh is apart from God. By emphasizing that "all man's will to live is from top to bottom . . . an effort of some sort to magnify, to elevate, to extend our self," a way of avoiding self-rejection of certain vital aspects of the personality is provided.²² Instead, the whole man is regarded as unruly and wayward, his only hope lying in despair of self and reliance upon God.

But it may be asked whether this view devotes sufficient attention to the things that man can and must do to facilitate his own inner development and growth? As Roberts has pointed out: "Belief in God is being abused when it is made into a substitute for fulfilling natural and human conditions that are within man's scope."²³ Rejectionism is in special danger of failing to delineate man's tasks in the achievement of his own salvation. If the case histories illustrate the dependence of the individual and the therapist upon "healing powers" at work outside of consciousness and voluntary effort, and

the need for a kind of forgiveness which will release the individual from the tyranny of a rigid code, they also demonstrate the need for the individual to initiate and carry through right relations with these beneficent forces. On this human side of the divine-human relationship it would seem that rejectionist leaders would benefit their followers by elucidating the part they are to play, other than that of humbling themselves before God—a necessary but insufficient procedure.

X To suggest another aspect of the same matter, we may say that the danger of rejectionism is that of focusing too extensively and exclusively upon sin. As Wise points out: "Preoccupation with symbols expressing the idea of sin . . . is indicative of an unhealthy rigidity, as such experiences are never stopping places in healthy religion."²⁴ Rejectionism's emphasis may serve to mitigate self-deception, facilitate full confession, and prevent rejection of particular parts of the self, but religion has other functions which center in the stimulation of the growing edges of the human personality by providing wholesome goals and suggesting fit means for their attainment. Rejectionism could profit by devoting more attention to these affirmative functions.

✓ *Its stress upon individualism.*—It has been remarked that this view is characterized by its stalwart individualism. This is represented in the rejectionist ideas of accountability to God alone, forgiveness solely by his grace, and guidance by the Word of God. X There is a corollary in the psychotherapeutic doctrine of autonomy and maturity. The meaning of individualism is well stated in these words of Boisen:

No man is well and no man is grown up until he has emerged from the state of dependence and has worked out his own philosophy of life so as to be able to stand on his own feet regardless of outward changes. For the religious man it means the recognition that earthly parents and guides are but representatives of an undying Love to whom he owes allegiance and in whom he must find the meaning of his life.²⁵

In the case histories, for example in that of the compliant woman, we see how important it is for healthy self-acceptance to work out

one's own values and to assume for oneself the responsibilities entailed in realizing them. The psychotherapist constructs his relationship with the patient so that this may occur. It would seem that the rejectionist emphasis on centering in God alone is therapeutically sound as far as it goes. Here again, what is needed is fuller knowledge of the ways in which such maturity can be fostered in particular individual cases. However, the conviction that "God alone is Lord of the conscience" ²⁶ justifies the individual's criticism of his originally accepted values (his *supergo*), allows him to limit his adherence to general rules, and encourages him to seek, in the light of God's Word, that differentiated standard, that "electing Word" as Brunner describes it, which God has for him alone.

It may be asked at this point whether Christian rejectionism is not too individualistic. Or, to put it another way, whether it does not overestimate the possible independence of the average person. With all the frailties and limitations of the flesh, to which it is first to call attention and of which dynamic psychology is more and more aware, one wonders whether mental and emotional underdevelopment is not the more usual condition of man, and, therefore, whether it is not important to develop and emphasize the importance of reliance upon institutional forms and practices to a greater degree. There is a tendency in Protestantism to treat everyone like an adult, and this may be very stimulating to some, but it lacks the corporate security which others need. By way of contrast, the tendency in Catholicism is to treat all men like children; it provides full support but little encouragement to strike out spiritually for oneself.

Its absolute ideal.—The rejectionist proponent declares that God's will for man is love. In contrast to the other two Christian views, the divine demand is interpreted to mean purely giving love (*agape*); no thought of self is allowed in it at all. It is contended that this standard is beyond human attainment, but that nevertheless it is most relevant. The law of love is understood to be God's will for man, as revealed in Christ, and it is found to be the law of human existence. Therefore, *agape* is the "impossible possibility" which is ever man's salvation and his condemnation.

Now the psychotherapist works daily with people whose mental illnesses are caused by absolute and inflexible standards and the pathological guilt feelings which result from them. The case of the ambitious scientist, who worked only for "human welfare," is one illustration of the destructive functioning of an impossible aim. Medical psychology has shown that the ideals or standards of religion and ethics are in constant danger of becoming static; that is, that the tendency of man is to regard his aims as fixed modes of behavior, which he must either fulfill or be condemned for not fulfilling. When representatives of religion demand or imply that the individual ought to achieve the absolute ideal of *agape*, they are making use of that ideal in a static and psychologically harmful way. They are holding the ideal before man as though it were an immediate requirement, which, since he cannot live up to it, makes him a sinner. When utilized in this way the absolute ideal is not viewed as a goal toward which one strives but rather as a fixed idea before which one prostrates himself. The result can only be the exacerbation of inner conflict, the very opposite of religion's ultimate goal.

All forms of Christianity, and especially the rejectionist form, can increase their own effectiveness by heeding psychotherapy's revelation of the right way to use ideals, including absolute ones. Horney points out: "Ideals have a dynamic quality; they arouse an incentive to approximate them; they are an indispensable and invaluable force for growth and development."²⁷ This is only true, however, when they are rightly presented and held. This means that they must at all times be related in vitally useful ways to personality growth and health. Ideals, says Wise, are meant to serve as expressions of "potential but as yet unrealized value."²⁸ It must be expressly realized that the validity of any ideal depends upon its relevance to actual life experience, which means its usefulness in the stimulation of growth. It must also be clearly understood that attainment of any standard will vary with the individual's capacities, age, surroundings, and so on. In other words, the ideal should never be regarded or presented in the form

- of a moral precept, something compulsive. It is meant to act as a lure, something that attracts and inspires.

Seen from this point of view, the absolute ideal has an indispensable and a therapeutic function. It is the "decisive basis for discrimination" upon which alternative or competing interests are considered. It is the standard by which the acts and attitudes of the larger wholes—church, fraternity, nation, culture—are evaluated. "The transcendent-yet-relevant criterion of Christianity may be regarded as its most valuable asset in carrying on the never ending task of revising and criticizing proximate goals." ²⁹ Moreover, and for the individual this is the most important thing, the absolute ideal of love "catches up and focuses all the human intentions that experience convinces us are worthy of preservation." ³⁰

THE FORENSIC PATHWAY

Its support of the individual.—The chief characteristic of Catholicism is its comprehensive provision for the spiritual support of the individual. The believer is constantly reminded that it is the church which makes possible his reconciliation with God. The church alone is empowered to grant forgiveness of sins and to instruct man how to live a life well pleasing to God. With respect to almost every important aspect of individual and corporate life, the individual is directed to the church for guidance. And, most important of all, the church assures the final destiny of him who trusts it and faithfully receives its ministrations.

The kind of support which the forensic way affords man is symbolized in the fact that the Catholic priest is called Father and the Church is called Mother. The family metaphor is complete. Says one writer, "Each Sunday finds us with God's Big Family." ³¹ The church assumes the role of a permanent parent and the believer remains always a child with all that this implies when the parents are benevolent, as the Catholic Church is to her own.

- Obviously the strength and weakness of this position is just the reverse of rejectionism's. Full cognizance is taken of man's help-seeking dependence. The Catholic Church is organized to provide

the security, forgiveness, and superior wisdom—all requisite elements for good personality development, and for the increase of the self-acceptance which that involves. But it does not encourage self-assertive independence. The individual remains dependent upon the church to the end of his life, and he dare not contradict its teachings or neglect its ministrations. This need not prevent individual maturation but it is likely to, especially when one considers the further fact that participation in the church's program is believed to comprise all that is necessary for salvation. Obviously, in this view, encouragement to exercise individual initiative would cast doubt upon the adequacy of the church to provide redemption. An example of this is the public opposition of Roman Catholic representatives to psychoanalysis. While not unanimous, and while based upon a number of arguments, this attack implies that the confessional is sufficient treatment for the troubled soul. The adequacy of the confessional as a psychotherapeutic method will receive attention later in this chapter.

Its eudaemonism.—The Catholic view does not hesitate to justify self-love, as has been shown. It asks only that, in the interest of proper self-love, the individual follow the forensic pathway to find his fullest satisfaction. In substance, the meliorist position is the same: "We must love our true selves if we are to imitate God, for God loves us," insists the meliorist. Beyond this point, of course, the two views part, taking different paths to self-fulfillment.

In the light of such cases as that of the sexually repressed woman, whose early life was burdened by so rigorous a sense of duty that she felt guilty whenever she had any personal pleasure, we may venture to state that religious instruction which allows a legitimate place for self-satisfaction can be definitely therapeutic. Likewise, in considering the case of the compliant woman, who was consumed by unmanageable guilt whenever she had pleasure or success, it seems obvious that a frank eudaemonistic emphasis could help prevent or at least alleviate such a pathological condition. It is significant that both of these sick souls were reared in Reformed Protestant homes. There seems to be little doubt that Calvinism's austere view of God's nature and will issues all too frequently in an attitude

- that looks upon pleasure as something "bad" or unworthy. An
- inevitable corollary of such a viewpoint is, of course, that what
- is "good" is "good for you" but is also unpleasant—an attitude often
- found among people of puritan background.

Medical psychology has shown that man is a dynamic psychic unity; his very nature is striving for fulfillment. And the first three chapters indicate that Catholic and Protestant Christianity have provided remarkable fulfillment to many followers throughout the years and centuries. This is their empirical justification, and the psychological basis of their success. But when clergymen condemn self-satisfaction they work against the acceptance of their own Gospel, which brings just that, in so far as it functions dynamically. Moreover, psychologically considered, there is no other healthy incentive for man to accept a particular way of life except that, of all the ways of living which are open to him, this particular one best meets his needs and satisfies his desires. If a man accepts a religious viewpoint on any other grounds it is most likely to work him harm. We need only recur to the sexually repressed woman. She had outwardly accepted the religion of her parents; however, it functioned statically not creatively for her. Undoubtedly she had accepted it because she felt obligated to do so. Perchance her parents declared that she would be disobeying God by not adhering to their faith. Perhaps she never questioned the propriety of dutifully following their way. In any event her case illustrates the fact that religion cannot aid in the development of a growing personality and the production of psychic well-being apart from willing acceptance by the subject. The important implication of this for each of the Christian pathways would seem to be that each should become more fully aware of the satisfactions which its form of religion offers to man and that each should proclaim its way of life to man on the ground that it really does provide the integration and fulfillment he is longing for. Such an approach has the advantage of being psychologically sound, but it is not congruous with any religious view which condemns self-love *in toto*.

Its narrower conception of sin.—The Catholic view of sin is narrower, less inclusive than the rejectionist view. Its tendency is to

limit sin to conscious and willing transgression of known law. In order to determine individual sinfulness and to impose appropriate satisfactions Catholicism developed the science of casuistry. But while casuistry was designed to ascertain guilt and impose penalties it represents also the recognition that the evil in man cannot be simply diagnosed as sin, as though there were not a number of factors involved in the generation of it, and that there are a number of ways to cure it. There is in Catholicism and in the modern forms of meliorism a disposition to analyze the particular difficulty or sin of the individual into its component parts, and to provide suitable means of dealing with them. By contrast, there is an unfortunate vagueness and a misleading simplification in the rejectionist predilection to attribute all evil to sin. Dynamic psychology has revealed the multiplicity of factors determining individual attitudes and conduct. For many of these the word sin is simply unenlightening: for example, helplessness, domination, illness, poverty are a few of these factors. The forensic and the meliorist viewpoints will benefit by expanding their doctrine of sin to include the whole man, but they should maintain and extend their concern for the various causes of individual and group difficulty as well as their interest in providing ways and means for their alleviation. From the standpoint of psychological help, the rejectionist representatives can benefit their followers by more accurate delineation of the different factors that operate to distort the human personality, and by giving further attention to techniques for their melioration.

It may be asked whether the confessional satisfactorily provides for helpful diagnosis of individual problems. Since its aim is atonement rather than problem-solving it is doubtful that it does much more than provide a certain amount of incidental release and guidance, while it may quite possibly complicate the individual's problem. And yet, the priest's advice may be wise and timely and the individual may be emotionally able to make good use of it. There is certainly an indispensable place in life for moral counsel and the inspiration which comes from confiding in a discerning and respected superior. Moreover, it is idle to hope that the confessional will be dispensed with until an effective substitute is sup-

plied. There is a natural desire at certain stages of life and especially under conditions of trouble or emotion for confidence and guidance. For multitudes there is no other opportunity than that which the confessional provides. Wise churchmanship as well as psychological human need would seem to suggest that Protestantism profit by the fine points and failings of the confessional and create adequate channels of communication of its own by which the laity can draw upon the wisdom, fellowship, and inspiration of the church.

The weakness of the narrower view of sin is found in the actual domination of the conscious by the unconscious, and the impotence of the will when bound by complexes. This explains why all kinds of attitudes and acts of the individual are manifest without his full consent and oftentimes against his will. In the light of these facts it is interesting to note that what the forensic view tries to do is limit the area of the individual's moral responsibility to that of his psychological freedom. The Catholics have taught their followers that they are not guilty of those things which they cannot help. All that is necessary in the confession, for example, is for the individual to confess to the priest what he knows to be grievously sinful, that for which he feels consciously guilty. As a result of such confession the penitent is officially given absolution and admonished not to sin any more. So definitely is sin limited to conscious and wilful "sins" in the Roman Church that the priest can direct the penitent to think no more about a sin that has been confessed and absolved. In the eyes of the Church he is no longer a guilty man, and therefore he should have no more guilt feelings about it.

Now dynamic psychology has revealed that, in Zilboorg's words, man has a "perennial, unconscious sense of guilt," seemingly an inevitable accompaniment of finitude.³² Whether it is inevitable or not it is quite clear that mental health usually depends upon the individual taking responsibility for more sin than that for which forensic and meliorist ideas hold him responsible. Rightly or wrongly there seems to be guilt in the human soul which consciousness does not know, and yet which must be dealt with. Freud made this very clear when he asked the question, "Must one assume responsibility for the content of one's dreams?" and answered by

declaring, "Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one's dreams. In what other way can one deal with them?"³³ Any view which does not admit that what is unknown, unconscious, and repressed is a part of the self is not basing itself on psychoanalysis, Freud declared. "For any vital purpose, the separation of the ego from the id would be a hopeless undertaking. . . . If anyone is dissatisfied with this and would like to be "better" than he was created, let him see whether he can attain more in life than hypocrisy or inhibition."³⁴ What Freud says here is that the juridical approach to the individual will eventuate in failure to help him because it is contrary to man's nature, which is a dynamic psychic unity. Thus when the priest leads man to regard some acts and attitudes as good, others as evil for which he is responsible, and still others as ones for which he is not held accountable, he is likely to foster self-righteousness and self-rejection, functional counterparts in the psyche. As Freud concludes: "The physician will leave it to the jurist to erect a responsibility that is artificially limited to the metapsychological ego. It is notorious that the greatest difficulties are encountered in attempts to derive from that construction any practical consequences that are not in contradiction to human feelings."³⁵ It is not to be wondered at that Catholic manuals of theology devote considerable space to the "problem" cases of recidivism and scrupulosity. These are only opposite extremes of that obsessional neurosis common to most if not all men. They represent most dramatically that dimension of sinfulness in man which forensic and meliorist views fail to take into account.

THE MELIORIST PATHWAY

Its high estimate of man's possibilities.—It is characteristic of the meliorist pathway to magnify the opportunities which this world presents for growth and development. This is expressed in its view of the instincts as the potential of personality out of which man is challenged to construct a character satisfying to himself and serviceable to God and man. It is also indicated in the confidence that the ordinary man's rational and volitional endowments capacitate him for this beneficent living.

The work of dynamic psychology has certified in a remarkable way the meliorist belief in man's capacity to change and grow. The case histories of Chapter Four illustrate this. The most striking example is the woman who had been a chronic drinker for ten years, to the ruination of her home and family life. She was remarkably altered by her psychotherapeutic experience. We must hasten to add what has been said before, psychotherapy is increasingly aware that every man must face his limitations as well as his possibilities. But this does not mean significant changes cannot take place. With regard to the goals of psychotherapy, which she lists as responsibility, independence, spontaneity, and wholeheartedness, Horney writes: "Our daring to name such high goals rests upon the belief that the human personality can change. It is not only the young child who is pliable. All of us retain the capacity to change, even to change in fundamental ways, as long as we live."³⁶ This affirmative emphasis, this faith in growth and in the realization of what is now potential, characterizes both psychotherapy and meliorism. And Fromm has designated this as "the most important attitude in any parent, teacher, or psychoanalyst."³⁷ The discriminating encouragement of people to use and develop their powers can be one of religion's greatest contributions to human life. The clergyman, especially the representative of rejectionist or forensic views, should ask whether he sufficiently accents such faith and hope in man.

At the same time, the priest must guard himself against the danger of stimulating ambition where the means of fulfillment are lacking. To do this can only lead to frustration and despair. This caution applies with force to the confidence in human reason and man's freedom to follow it so characteristic of the meliorists and, in somewhat less degree, of the forensic representatives. Medical psychology has shown "that reason as the organ of the ego must be subject to the advantages and the disadvantages of the ego."³⁸ Reason is the most powerful instrument man possesses for discovering and utilizing natural and human resources, but it is not free to discover and utilize reality independent of the psychological unity of which it only a part. Because of this fact, "the unconscious may misdirect

it [i.e. reason] rather neatly, and intelligence not only will not know it but will serve this misdirecting impulse with almost the same loyalty with which it usually serves or should serve the ego and its normal relationship to reality.”³⁹ The prideful minister, for instance, who was treated psychotherapeutically for a year, was still unable at the end of that time to recognize that he harbored hostility toward anyone. Here is a clear illustration of reason’s conditioned and limited character.

The instinctual drives percolate into our reasoning machinery, clogging up its bushings and gears and valves with projections, rationalizations, emotional premises, and psychological realities into which our reason has no spontaneous, direct insight whatsoever.⁴⁰

These facts about human reasoning should caution religious workers against assuming that man is necessarily capable of profiting by an appeal to reason, however wise and sensible it may be. They also reveal how little the clergyman can count upon the individual’s own “pure” reason as a force for change of and by itself.

Man’s free will, his power to alter his life and to change his attitudes, is likewise conditioned by his individual psychic structure. It has been pointed out that dynamic psychology conceives of free will not as a special, unmotivated force but as the organized personality in responsible action, which of course includes the power to make rational decisions in the face of known alternatives. This freedom is definitely delimited by the individual’s instinctual equipment and the severity of his repressions, as well as by his family background, his education, and so forth. Knudson has rightly said:

Our physical and mental constitution and our social and material environment map out for us the main lines of our activity, and only to a limited degree are we able to modify and direct them. Our conduct is far more dependent on hidden forces of our own being and of the surrounding world than most of us realize; and so intimate and subtle is this dependence that no finite mind is in a position to determine the exact extent of our freedom and responsibility.⁴¹

The representative of religion, whatever view he espouses, can be of most help to the individual and to society if he sees human freedom in the light of dynamic psychology: "Man's free will cannot come to expression without free reason. . . . Reason cannot be free unless the organic or biological system within which the human personality is destined to function does function without the impediments which we . . . call neurosis, or illness."⁴² In so far as the individual is helped to become aware of his peculiar limitations and to accept them in the full sense in which we have explicated that term, he may, within these limits, alter his life. As Wise puts it, "Freedom consists in developing the organism's capacity . . . not on the basis of impulses, but on the conscious recognition of realities and of the consequences of various relationships to those realities."⁴³

Its stress upon the love of God.—Christian meliorism focuses upon God's love as the central and most relevant truth about Him. It emphasizes, more definitely than the other two Christian views, that the heart of religion is the glad acceptance of the love of God, who "was in Christ reconciling the world to himself."

The work of dynamic psychology has demonstrated that benevolence is an indispensable element in the fostering of self-acceptance, and that apart from manifest good will upon the part of the significant elders the individual cannot achieve it in sufficient measure. In fact, if the early family relationship is so lacking in true love that mental illness develops, it often takes the specialized benevolence of the therapist to help the patient find self-acceptance. The effective agent in the psychotherapeutic process, declares Prinzhorn, is this: "*that the therapist, in virtue of the Eros paidagogos which inspires him, helps, as mediator, from the isolation that is full of fear, to wholeness of life, to new comradeship, to the world, perhaps to God.*"⁴⁴ It is the security provided by the physician's dependable and concerned regard for the patient that fosters self-awareness, a new sense of responsibility, critical appreciation of oneself, and clarification of one's goal—the components of self-acceptance.

✓ The functional parallel between the benevolent therapist and

the loving God of Christianity is obvious. Evidently, in view of the first three chapters, God's benevolence has been stressed sufficiently through the ages, even by those forms of Christianity which tend to obscure it by emphasizing other of the divine attributes, to foster self-acceptance in supreme measure for many believers. But it is undeniable that Christian priests have often represented God as a stern, punishing deity, a presentation which can only result in repression. Meliorism is psychologically sound in teaching that God, the Most Significant Other, is love, and that no act of will, no imitation of others who have found peace, and no rule-following is sufficient to initiate the needed transformation of the inwardly divided life. For mental health men need two things from religion: knowledge of God's mighty and eternal love for them, and opportunity to respond personally to that love with all they have. In so far as Christian clergymen present God as the Most Significant Other who loves man fully and completely, and urge men to give themselves over to personal love of this God, they will be offering man a most efficacious therapy, a message of unlimited possibility for the fostering of self-acceptance. Yet there remains, particularly for Protestantism, the problem of effectively and convincingly representing its doctrine to man because of its paucity of symbols and practices which might mediate it in the church—a point which Catholicism's approach seems to have solved more satisfactorily because of its fuller development of the institution.

Its emphasis upon affirming oneself under God.—The relationship between realizing God's benevolence, on the one hand, and affirming oneself under God, on the other hand,—complementary steps on the meliorist pathway—is paralleled in psychotherapeutic experience by the interaction of response and effort.⁴⁵ It is the experience of medical psychology that the neurotic person cannot alone save himself. In a sense, the more he struggles the more thoroughly he becomes caught; the more he exercises his "will power" the more frustrated he gets. What the individual needs to do is to be willing to seek help outside himself. This is where the rejectionist emphasis upon despair may sometimes prove helpful; it may touch off a growing feeling of helplessness, and lead the distressed and anxious soul to seek the aid of power outside of himself. In

so far as the individual feels the need for a completion that is not his he is enabled to respond to power outside himself. In the case of psychotherapeutic treatment he subjects himself to the physician; in the case of religious experience he submits himself to God, the "meaningful structure of reality." The result of help-seeking is positive response to the trusted realities outside oneself—people, nature, symbols of all sorts from the trivial to the ultimate. And positive response issues in increasing self-acceptance, accompanied by a sense of well-being and increased strength and energy.

However, the giving up and the responding to realities outside oneself is accompanied at every stage by effort or self-affirmation. Walking to the physician's office requires that the individual put forth effort in behalf of his own cure. As we have seen, successful psychotherapy involves increasingly significant efforts on the part of the individual. He learns to make efforts that will alter his family relations, or his business dealings, or his social contacts. As Rollo May points out:

The crucial question in the field of personality is not whether or not one puts forth effort; it is rather, how is the effort *directed*? . . . The healthy personality . . . uses his energy to put himself in touch with the desired realities of life, such as love and friendship and congenial work. He works with forces outside himself—with the therapist, with other people, with what we ambiguously term "reality," and as the religious person would say, with God.⁴⁶

Clearly self-acceptance requires response and effort, and these must always be in vital interaction. Christian meliorism's stress upon the reality of Divine Love which calls out man's response, on the one hand, and its provisions for affirming oneself under God, on the other hand, is such a correlation. It is eminently suited to help the individual achieve greater self-acceptance.

AN APPRAISAL OF COMMON ELEMENTS

The components of healthy self-acceptance, explicated in the fourth chapter, are based upon established psychotherapeutic experience. As such they provide for illumination of the ways in

which the Christian pathways actually provide or fail to provide for healthy self-acceptance. They also furnish new knowledge and resources that can enrich religious approaches. The representatives of religion are challenged to consider how all this can contribute to the reconstruction of their own views, and increase the effectiveness of their own procedures. Having estimated the most salient strengths and weaknesses of each pathway individually, we shall conclude this study with a brief appraisal of the common elements in the three Christian pathways to self-acceptance in the light of its psychotherapeutic components.

EXPRESSION

The importance of avoiding repression and of facilitating awareness of the various drives and impulses which are forever struggling within one has been explained as fundamental. Continued and increased self-acceptance depends partly upon a growing acquaintance with the "crowd" within one's "earthly temple." That the various forms of Christianity do foster psychological expression to some degree is evident. The Church's preaching of sin and repentance, the opportunities it offers for group and individual confession, and its pastoral counseling services all provide at least limited opportunity for increased facing of the painful, unlovely, and fearful elements and the guilt-ridden desires of the inner life.

But there is at least one great adjustment which Christianity in general needs to make at this point; that is, further elimination of the moralism which often characterizes its approach to individuals and to society. Examples of this moralism may be seen in the Catholic confessional, which could be of greatest benefit in facilitating awareness of oneself but which, instead, concentrates upon the individual's specific failures to conform, imposing punishment and granting absolution accordingly; and, in Protestantism's all too frequent identification of religion with the bourgeois virtues of honesty, industry, frugality, and temperance. What is needed for self-acceptance is freedom from paralyzing fear of nonconformity and the depressing sense of condemnation that the Church itself so often metes out to those who fail to comply with its teachings.

Ecclesiastical moralism is more likely to increase self-righteousness and self-rejection than it is to foster true confession and insight into oneself.

One thing all forms of Christianity can do to avoid this kind of repressive religion is "*to shift the basis of self-respect from the rigid or static type of morality to the dynamic type.*"⁴⁷ The Church can preach and teach man that no matter how extraordinary or reprehensible his attitudes or his conduct may have been he is a good man and worthy of honor in so far as he is earnestly trying to become better. In other words, the Church can show that morality is not a matter of outward conformity but of inward aim and intention.

Psychotherapy has pointed out that man needs nothing so much as relief from the sense of isolation or estrangement. The Church believes in a God who, far from holding himself aloof from sinful man, comes into the very midst of human life for the express purpose of affecting man's salvation. The good news of the Church, then, is that God wills to effect a reconciliation of man with Himself obviously not on the questionable basis of man's uneven conformity but on the certain basis of His own everlasting love for a creature who never really conforms. Indeed, this God is not looking for conformity but for fellowship; what He wills is that man respond to Him with whatever he has. In one way and another, all forms of the Christian religion believe these things. What is needed, therefore, is the fuller application of their implications in the varied ministrations of the Church. In all of its functions the basic approach to man should be: goodness is nothing else than man's striving for the highest with whatever capacities and limitations are his. Such an approach, implemented by preaching and praying, teaching and counseling, the hearing of confessions and the giving of advice, would help instead of hinder full expression of man's whole self.

RESPONSIBILITY

Part of a healthy self-accepting attitude is the willingness to accept responsibility for oneself, which means reliance upon one's

own resources and establishment of one's own values. In psychotherapeutic treatment the individual is encouraged to feel "himself the active, responsible force in his life, capable of making decisions and of taking the consequences." ⁴⁸

How far the various forms of Christianity foster the responsibility component of self-acceptance is a basic question. For, while the rejectionist and the meliorist views encourage varying degrees of independent thinking and action, they are one with the forensic view in this, that man is taught to depend ultimately upon God for his salvation. All Christianity declares that God is the one upon whom man must ever rely for forgiveness, power, and direction. Dynamic psychology challenges Christianity to justify this principle of heteronomy, and, in the face of it, to develop approaches which foster the autonomy needed for sound self-acceptance.

As is well known, Freud believed that religion by its very nature could not promote this kind of responsibility for oneself. He saw religion as an alternative to the self-sufficiency and self-government necessary for mental health. Religion is a technique by which the individual who is afraid of life seeks a false security, he argued; religion provides a way of going through life in a state of dependence and protection much like that which the child enjoys in his father's arms.⁴⁹ Thus to Freud religion was "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity."⁵⁰ Jung espouses an entirely different view. He sees religion as a means of liberating man from his infantile attachments and of helping him to integrate his conscious energies. In his view "Religions are systems of healing for psychic illness."⁵¹

There is truth in the observations of both Freud and Jung. Religion can and does function as a substitute for individual growth and development in some people; and in others it can and does operate as a stimulus for individuation. However, granting that religion may be therapeutic in some cases, is any kind of dependence upon God desirable in principle? To put it another way, is it not better to teach the individual to depend only upon himself for forgiveness, power, and direction? This is the deeper issue which dynamic psychology raises.

For a more adequate answer than it has been able to provide in

centuries past, Christianity today may draw upon the findings of medical psychology itself. Here the importance of interpersonal relations has been clarified until we see now that they are primary in determining the course of individual development. If the human spirit is to flourish it needs to receive emotional nourishment as well as to create and supply it, for example, one must experience the loving attitude before one can feel and manifest it. Herein lies a pivotal principle of personality development, which we dare say needs to be seen more clearly by psychotherapists as by representatives of religion. The principle is this: "by identifying oneself with and experiencing oneself as part of superindividual wholes [such as the nation, nature, the "meaningful structure of existence," God, or whatever the individual's formulation of it may be] one expands beyond the narrower individual self."⁵²

There appear to be two needs in healthy human growth, as Dr. Andras Angyal points out: one is toward increased autonomy, but the other is toward fuller participation or merging in larger organizations than oneself.

Human behaviour cannot be adequately understood solely as a manifestation of the trend toward increased autonomy. There is a second trend, a trend toward homonomy, in which the person seeks to share and to participate in, and to fit into or conform with superindividual units, such as the family, social groups, meaningful world order, and so forth.⁵³

The objective existence of "superindividual wholes" is not the question here but rather their vital role in healthy human development. Evidently the activities and the goals of sharing, participation, and union are natural and essential psychic correlates of the activities and the goals of possessing, asserting, and conquering.

In the light of this new knowledge Christianity has empirical justification for upholding the principle of heteronomy. Christianity may claim that its great power to help man lies in its provision for sharing, participation, and union with the whole meaningful order of life, that is with God; and, that apart from dependence upon forces greater than himself and beyond his control man cannot find increasing capacity for taking personal responsibility.

A certain degree of homonomous expression is absolutely necessary for normal adjustment. Self-centeredness, being wrapped up in oneself, inability to "loosen up," to get out of oneself, is a well-recognized characteristic of many forms of personality disorder. . . . The merging into superindividual wholes, the sharing and participation in larger units, is a powerful support of mental health.⁵⁴

At the same time, each form of Christianity must continually ask itself what kind of dependence upon God is being fostered. Here Freud's contentions about religion apply with particular force, for the Church has often fostered unhealthy ideas and practices. For one thing, Christianity as a whole is somehow associated with the suppression of self-assertiveness, sexual desire, and the expression of resentment. Moreover, it is characteristic, at least of much rejectionism, to declare that the individual can do nothing to further his salvation; nothing, that is, but despair and hope. The forensic view openly proclaims that the believer must work out his own salvation in accordance with the standards and practices of the Church. And meliorism has the tendency to make the virtues of fellowship so imperative that expressions of self-assertiveness and hostility are allowed no outlet. Then again, the Church has laid so much stress upon its comforting functions that religion in the minds of many has come to be associated with weakness and protection rather than with strength and inspiration for the facing of life's realities. These are a few of the special characteristics of some types of Christianity. Obviously they need correction in the light of man's need for the kind of heteronomous relations that really foster the responsibility component of self-acceptance. All the more because it does provide for the richest, most universal, indeed the most breath-taking "merging into superindividual wholes," each form of Christianity needs always to ask of itself these questions. Is the individual being helped to grow? Is his autonomy being fostered? Is he finding the kind of group experience which is strengthening him to take up the task of making the most of his own resources? Is he being challenged to make his own decisions and choose his own ultimate values?⁵⁵

APPRECIATION

Favorable, critical estimation of one's possibilities is a *sine qua non* of sound self-acceptance. To put it another way, one must have faith in one's possibilities. In a general way Christianity today is able to foster this appreciative attitude toward oneself. For, in varying degree, the representatives of all the pathways declare that man's fulfillment is limited on earth, largely for reasons of persistent sin and creaturely finitude, while, on the other hand, they teach that indeterminate, although in the case of rejectionism, very limited, possibilities belong to man by virtue of God's love and grace. Thus man is helped to accept the fact that suffering and failure, are parts of life; yet he is encouraged to believe that life can be lived in a different and more harmonious way. Christianity helps to smash the "idealized image," that uncritical estimate of oneself, by what G. K. Chesterton called "the glad good news brought by the Gospel . . . the good news of original sin."⁵⁶ And, Christianity also proclaims that one's life, however limited, can be lived with greater fullness and freedom from fear and guilt.

A fundamental lack here, which we have already remarked, is the very methodology of religion; namely, its normative, educational approach. This usually keeps the priest from being of much specific help to the individual who is having difficulty with self-evaluation. Moreover, there is the fact that enlightenment with regard to personal limitations and possibilities must be gained, for the most part, indirectly: that is, by what the person "gets" out of the corporate services of the Church, because apart from the confessional or pastoral conferences the Church furnishes no direct help to the individual in critical re-estimation of himself. The need for more work with individuals is nowhere more evident than at this point. The only adequate answer would seem to be widespread training of the clergy and many laity too in the kind of counseling that adapts the diagnostic methodology of medical psychology.

From the psychotherapeutic point of view, the most serious barrier which Christianity throws up against the increase of critical, favorable appreciation of oneself is its tendency to over-idealize

What's your beef, fellow? →

on M
(or P)

Christ. In rejectionism this commonly takes the form of allowing oneself to go untended, so to speak, in the interest of attributing all goodness and power to Christ. Moreover, rejectionism is likely to suppress self-appreciation in the interest of doing God's will only. In forensic and meliorist Christianity the over-idealization of Christ is sometimes quite forthright; the ideal is to live in the way he lived rather than to discover and evaluate one's own capacities: the whole focus is upon him. Jung finds this to be a very real problem, a significant fact because of his extensive psychotherapeutic work with Christian people. Addressing himself to Protestants he writes:

We Protestants must sooner or later face this question: Are we to understand the "imitation of Christ" in the sense that we should copy his life and, if I may use the expression, ape his stigmata; or in the deeper sense that we are to live our own proper lives as truly as he lived his in all its implications? It is no easy matter to live a life that is modelled on Christ's, but it is unspeakably harder to live one's own life as truly as Christ lived his.⁵⁷

Jung goes on to say that the monk may deserve one's respect for his practice of identifying himself with Christ but that most people cannot follow a similar course without becoming neurotic, developing an "inner cleavage" between their idealized image and those unideal aspects of themselves which "Christ" cannot admit. Whether the over-idealization of Christ takes the form of looking only to him for one's righteousness and peace with God or the form of identification with Christ, the process carries the believer away from reality and appreciation of himself. Christianity needs to school itself in the dynamic use of its redemptive symbols, as we have previously said. "To the extent that the conscious attention is focused on the symbol itself, and the processes of consciousness, such as reason, are involved with the symbol itself, the symbolism serves the will not to know," declares Wise. "To the extent that attention is focused on the reality behind the symbol, and conscious thought centers in this reality, the symbolism serves the will to know."⁵⁸

BENEVOLENT RELATIONSHIP

In the light of dynamic psychology two things about the individual's interpersonal relations stand out. (One is that a healthy self-accepting attitude is dependent in great measure upon being accepted and treated in a truly benevolent way by others, such as one's parents, one's therapist, one's social group.) The other is that the disposition toward accepting or toward rejecting oneself is largely determined by home influences, especially as they operate during the individual's infancy and childhood. note

The fact that the Church is characteristically built upon the family as a unit suggests that one of its most important responsibilities and opportunities lies just here. To be sure, Christianity has not been unaware of the potency of familial relationships in personality development. Especially in modern times it has tried to influence the spirit of the home. It has been pointed out that the various churches lay different types of responsibility upon parents for the religious and moral upbringing of their children; they also place responsibilities upon children, in some cases very heavy responsibilities, for contributing to the order of the family. But the knowledge that benevolent relations in the home are so vital raises a crucial question for the Christian churches: namely, are they each one espousing the kind of parent-child relationship which will foster the child's self-acceptance?

The tragic mistakes and sins of the parents in the case histories of the last chapter indicate indirectly what elements are indispensable if self-acceptance is to be fostered in children. In this light we may list essential aspects of true parental benevolence, which the representatives of religion should take into account. These elements are: dependable conduct in relation to the child; serious consideration of childish questions and enterprises, accompanied by honest instruction; avoidance of unnecessary disappointments and arbitrary requirements; respect for the child's interests and desires; and, above all, willingness to foster self-reliance in thought and action, accompanied by refusal to impose parental values upon the child. The underlying element in all of this is affirmation of the child's

life, growth, joy, and freedom; the opposite, of course, is negation, which may be expressed in terms of harshness, pampering, or indifference.

There is no Christian view which would not largely agree in principle with all of this, and recommend it, with perhaps some qualification, to its followers. However, it cannot be said as well that all the forms of Christianity today are willing to stress these aspects of parental responsibility. Indeed, in Catholic thought, for example, the emphases are distributed quite differently. The function of the parent as a disciplinarian receives considerable attention. The child is exhorted to obey, which means to control himself according to the rules laid down for him by his parents and his Church. The forensic view of the parent-child relationship is in principle the same as its view of the priest-believer relationship—authoritarian. In the home, as in the church, such a relationship may provide security, forgiveness, and superior wisdom, but it is extremely doubtful whether domestic patriarchy is the most desirable family pattern in so far as provision for the above-mentioned elements of true parental benevolence are concerned. This applies also to much of Protestantism today. For, in practice, Protestantism has not differed greatly from Catholicism in its conception of parent-child relations. In both the patriarchal view has dominated.

Where Christian meliorism has held sway, however, this has not been the case, but its influence has been limited until quite recently. Indeed it is to Horace Bushnell and other modern meliorists that we must look for an emphasis similar to the one which in our time is seen to be so important for self-acceptance and mental health in general. Bushnell attacked the indoctrination of children, and all authoritarian dealings with them. He especially stressed the importance of not expecting children to adhere to adult modes and values. His positive constructive emphasis was upon deep-going parental love and its pervasive power for the healthy Christian nurture of children.

In this view the Christian Church has a challenging task. It is nothing less than that of helping parents to discover Love at its

- best and to practice it with each other and with their children in
- the home.

The church's task is to give to the parents a vital faith in the sovereignty of the Love that looks upon the heart rather than upon outward conformity, so that the child may never be afraid to talk over with them his real problems and difficulties and may find encouragement and help toward the attainment of his true objectives.⁵⁹

If healthy self-acceptance is to be promoted the home will need fullest support from the Church. And the Church has need of re-constructing its concept of parent-child relations so that the parents may be stimulated and helped to be truly benevolent at home. In so far as this conception clashes with authoritarian, patriarchal ideas, the Church will benefit parents and children by enlarging and assimilating the new knowledge.

CHOOSING GOALS

- Feeling free to choose goals in the light of one's capacities at
- the particular stage of one's development is an aspect of healthy
- self-acceptance for which religion has an obvious indispensability.
- For, when religion functions properly in life, it provides for the
- organization of the impulses and potentialities around abiding and
- universal ideals. Within Christianity, the psychological reality of
- this saving service is classically expressed in the symbol of Christ.
- As Wise puts it: "Christ as Saviour has been to many a positive
- ideal, appropriated through identification and affection rather
- than through authority and fear, which gives the ego power to
- effect and maintain personality integration."⁶⁰

In the preceding chapter important lessons about the use of ideals in dealing with people were suggested, lessons which the Christian Church may profitably utilize. Earlier in this chapter we pointed to the possible therapeutic functions of the absolute ideal, and to its dangers; also, we discussed the crucial differences between a static standard of morality and a dynamic one. Increasing

assimilation of these various applications of modern psychotherapeutic knowledge will go far toward helping the various forms of Christianity to provide man with opportunities to organize his life about truly satisfying ideals.

But there remains an important problem facing Christianity, not with regard now to ways presenting the mighty ideals and goals in its possession but with regard to their content. The reference here is to Christian aims as they relate to man's sexual nature.

It is crystal clear that the sexual elements in human nature are so central that they can neither be repressed nor expressed without restriction. Somehow they must find controlled satisfaction which are in harmony with the goals of the whole man if health and well-being are to be achieved. The case histories indicate what happens when sex is either neglected or mismanaged. Such cases demonstrate man's need today for better understanding and direction of this titanic force. The Christian religion is challenged to provide a positive, constructive ideal for this part of life which will indicate the real value of the sexual forces, and not leave man partly perplexed, partly ashamed, and partly frustrated because of them.

It can hardly be denied that Christianity thus far has failed to do this. Since the Middle Ages Christianity has proclaimed officially that sexuality is not sinful *per se*. In fact, the forensic and the meliorist views have specified that man's erotic nature as a whole is the striving basis of union with God. And yet, as Wise points out, to a large extent this teaching has been more verbal than real. "The basic problems involved in the development of the capacity to love in the true Christian sense and the mature psychological sense have been ignored or neglected."⁶¹ When we look particularly at the sexual component of the total love impulse this judgment applies with added force. The meliorist view at this point is quite recent in history though its influence among Protestant churches is definitely spreading so that many clergymen are accepting its views of sex, love, and marriage as a gospel of enlightenment. However, in our time as in the past puritanism prevails in great sections of Protestant Christianity with all the concealment, disapproval, and guilt so characteristic of it. These groups agree entirely with

the Roman Catholic Church on such fundamental principles as these: conjugal intercourse is only for the purpose of procreation; marriage itself is, secondarily at least, a *remedium concupiscentiae*; the use of contraception is sinful; and sex education of children and youth is undesirable. The Roman Church itself, of course, has become very active recently in its opposition to birth control; its stand on this matter is unequivocal. Moreover, this Church declares today as in times past that chastity is ever the "better way." This glorification of the virgin would seem to be the fitting symbol for Catholicism's negative attitude toward sexuality with its accompanying repression. All these things considered, it can easily be seen why good Protestants and Catholics still grow up with the conviction that sexuality is evil, that intercourse is dirty, and that marriage is licensed prostitution.

It is precisely because sexuality is not yet provided for, in terms of a positive and constructive goal, that it remains so acute a problem for Western man. "We have found no evidence," declares Boisen, "that sexual maladjustment operates directly through its organic effects." ⁶² Sexual difficulties are more usually psychological, and they require a resolution which only new evaluation can supply.

In asking, what must Christianity do? it must never be forgotten that religion is responsible for collective interests as well as for individual ones. It must concern itself not only with the individual man but with the perpetuation and the enrichment of the race. Thus its restrictive requirements in the sexual realm as in other realms, such as those of self-assertiveness and the expression of resentment, serve society positively. Moreover, the close connection which Christianity always emphasizes between the pleasures and the responsibilities of sexual expression is a creative contribution to healthy family life and also to the development of the individual.

It is just at this point that Christianity could well begin a more constructive contribution to this part of man's life by taking a larger view of the sacramental character of marriage. Both Protestantism and Catholicism could emphasize more positively that the sacramental character of it implies that the act of intercourse is itself

to serve as an outward and visible symbol of communion, not merely between man and wife but with God.⁶³ This would also involve the recognition that the end of marriage is not romantic love but, as Boisen puts it, "the bringing into being of new and higher types of personality, the new birth in beauty and power of both body and soul."⁶⁴ And this, in turn, would require the further recognition that in the development of such higher types of personality the home is a factor just as important as the body of the mother, and the social medium is just as potent as the physical.

The insight that sex love at its best is not merely a seeking after the finite love object, but after the Love that is beyond that of father and mother or of husband and wife, has consequences of greatest therapeutic importance. It is a step beyond the Freudian doctrine that no man is well or mature until he has learned to stand on his own feet as an autonomous being. Instead of requiring of us that we should stand "with heads bloody but unbowed under the bludgeonings of fate" as arrogant little captains of our own souls, it provides the basis for a philosophy of life which will enable one to meet outward difficulties and disappointments with something more than stoical resignation. It makes possible the faith that can overcome obstacles and actually change conditions.⁶⁵

The reconstruction of Christianity's goals in relation to the sexual elements in man's life might well take some such direction as this one. Sexuality could be recognized as an important part of man's motivational equipment. It could be taken up into the total love impulse as a genuine and enriching component of it in all relationships with other individuals and superindividual wholes. The Church would thus be guiding sexuality creatively for the sake of the indispensable part it has to play in the developing life of the individual and of the race. The constructive incorporation of such sex goals in the hierarchy of Christian ideals is something waiting to be achieved. Christianity will have to do it if it is to provide more completely for healthy self-acceptance.

Stressing ideals, goals and values as it does, Christianity is in danger of either emphasizing the ultimate without reference to the

actualities of human life or of rejecting and even condemning them. The ideals of religion function in an integrative way in so far as they represent possibilities which are inherent in human nature and are offered to man as goals toward which he may grow, each in his own ways. "The task of religion is to provide a structure through which life becomes a constant reconciliation of the ideal and the actual in both personality and social life."⁶⁶ If Christianity has this view it will expect that the configuration of ideals in the life of the individual person will vary, and it will approve of this. Healthy religion does not espouse ideals in terms of fixed modes of behavior but rather it presents those potentialities which belong to all men in varying measure and which must be realized uniquely by each. In the words of Whitehead:

Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, yet the greatest of all present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.⁶⁷

Christianity is concerned with the individual, the social group, and the universe, and through its use of symbols it fuses these aspects into a whole. It is thus "capable of raising the expression of impulsive energy toward goals that create high positive meaning and integration, thus removing both guilt and isolation."⁶⁸ It seeks to relate man to his universe on the basis of understanding and cooperation and to present objects and values worthy of his affections, worship, and striving."⁶⁹ All this is true, but it is not the whole truth, nor is it true in as many cases as the Christian Church might wish. The goal of achieving it more fully is worthy. And Christianity has at hand today new knowledge and resources. Not only in the sphere of self-acceptance but in all the areas of human soul's concern, Christianity can hope to increase its effectiveness by making full use of what these new resources—particularly dynamic medical psychology—have to offer.

Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1. Romans 12:1.
2. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. John Allen (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publications, n.d.), I, Bk. III, chap. vii, sec. 1 (*italics mine*); hereafter cited as Calvin, *Institutes*.
3. *Ibid.*, sec. 2.
4. *Ibid.*, sec. 1.
5. See Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, trans. Douglas Horton (The Pilgrim Press, 1928), pp. 250-54.
6. N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927), p. 424.
7. Isaiah 6:1, 5.
8. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), p. 221, n. 11.
9. Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*; this passage trans. R. B. Hoyle and quoted in his, *The Teaching of Karl Barth* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 108-109 (*italics mine*).
10. Calvin, *Institutes*, II, Bk. III, chap. xxiii, sec. 2.
11. Quoted in Hoyle, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
12. Matthew 22:37, 39.
13. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941-43), I, 287; hereafter cited as Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*.
14. For example, Ignatius (second century, A.D.) cried for death saying, "Permit me to be an imitator of the passion of my God."
15. See Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics*, trans. Olive Wyon (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), chap. xvii; hereafter cited as Brunner, *Divine Imperative*.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 175 (*italics mine*).
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76 (*italics mine*).
18. A remarkable work by Professor Anders Nygren of the University of Lund (Sweden) elaborates this rejectionist idea of Christian love in a brilliant manner. Nygren criticizes the early patristics and especially Augustine for incorporating Greek and Hebrew eudaemonism

into what he regards as the true Christian idea of love—*agape*, purely giving love. He finds in Luther the real recovery of the Christian conception; Luther says: "To love is the same as to hate oneself." The love commandment excludes every kind of self-love, *eros*. See Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, trans. P. S. Watson (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1939), Part II, Vol. II, chap. vi.

19. E. S. Bates, *American Faith: Its Religious, Political, and Economic Foundations* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1940), p. 27.

20. Jonathan Edwards, "The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners" (Sermon IX), *The Works of President Edwards* (New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co., 1849), IV, 228.

21. Niebuhr makes this observation about Barthianism in *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 68.

22. E. T. Clark in his study, *The Small Sects in America*, notes the rapid increase of many of them in contemporary America. He comments that total depravity is "the first principle of most of the sects" (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1937), p. 228.

23. Sören Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1944), p. 82.

24. Sören Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1944), pp. 17 ff.

25. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 181.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 178 ff.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 251.

28. Karl Barth, *The Christian Life*, trans. J. S. McNab (2d ed.; London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1931), p. 51.

29. Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. II, chap. 1, sec. 11.

30. Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, p. 88.

31. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 260 (italics mine).

32. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

33. Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. II, chap. i, sec. 8.

34. The condemnation of sex by Calvinism is taken over from the more consistent and pervasive attitude of patristic and medieval Catholicism. See, among others, C. E. Raven, *The Gospel and the Church: A Study of Distortion and Its Remedy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), chap. iii. The neo-orthodoxists like Niebuhr, Brunner, and Barth do not proclaim this attitude toward sex. See, also, chap. ii of this study.

35. Quoted in Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. Olive Wyon (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), II, 988, n. 511.

36. R. B. Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1944), p. 230.

37. Karl Barth, *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik: Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes* (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag A. G. Zollikon, 1944), I/1, 258.

38. Quoted in William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* [1902] (New York, The Modern Library), pp. 239-40 (*italics mine*).

39. See Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 293.

40. Emil Brunner, *Our Faith*, trans. J. W. Rilling (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 97.

41. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, II, 111-12.

42. Brunner, *Our Faith*, p. 98.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

44. Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. III, chap. iii, sec. 10.

45. See Ephesians 2:8-9.

46. See Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. III, chaps. xvi-xvii.

47. For a typical orthodox Calvinist declaration of the high possibilities of sanctification in this life, as contrasted with the neo-orthodox view described in this section, see S. G. Craig, *Christianity Rightly So Called* (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1946), esp. chap. iii.

48. Barth, *The Christian Life*, p. 28.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33 (*italics mine*).

50. William Cunningham, *Collected Works; Vol. I, The Reformers; And the Theology of the Reformation*, ed. by his literary executors (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1862), p. 209.

51. Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. III, chap. vii, sec. 1.

52. Cf. Weber, *op. cit.*, chap. iv; Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, II, chap. iii, part 3.

53. See J. C. Bennett, *Social Salvation: A Religious Approach to the Problems of Social Change* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 144; also R. N. C. Hunt, *Calvin* (London: The Centenary Press, 1933), pp. 130-32.

54. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 115. Eternal damnation is widely preached in America today by Protestant Fundamentalists and by Roman Catholics. Dr. A. T. Boisen documents this in his "Factors Which Have to Do with the Decline of the Country Church," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXII (1916), 177-92. The major Protestant denominations do not currently emphasize hell; neo-orthodoxy treats the idea of damnation psychologically.

55. Edwards, *op. cit.*, I, 15-16.

56. Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, II, 607 (*italics mine*).

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 808-10.

58. William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 141.
59. Quoted in Emil Brunner, *Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946), p. 423; hereafter cited as Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*.
60. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 106.
61. Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. I, chap. i, sec. 2.
62. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 15.
63. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Discerning the Signs of the Times* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 172.
64. Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy*, p. 242.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 36.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 429.
68. This is a phrase of Emil Brunner's from *The Divine-Human Encounter*, trans. A. W. Loos (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. 28. This book is a typical Protestant polemic directed against the objectifying and absolutizing of Christian rites and institutions.
69. Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, pp. 19-21 (*italics mine*).
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18 (*italics mine*).
71. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
73. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, II, 125-26.
74. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
75. Quoted in Robert Southey, *The Life of Wesley* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1847), II, 308.
76. Psalms 39:12.
77. Thomas Taylor, *Three Treatises*, p. 123; quoted in Haller, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
78. Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, p. 53.
79. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, II, 298.
80. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 179.
81. *Ibid.*, 228.
82. Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, II, 606.
83. Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), p. 133.
84. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 236.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
86. Brunner, *Divine Imperative*, p. 349.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 367.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 350.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 371.
91. See Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 366.
92. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
93. O. A. Piper, *The Christian Interpretation of Sex* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 27.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.
95. Brunner, *Divine Imperative*, p. 368.
96. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, I, 293.
97. Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
99. Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 430 (italics mine).
100. Emil Brunner, *Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology*, trans. Olive Wyon (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p. 283.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 285 (italics mine).
102. Martin Luther, *A Compend of Luther's Theology*, ed. Hugh T. Kerr (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), pp. 105-106 (italics mine).
103. Barth, *The Christian Life*, pp. 12-13.
104. Emil Brunner, *Der Mittler* (Tubingen: Ravel Siebeck, 1927), p. 477.
105. *Ibid.*
106. Calvin, *Institutes*, I, Bk. III, chap. x, sec. 6.
107. Barth, *The Christian Life*, p. 36.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
109. Martin Luther, *A Compend of Luther's Theology*, pp. 55-56.
110. Niebuhr, *Discerning the Signs of the Times*, p. 169.
111. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.
112. "The Confession of Faith," *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.* (Rev. ed.; Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1939), chap. i, sec. 6 (italics mine).
113. E.g., Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, chap. iv.
114. Niebuhr, *Discerning the Signs of the Times*, p. 90.
115. Brunner, *Divine Imperative*, p. 175.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
117. See Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*, pp. 94-95.
118. Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, pp. 345-48.
119. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
120. Brunner, *Divine Imperative*, pp. 177-78 (italics mine).

CHAPTER TWO

1. A. C. McGiffert, *A History of Christian Thought* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), I, 67.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
4. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 80.
5. Joseph Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology, and Natural Law* (4th ed.; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), p. 26 (*italics mine*).
6. Hermas, "Similitudes (I)," *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), II, 31.
7. Antony Koch, *A Handbook of Moral Theology*, ed. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1918-24), III, 6.
8. I am indebted to Henry Balmforth *et al*, *An Introduction to Pastoral Theology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1937), for the term *forensic*, which they apply only to Roman Catholic hamartiology. These writers declare: "The forensic view of sin is the basis of all Roman Catholic Moral Theology" (p. 64).
9. The Anglo-Catholics in the Anglican Church and elsewhere are concerned to emphasize the visible church and its importance without adopting the rigid authoritarianism of the Church of Rome. On the particular point of modern Roman legalism see, for example, K. E. Kirk's view, *Some Principles of Moral Theology: And Their Application* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), p. x.
10. J. G. Brunini, *Whereon to Stand* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), pp. 123-24. Roman Catholicism believes, however, that the Church includes members who appear to be outside her, as Mr. Brunini goes on to point out. These members belong invisibly and incompletely but they really belong.
11. This theology is Thomistic and is taken from Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*, Part i; Scotist thought is markedly different in many points, but it is not dominant in Roman Catholic thinking.
12. Psychologically, however, man remains free. See the section on the free will of man, *infra*, pp. 46 ff.
13. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, III, 64; quoted in McGiffert, *op. cit.*, II, 271 (*italics mine*). R. Seeberg's article, "Thomas Aquinas," in *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, ed. S. M. Jackson, Vol. XI (1911), affords a summary of Thomistic theology which I have found useful.
14. F. J. Connell, *God: Man's First Need* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1943), p. 30.

15. Henry Davis, *Moral and Pastoral Theology* (4th ed. rev.; New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943), I, 3-4.

16. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-32.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 33. For a representative presentation of Roman doctrine on the subject of the determinants of sin and guilt see, among others, Davis, *op. cit.*, I, Treatise II, chap. iii.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 168 (italics mine).

23. *Summa Theologica*, i, iiae. q. x. a. 4.; quoted in Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

24. *The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, trans. T. A. Buckley (London: George Routledge & Co., 1851), Session VI, canons vi, v; hereafter cited as *Trent*.

25. Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 68-69.

26. See Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny*, II, 134-43.

27. Augustine, "On Grace and Free Will" (chap. 32, xvi), *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1887), V.

28. Thomas Aquinas, *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1944), II, 991 (italics mine).

29. See Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

30. Romans 13:14 (Douay Version).

31. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, p. 145 (italics mine).

32. *Ibid.*, p. 141 (italics mine).

33. See Joseph Wilhelm and T. B. Scannell, *A Manual of Catholic Theology* (Vol. I, 3d ed. rev., Vol. II, 2d ed.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1901-1906), I, Part I, chap. v, on infallibility.

34. W. A. Brown, *The Church Catholic and Protestant* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), p. 163. Dr. Brown presents a constructive, sympathetic interpretation of Catholicism upon which I have drawn in this section on the church.

35. Brunini, *op. cit.*, p. 109 (italics mine).

36. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

37. In the Roman Catholic penitential system the disciplinary element predominates; see, among others, Davis, *op. cit.*, III, Treatise XIII. In Anglican penitential practice, only incompletely developed today, the counseling element tends to predominate; see, for instance, a rather extreme presentation by H. H. Henson, *Moral Discipline in the*

Christian Church (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905), Preface and Lecture IV, esp.

38. Protestant Fundamentalism generally makes a very simple appeal to mankind to escape hell and enter heaven by accepting Christ as personal Saviour. There is no positive and elaborated otherworldliness in it which corresponds to the Catholic consciousness of the present reality of the heavenly world as experienced by contact through worldly means, the idea of the communion of saints, or the doctrine of purgatory.

39. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

40. Brunini, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

41. Thomas Aquinas; quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 181-82.

42. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

43. Brunini, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

44. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

45. See Brunini, *op. cit.*, chap. xxx.

46. *Trent*, Session XXV.

47. Richard Ginder, *Between Heaven and Hell* (New York: The Catholic Information Society, n.d.), pp. 15-16.

48. Brunini, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

49. For an approved presentation of the Roman doctrines of hell and purgatory see, among others, Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, II, Bk. VIII.

50. Brunini, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

51. Quoted in Koch, *op. cit.*, I, 22.

52. Prof. J. B. Pratt observes that the Catholic Church lays no special stress upon "conversion experience" so typical of many evangelical churches. "The emphasis in the Catholic Church is on outer acts and on character building," and the believer is not directed to watch his emotional experiences; see *The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 153-54.

53. *Trent*, Session VI, chap. viii.

54. Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, II, 993.

55. Koch, *op. cit.*, IV, 1.

56. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

57. See among others, *ibid.*, p. 4.

58. Koch, *op. cit.*, I, 20.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

60. Connell, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

61. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12.

62. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

63. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

64. Connell, *op. cit.*, p. 11; he writes, "Intelligence, not feeling, must lead man to truth."

65. Full understanding of objective reality and of God behind it is dependent not alone on natural reason but on positive revelation which, again, is not contrary but complementary to natural revelation. This is where the church comes in on the forensic pathway, as will be shown further on in this chapter.

66. See McGiffert's chapter XII, "Thomas Aquinas," *op. cit.*, II, esp. p. 261.

67. Thomistic natural theology depends for its main strength on the "cosmological argument." See A. C. Knudson, "God," *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 302.

68. Connell, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

70. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 104.

71. J. A. O'Brien, *Is the Will Free?* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1946), pp. 4-5.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 6 (italics mine).

74. A. E. Taylor, "Human Mind and Will," *The Anglo-Catholic Congress Books*, ed. Leonard Prestige (London: The Society of S. S. Peter & Paul, Ltd., n.d.), II, Bk. 22, p. 19.

75. Here again we may point out that the idea of "steps" is used figuratively and does not imply a time sequence. Ideally, in Catholic practice, church membership begins in earliest infancy; rational and volitional training is correlative to participation in the visible church at every stage of life. This must be if true self-acceptance is to come about, so it is held.

76. See, for example, Koch, *op. cit.*, IV, 7, 27-43.

77. J. H. Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891), p. 239.

78. Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, I, 137.

79. Brunini, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

80. John 6:35.

81. Davis, *op. cit.*, III, 385.

82. D. A. Lord, *Confession Is a Joy?* (St. Louis: The Queen's Work, Inc., 1945), p. 39.

83. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 183.

84. F. G. Belton, *A Manual for Confessors* (London: W. Knott, 1916), makes this three-fold classification of satisfactions (pp. 80-82).

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

86. Ginder, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

87. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

88. See Matthew 18:8, 9.

89. Davis, *op. cit.*, I, 21 (italics mine).
90. *Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas*, Joseph Rickaby (2d. ed.; London: Burns & Oates, Ltd., 1896), II, II-II. Quest 153, Art. ii (italics mine).
91. *Trent*, Session V, "Decree Concerning Original Sin." See, also, Davis, *op. cit.*, I, 21.
92. *Trent*, Session V, "Decree Concerning Original Sin."
93. Davis, *op. cit.*, I, 24 (italics mine).
94. See Raven, *op. cit.*, chap. iii.
95. O. A. Piper, *The Christian Interpretation of Sex* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 20. In patristic times the married were admonished to abstain from sexual intercourse at certain seasons of the year as a work of penance (Koch, *op. cit.*, V, 479).
96. See A. L. Ostheimer, *The Family: A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939), p. 31. Today the Roman Church can say, "We must take man as we find him, and man has a fleshly concupiscence that has a legitimate outlet in marriage" (Davis, *op. cit.*, II, 201).
97. See Davis, *op. cit.*, II, 201.
98. I Corinthians 7:9.
99. Davis, *op. cit.*, I, p. 26.
100. *Five Great Encyclicals* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1939), pp. 92-93.
101. Koch, *op. cit.*, V, 475.
102. Piper, *op. cit.*, p. 21. "Those who are not yet married and those who have been married may not take pleasure in thought of what is allowed to married people, for in practice such pleasure cannot be confined to the intellect; it also excites the sensual appetite and this causes temptation and sin" (Thomas Slater, *A Manual of Moral Theology* [3rd ed.; New York: Benziger Bros., 1909], I, 152).
103. Davis, *op. cit.*, II, 202.
104. *Ibid.*, 203.
105. Ostheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 39. Pope Pius XI's encyclical on marriage, *Casti Connubii*, sets forth a beautiful, rounded view of it, which definitely includes the ideals of mutual love and companionship, although these are "secondary" aims of marriage.
107. *Five Great Encyclicals*, p. 86.
108. Koch, *op. cit.*, V, 494.
109. For the Roman position on separation and divorce see among others, Davis, *op. cit.*, IV, Treatise XVIII, chaps. xix, xxiii.
110. *Five Great Encyclicals*, p. 84.
111. Ostheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

112. Ephesians 5:22, 23 (Douay Version).
113. Koch, *op. cit.*, V, 535-36.
114. Exodus 20:12. See Koch, *op. cit.*, V, 538.
115. Koch, *op. cit.*, V, 534.
116. Rickaby, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 368.
118. Johannes Hessen, *Unser Vater* (Rottenburg, 1929), p. 33; quoted in trans., Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-48.
119. M. J. Congar, *Divided Christendom: A Catholic Study of the Problem of Reunion*, trans. M. A. Bousfield (London: The Centenary Press, 1939), pp. 229-30 (*italics mine*).

CHAPTER THREE

1. John Wesley, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," *The Miscellaneous Works of the Rev. John Wesley* (New York: J. & J. Harper, 1828), I, 36.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34 (*italics mine*).
3. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
5. Matthew 12:28.
6. E.g., II Corinthians 1:22, 3:18; Galatians 5:22.
7. E.g., John 10:28.
8. R. N. Flew, *The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 139.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 397.
10. See W. W. Sweet, *Religion in Colonial America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 126.
11. See W. C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1912), p. 36.
12. For an excellent contrast of objective and subjective emphases in Christian Church worship see Pratt, *op. cit.*, chap. xiv.
13. See McGiffert, *op. cit.*, II, 368.
14. Charles Chauncy, *The Benevolence of the Deity, Fairly and Impartially Considered* (Boston: Powars & Willis, 1784), p. iii.
15. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, "Immanence and Transcendence," *The Spirit*, ed. B. H. Streeter (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921), pp. 13-14.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
17. H. E. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Faith* (New York: Association Press, 1922), p. 236.
18. Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912-13), II, 409.

19. Henry Drummond, *The Ideal Life* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., n.d.), p. 6.
20. D. S. Cairns, *The Riddle of the World* (New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1938), p. 154.
21. H. F. Rall, *Christianity: An Inquiry Into Its Nature and Truth* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 327-43.
22. E. S. Jones, *Is the Kingdom of God Realism?* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1940), p. 18.
23. *Ibid.*
24. F. R. Tennant, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin* (Cambridge: University Press, 1903), p. 11.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
28. John Burnaby, *Amor Dei* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938), p. 16.
29. Pointed out in *ibid.*, p. 96.
30. Augustine, *Sermons on Selected Lessons of the New Testament* (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1844), p. 55.
31. A. C. Knudson, *The Principles of Christian Ethics* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943), p. 123.
32. Quoted in Bates, *op. cit.*, p. 401.
33. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 179.
34. L. H. Hough, *The Christian Criticism of Life* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941), p. 215.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
36. F. R. Tennant, *The Concept of Sin* (Cambridge: University Press, 1912), p. 165.
37. John Oman, *Grace and Personality* (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), p. 157.
38. *Op. cit.*, p. 110.
39. John Wesley, "The Important Question," *Sermons on Several Occasions by the Rev. John Wesley, M.A.* (London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1869-70), II, 472.
40. W. S. Chalmers, *Does Your Life Matter?* (West Park, N.Y.: Holy Cross Press, n.d.), p. 11.
41. Henry Drummond, *The Greatest Thing in the World* (New York: Landau Book Co., Inc., n.d.), p. 38.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.
43. Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-98.
45. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Faith*, p. 265.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

47. B. P. Bowne, *The Immanence of God* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905), p. 145.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.
49. C. W. Emmet, "The Psychology of Grace: How God Helps," *The Spirit*, p. 177.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.
51. H. E. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Prayer* (New York: Association Press, 1938), pp. 86-87.
52. James, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
54. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Faith*, p. 269.
55. Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
57. Karl Tiedemann, *What Am I Like?* (West Park, N.Y.: Holy Cross Press, n.d.), p. 15, n.
58. Oman, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-22 (*italics mine*).
59. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Faith*, pp. 243-44.
60. Tennant, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, p. 128.
61. Pratt, *op. cit.*, chap. viii, "The Factors at Work in Conversion," has shown very clearly that in many conversions effort is of crucial importance (*esp.* pp. 156-57).
62. John Wesley, "A Blow at the Root," *The Miscellaneous Works of the Rev. John Wesley*, II, 457.
63. John C. Bennett, "The Causes of Social Evil," *Christian Faith and the Common Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938), *esp.* pp. 180-82.
64. W. S. Chalmers, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 11 (*italics mine*).
66. See Wesley's "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," *esp.* p. 29.
67. Tennant, *The Concept of Sin*, p. 245.
68. Wesley, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," pp. 44-45.
69. Henson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
70. D. E. Trueblood, *The Predicament of Modern Man* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 87.
71. Isaac Sharpless, "Friends, Society of," *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, IV.
72. E. S. Jones, *Abundant Living* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942), p. 255.
73. Bowne, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
75. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Faith*, pp. 233-34.
76. Drummond, *The Ideal Life*, pp. 6-8.

77. See F. N. D. Buchman, *Remaking the World* (abr. ed.; Washington: Moral Re-Armament, 1945).
78. E. S. Jones, *Is the Kingdom of God Realism?*, p. 80.
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
82. H. E. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Service* (New York: Association Press, 1922), p. 221.
83. *Ibid.*
84. H. R. Mackintosh, *The Christian Experience of Forgiveness* (London: Nisbit & Co., Ltd., 1927), p. 268.
85. *Ibid.* (italics mine).
86. Horace Bushnell, *Christian Nurture* (Rev. ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890), p. 10.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
90. Ephesians 6:4.
91. Bushnell, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
92. Even today, this liberalism is not wholly acceptable to neo-orthodox exponents of Christian rejectionism, and it is certainly not tenable in the view of forensic thought or of puritan rejectionist thought. Even in such a book as Emil Brunner's latest ethical treatise (*Justice and the Social Order*, trans. Mary Hottinger [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945]) the hierarchical conception of ethical relationships issues in a patriarchal view of the family, as Dr. John C. Bennett points out ("Book Reviews," *The Review of Religion*, XI [January, 1947], p. 193).
93. Jones, *Is the Kingdom of God Realism?*, pp. 181-82 (italics mine).
94. *Ibid.*, p. 282 (italics mine).

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Hans Prinzhorn, *Psychotherapy* (London: Cape, 1932), p. 329.
2. L. W. Grensted, *Psychology and God* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1931), p. 122.
3. H. S. Sullivan, "Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," *Psychiatry*, III (1940), 1-117, esp. pp. 46-48.
4. Dr. Carney Landis of the Columbia University Psychiatric Institute has defined psychotherapy as "the influencing of one mind by another mind with the intent of relieving mental pain, anguish, disorder, deviation, or illness by means of the spoken (or written) word"

("Psychotherapy and Religion," *The Review of Religion*, X [May, 1946], p. 413).

5. This quotation, the next one, and the description involved on this and the next two pages are Sullivan's. See *ibid.*, pp. 46-48.

6. Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1945), p. 32.

7. J. A. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals* (New York: R. M. McBride & Co., 1925), pp. 188-89.

8. "This conflict between help-seeking dependence and self-assertive rivalry has been found to be the nuclear conflict" in widely different types of mental illness, these psychiatrists declare. See Franz Alexander, T. M. French *et al.*, *Psychoanalytic Therapy* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1946), p. 4.

9. See C. G. Jung, "On Psychical Energy," *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, trans. H. G. and Cary F. Baynes (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1928), pp. 57-58.

10. See C. G. Jung, *The Integration of Personality* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), p. 27 among others.

11. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

12. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

13. Margaret Mead, "The Concept of Culture and the Psychosomatic Approach" (Paper presented to the Macy Foundation, New York, 1940), p. 10 (*italics mine*). The relationship between the culture and the family, so far as shaping influence upon the infant and child is concerned, may be said to be that in which the second is the *focus* of the first, the family is the "psychic agency" of the society. Among others who have revised the Freudian concept of relationship in consideration of cultural factors are Abram Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (1940); Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (1941), and "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," *American Sociological Review*, IX (1944); and Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (1937).

14. Erich Fromm, "Selfishness and Self-Love," *Psychiatry*, II (1939), p. 513.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 510-11.

17. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 27. This view does not deny the concept of dynamic psychology which we shall mention next: namely, that the individual can alter his basic attitudes. But it indicates one of the obstacles to alteration—*anxiety*. Neurotic trends are always in some sense aids to security as well as hindrances to it. Thus they are hard for the patient to surrender.

18. Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 515-16 (italics mine).
20. K. A. Menninger has clearly shown the vast variety of (psychic and somatic) forms which self-hate may take. See *Man Against Himself* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936).
21. Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 518. Fromm comments here: "It [love] has been made so empty that for many people *love* may mean no more than that two people have lived together for 20 years just without fighting more often than once a week."
22. *Ibid.*, p. 519.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 519-22.
24. See Fromm's analysis of the factors which induce character-conditioned hatred: "*The decisive factors . . . may be stated to be all the different ways by which spontaneity, freedom, emotional and physical expansiveness, the development of the 'self' of the child are blocked or destroyed.* The means of doing this are manifold; they vary from open, intimidating hostility and terror, to a subtle and 'sweet' kind of 'anonymous authority,' which does not overtly forbid anything but says: 'I know you will or will not like this or that'" (*ibid.*, p. 514).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 520.
26. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 47, n. 3.
27. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
28. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
29. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
30. *Ibid.* "All of us retain the capacity to change, even to change in fundamental ways, as long as we live. This belief is supported by experience" (*ibid.*).
31. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
32. Prinzhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
33. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.
34. This case history is a condensation of Case A, reported by Franz Alexander, in Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-65.
35. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 81-82.
36. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
38. So far as his dealings with the patient are concerned, the psychotherapist does not adhere to the principle that continuance in marriage is preferable to separation or divorce. It depends upon the individual and his circumstances. That this marriage could be continued is significant as one indication of the changed emotional climate in the home made possible by the husband's overcoming of hostility.
39. This case history is a condensation of Case B, reported by Franz Alexander, in Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-55.
40. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 71.

41. Possibility of acute paranoid condition led the therapist to outside investigation of the patient's claims to fame and ability. The therapist found that the patient had not exaggerated his standing or importance in his scientific field.

42. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

43. This case history is a condensation of Case I, reported by Dr. Catherine L. Bacon, in Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-20.

44. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 63. Horney describes this type of mental illness in chap. iii, "Moving Toward People."

45. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

46. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

47. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-17.

48. This case history is a condensation of Case M, reported by Dr. Margaret Wilson Gerard, in Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-67.

49. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

50. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

51. This case history is a condensation of "The Case of Herbert Bryan," presented *in toto*, as phonographically recorded, in Carl R. Rogers, *Counselling and Psychotherapy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942), pp. 261-437.

52. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 73-74.

53. Voyeurism: undue visual curiosity; especially, sexual pleasure derived from concentration upon seeing sexual organs.

54. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

55. "From a psychological point of view one may judge the client to be immature, because of the complete lack of any social feeling and the absence of any interest in, or regard for, the personality of the partner. From a moralistic point of view, one may evaluate the client as amoral in his attitudes and unconventional or even antisocial in his behaviour. But from a therapeutic point of view, such evaluations and judgments are not made. It is the therapist's function not to pass judgment, but to clarify and objectify the client's basic attitudes, in order that the client himself may decide whether they are in line with his own life goals. To take such an approach involves a deep respect for the autonomy and integrity of the individual. It involves belief in the right of each individual to self-determination" (*ibid.*, p. 327, n.).

56. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 414.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

62. *Ibid.*

63. This case history is a condensation of Case N, reported by Dr. Helen Vincent McLean, in Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-90.

64. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 79; 81.

65. While little was learned of the patient's childhood, the fact that she never had an intimate woman friend gives ground for believing that she had an unconscious fear of women. This would only have been increased by her conflict over having only female children. The fact that the daughter brought the mother for treatment, acting in a sense as a mother to her own mother, and the fact that the therapist was a respected and forgiving woman, combined to give the patient freedom and support to face her guilt honestly, yet with reasonable hope of continued acceptance.

66. This case history is a condensation of a case reported by Dr. Robert P. Knight, "Practical and Theoretical Considerations in the Analysis of a Minister," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, XXIV (1937), pp. 350-64.

67. Koch, *op. cit.*, II, 68.

68. Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," trans. W. D. Ross, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), Bk. IX, chap. iv.

69. C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939), pp. 39-40 (italics mine).

70. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-80.

71. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-17 (italics mine).

72. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

73. "Areas of Agreement in Psychotherapy," *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, X (1940), 700. This article is a resumé of therapists' views on the areas of agreement in psychotherapy, with a summary by Dr. Gardiner Murphy, chairman of the section, convened February 22, 1940, in Boston, as part of the 17th Annual Meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 698. Cf. pp. 708-709: Dr. Gardiner Murphy says that the analytical psychologist would add to Freud's formula this thought, at least for some persons, "Keep working at that synthetic, creative, partly spontaneous process of growth whereby each realizes his unique indivisible individuality." Recent trends in medical psychology reveal tendencies toward brief therapy, in which Freudian "complete analysis" is not attempted.

75. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

76. J. L. Liebman, *Peace of Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), pp. 53-54.

77. Horney, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-72.
78. "Areas of Agreement in Psychotherapy," p. 708.
79. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-34 (*italics mine*).
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 317-19 (*italics mine*).
81. In the case of hostility this facing of the patient with liberty and the necessity of making decisions is especially noticeable as a therapeutic technique.
82. L. J. Sherrill, *Guilt and Redemption* (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1945), p. 154 (*italics mine*).
83. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
84. Alexander and French, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
85. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.
86. Otto Rank declares that "instinct lifted into the ego sphere by consciousness is the power of will, and at the same time a tamed, directed, controlled instinct, which manifests itself freely within the individual personality, that is, creatively." See *Will Therapy and Truth and Reality* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1945), esp. p. 232.
87. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108 (*italics mine*).
88. Erich Fromm, "Faith as a Character Trait," *Psychiatry*, V (1942), p. 315 (*italics mine*).
89. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
90. "Areas of Agreement in Psychotherapy," p. 699.
91. Horney, *op. cit.*, chap. vi.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
94. See Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
95. See "Areas of Agreement in Psychotherapy," p. 709.
96. Gotthard Booth, "Anxiety Concerning Disease" (Paper discussed at Columbia University Seminar on Religion and Health, New York, November 13, 1946), p. 6. (Mimeographed.)
97. *Ibid.*; see, also, Prinzhorn, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-33.
98. This opinion is widespread today. See "Areas of Agreement in Psychotherapy," pp. 704-706, 708-709.
99. Booth, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.
100. Erich Fromm, "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," *American Sociological Review*, IX (1944), 382.
101. Fromm, "Selfishness and Self-Love," pp. 518-19.
102. Prinzhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
103. "Areas of Agreement in Psychotherapy," p. 708.
104. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 355.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 400 (*italics mine*).
106. Oskar Pfister, "What Transformations Does Psychoanalysis Require in Ethics and Moral Education?", *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, V (1931), p. 410.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 413.

108. Hadfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-57.

109. Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 413. Pfister adds that he is aware this view can be interpreted as leading to lax ethics. But his knowledge of the innumerable sacrifices resulting from uniform ethical requirements will not permit him to retreat from insistence on an individual and varied application of ethical principles, he declares. What is more, he says, this view is required in the name of the moral imperative. The command of Jesus, "Thou shalt be perfect" (Matthew 5:48), like the entire ethics of the sermon on the mount, is to be understood not as "command ethics," but as "ideal ethics." Understood imperatively it must break to pieces because of its actual impracticability. For who can be perfect in accordance with the standards of Jesus? (*ibid.*, p. 414).

110. *Ibid.*, p. 416.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. A. T. Boisen, *The Exploration of the Inner World* (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1936), p. 234.

2. Greek and Hebrew thought, and many representatives within the Christian tradition, witness in more or less veiled ways to the importance of self-acceptance. Aristotle is an unusually clear exponent of this idea.

3. Gregory Zilboorg, *Mind, Medicine, and Man* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943), p. 313.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

7. *Ibid.*

8. C. A. Wise, *Religion in Illness and Health* (2d ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), p. 168, see also *ibid.*, pp. 121-22.

9. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

10. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

11. S. M. Shoemaker, *How You Can Help Other People* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1946), p. 52.

12. Reported by Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. xvii.

13. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 136. Wise's whole treatment of the use and misuse of religious symbolism breaks new ground in the field of religion and health. He shows very clearly, on the basis of dynamic psychology, what crucial functions religious symbols serve and how they may be utilized more effectively in religious work.

14. *Ibid.*, chaps. viii-x.

15. H. L. Friess, "The Importance of Religion," *American Thought* 1947 (New York: The Gresham Press, Inc., 1947), p. 457.

16. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 204 (italics mine).
18. W. M. Horton, *A Psychological Approach to Theology* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931), p. 21.
19. Zilboorg, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
20. D. E. Roberts, "Theological and Psychiatric Interpretations of Human Nature," *Christianity and Crisis*, VII (February 3, 1947), p. 4.
21. Cf. Barth's statement: "Our real life in God consists in nothing else than our admitting to ourselves: we do not live in God, but far from him."
22. These are Barth's words.
23. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
24. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
25. Boisen, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-11.
26. "The Form of Government," *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.*, chap. i, sec. 1.
27. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
28. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
29. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
30. G. W. Allport, *The Roots of Religion* (Boston: Editorial Board Advent Papers, Church of the Advent, n.d.), p. 23.
31. G. J. Haye, *The Mass is Life* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1943), p. 18.
32. Zilboorg, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
33. Sigmund Freud, "Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams," *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, XXIV (1943), 73.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
37. Fromm, "Faith as a Character Trait," p. 315.
38. Zilboorg, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
41. A. C. Knudson, *The Doctrine of Redemption* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933), p. 160.
42. Zilboorg, *op. cit.*, p. 333.
43. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
44. Prinzhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
45. Rollo May discusses this response-effort pattern of psychotherapeutic experience in *The Springs of Creative Living* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1940), chap. ix.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

47. Boisen, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
48. Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
49. Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928), especially chap. viii. It is worth noting that Freud lived most of his long life in Vienna, in the atmosphere of ancient Catholic tradition. He seems to have known nothing of liberal Catholicism or of Protestantism (see Zilboorg, *op. cit.*, p. 309). Freud's later work on the Hebrew religion, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939) analyzed Hebrew prophetic religion in terms of this people's unresolved guilt feelings.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
51. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 278. It is interesting to note that Jung classifies himself as a left-wing Protestant (*ibid.*, p. 281), but that he finds far more Protestants than Catholics coming to him for psychotherapeutic treatment (*ibid.*, p. 264).
52. Andras Angyal, *Foundations for a Science of Personality* (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1941), p. 174.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 179-80.
55. The scope of this study does not include a critique of psychotherapeutic theory. However, it may be observed that the psychotherapists have tended to emphasize the principle of autonomy in personality development to the exclusion of the principle of heteronomy. This can only lead to a specious individualism which ignores that fact that the individual grows by wholeheartedly subsuming himself as well as by independently affirming himself.
56. G. K. Chesterton, *St. Francis of Assisi*, p. 39; quoted in Shoemaker, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
57. *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 273.
58. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
59. Boisen, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85.
60. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
61. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
62. Boisen, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
63. Boisen makes this suggestion; *ibid.*, pp. 278-79.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
67. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 275.
68. Wise, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
69. *Ibid.*

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